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•You adapt what you do to the circumstances of the
case, the will of the parties and the necessities."
Philip Noel-Baker

-iii-
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PREFACE
This study is an attempt to determine the Security
Council's effectivness in maintaining peace in a dispute of
the nature anticipated by the framers of the Charter.

The

Kashmir question is peculiarly adapted to such a study.
Great power rivalry has rarely intruded and the veto power
has not been a factor.

The duration of the dispute affords

an opportunity to observe Council adjustment to long-term
developments.

And the Council has employed various dispute-

settling devices in seeking a solution.
Although but one element in the broader India-Pakistan
question, the Kashmir issue initiated Council consideration
of the greater controversy and remains by far the most im
portant aspect.

The additional issues figure in the study

only where they are related directly to the Kashmir problem.
It is hoped that this investigation contributes to a
clearer understanding of Council capabilities.

In narrowing

the area of disagreement and in bringing the parties within
sight of a settlement, the Council has aided in forestalling
open hostilities between India and Pakistan.

Not the ultimate

answer to international strife, the Council may yet contribute
to peace, if only negatively by delaying war until martial
passions have cooled.
D. F. G.
-iv-
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUNDS
I
Each of the modern world's political phenomena is a
visible result of myriad influences, a web of complexities
clearly comprehended only in relation to all factors, past
and present, which affect it.

No problem in international

politics has exclusive origin in a specific date or isolated
incident*

Yet at some one point in the development of a

situation it may be possible to say that this event or this
date, while not the genesis, is of such significance that it
may serve as a logical beginning for a study of the problem.
There exists today a complicated and prolonged dispute, al
ready of almost five-years duration, between India and Pak
istan over possession of a political unit called Kashmir.
Many events were of great importance in the development of
the Kashmir dispute.

One stands out as marking something of

a critical point between the generation of a dangerous situ
ation over long centuries and the succession of incidents in
recent history that carried ancient sores to the point of
eruption.
On August 15, 1947, after three centuries of dominion
in India, Great Britain granted full powers of self-governSmg^
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-2to the provisional administrations of Pakistan and the Indian
Union.

Not least among the problems facing the young domin

ions during the first weeks of independence was the status,
present and future, of several hundred semiautonomous princi
palities which had been morticed with British-administered
provinces in the framework of the Indian Empire.

Theoretical

ly, liquidation of British suzerainty left the princely states
independent nations, free to remain independent or to seek
union with either India or Pakistan.

Their official position

had been one of alliance rather than subjugation to the Brit
ish Crown.

The practicalities of modern politics, however,

appeared to dictate early accession to whichever dominion a
given state was most closely associated with through geogra
phy, economy, and religion.

A majority of state governments

immediately sought accession; a few, including several of the
most important, did not.
Outstanding among the uncommitted states was Jammu
and Kashmir, coveted by India and Pakistan because of its
great size and its strategic and economic value.

Kashmir’s

maharaja. Sir Hari Singh,^ was still negotiating with both
dominions on the question of accession when, October 22, 1947,
an armed force entered the state from the direction of Paki
stan.

The onslaught shattered the weak state forces and

IColonel H. H. Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, 1895- , is
the fourth member of the Hindu Dogra dynasty, originally a
princely Rajput family in the service of the Sikhs, to rule
in Kashmir. A great grandson of the founder of the line,
Gulab Singh, Sir Hari Singh succeeded to the throne in 1925.
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-3upset Kashmir's political equilibrium*

Their identity was

not yet certain before the invaders were besieging Srinagar,
the capital*

Powerless to halt the incursion with the rem

nant of an army at his disposal, the maharaja pledged immedi
ate union with India in return for military aid in the defense
of his possessions.
The Indian government promptly accepted the offer and,
over bitter Pakistani protests, rushed contingents of the
Indian army to the aid of Srinagar's defenders.

Within days

India and Pakistan were close to open belligerency over ques
tions of the identity and supply sources of the invaders, the
legality of Kashmir's accession to India, and the religious
and political preferences of the state's inhabitants.

While

hostilities continued in Kashmir, the dominion governments
exchanged accusations, demands, and proposals, but two months
of negotiation distinguished by absence of any inclination
toward compromise failed to produce even a sign of agreement.
On January 1, 1948, India referred the dispute to the United
Nations Security Council, and Kashmir became a world problem.
II
Jammu and Kashmir is territorially the largest of the
Indian states although its 84,000 square miles are largely a
rugged and sparsely settled Himalayan mountain region.

Situ

ated at the northern tip of the former Indian Empire, the
state consists of nine provincial districts— Kathua, Jammu,
Udhampur, Mirpur, Riasi, Poonch, Kashmir South, Kashmir North,
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•4and Muzaffarabad— in the southwest; the eastern, semi-Tibetan
territories of Ladakh and Baltistan; and the northern tribu
tary areas of Gilgit, Gilgit Agency, Gilgit Wazarat, Chilas,
and the Tribal Territory.

Kashmir’s heart and its richest

district is the Vale of Kashmir which lies in the districts
of Kashmir North and Kashmir South.

Within the narrow confines

of this famous valley are Srinagar and over one-third of Kash^
mir’s four million people.

The Vale is the true prize at

dispute between India and Pakistan.

Kashmir’s southern and

western boundaries touch the Punjab provinces of India and
Pakistan and Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province,

Along

an undefined frontier in the north and east lie Afghanistan,
the Chinese provinces of Tibet and Sinkiang, and— perhaps—
the Soviet Union:
This is an undemarcated border of doubtful location
in wild tribal country, much of which is above the
clouds. The best maps show that a finger of China’s
Sinkiang Province intervenes between Kashmir and
Soviet territory, but the Indian Government under
stands. • • that Russian control begins where one
leaves Kashmir in the High Pamirs, on the Roof of
the World,2
Historically, Kashmir has faced the region that has
become Pakistan.

The cities of the Indus valley are natural

markets for the state’s timber, woodwork, woolens, and agri
cultural produce.3

The sole rail connection with the outside

^The New York X uûSlS.» December 1, 1947, The agreement
of Kabul between Russia and Great Britain in 1893 vaguely
drew boundaries in this region, Afghanistan acquired a nar
row panhandle across the top of India (Kashmir) which was
intended to meet a shorter extension from Chinese Sinkiang.
However, the latter was never clearly delimited.
^Government of Pakistan, Iba Story sd. Kashmir (New
York: Pakistan Delegation to the Security Council, 1951), p. 3,
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*5world is a spur line from Sialkot in West Punjab to Jammu and,
until recently, the only all-weather roads led to the West
Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province.

Four of the great

rivers of Pakistan, the Indus, the Jhelum, the Chenab, and the
Ravi, whose waters are lifeblood to irrigated areas in Paki
stan, rise in or flow through Kashmir.

At a number of sites

in the mountains of Kashmir the rivers offer possibilities
for hydroelectric developments which could balance Pakistan's
lack of coal.

For Pakistan, these are reasons why "the gov

ernance of all Kashmir by a potentially hostile India has been
4

a prospect too fearful to be borne."
»
The modern Kashmiri is a cousin of the Punjabi to the
south, although Ladakh, or Little Tibet, in the northeast is
inhabited by a small Mongol-Buddhist population.

Largely

peasants, the Kashmiris are predominantly Moslem with a Hindu
and Sikh minority, the latter a variant of Hinduism, concen
trated in Jammu, close to the Indian border.^
Kashmir's remoteness and mountainous topography enabled
it to enjoy a detached and solitary existence as an independent
Hindu state prior to the Moslem invasions of India,

Little

affected by the early Islamic incursions, beginning in
664 A.D., it at last fell under Moslem domination in the
^"Kashmir and Jammu," Round Table,XL (June, 1950),
p. 218. Pakistan has reason to fear Indian control of the
rivers. Partition gave India the headwaters of canal systems
irrigating West Punjab, India began to divert the waters to
its own Punjab regions, cutting off Pakistan's water supply.
^Government of Indian,
Kashmir IsSüg. (Delhi; Min
istry of Information and Broadcasting, n,d,j, pp« 1-2*
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fourteenth century and most of the population was forcibly
converted to Mohammedanism.

With the annexation of Kashmir

%» the Moguls In 1586, the Vale became the summer capital of
the Empire but by the middle of the eighteenth century a
measure of independence had returned.

As Mogul dominion wilt

ed before the expanding power of both British and Sikhs, the
governor of Kashmir began to exercise authority independently
of the capital at Delhi.*
Scarcely had autonomy been achieved before warlike
Pathans overwhelmed the Vale and established an independent
Moslem dynasty.

By 1800 the Sikhs had driven the Moguls from

the Punjab and in 1819 they wrested Kashmir from the Pathans,
only to lose it to the British in 1846 following the first
7
Sikh war.
Uninterested at the time in their acquisition,
the British, In the Treaty of Amritsar, ceded the Vale to
8
Gulab Singh, a Hindu of the Dogra sect and ruler of the small
principality of Jammu under Sikh suzerainty, v/ho offered to
pay the 7,5 million-rupee indemnity (about $2,250,000) levied
upon the defeated Sikhs.

Already in control of the Ladakh

and Baltistan areas bordering the Vale, Gulab Singh consoliFitzGerald-Lee, "Kashmir," CjBntg.mp9r.ary Review.
CLXXIX (February, 1951), p. 93.
7sir William Barton, "Pakistan’s Claim to Kashmir,"
FOieAan A£faix.,S» XXVIII (January, 193), pp. 299-300.
®Gulab Singh, a Rajput chieftain raised to high
office under the Sikhs, received the principality of Jammu
from the Sikh leader Ranjit Singh. After the Battle of
Sabraon concluded the first Sikh war, in which he was neutral,
Gulab Singh was a spokesman for the Sikhs in arranging peace
with the British,
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-7dated his territories, transferred his capital to Srinagar,
and established the modern ruling house on the soil of Kash
mir.
The Dogra administration followed a typically auto
cratic pattern.

The household expenses and privy purse of

the maharaja consumed approximately one-third of the state
revenue while public services were ignored.

Dogras and royal

favorites, almost invariably Hindu, filled government posi
tions and exclusively controlled the militia; the Moslem
peasant population was forbidden arms of any description.
The prime ministers, usually Hindu Punjabis, were non-Kash
miris and a few Dogra nobles possessed most of the land in
large feudal grants:
Against the discontent which the perpetuation of
an antiquated land system and arbitrary rule in
evitably aroused, the Dogra regime was explicitly
safeguarded by its peculiar relation to the imper
ial authorities. Together with the other princely
states which had helped the British" put down the
famous ^êpoy Rebellion of 1857, Kashmir came to be
treated as an especially valuable prop of empire.?
An uprising in 1930 was the first serious attempt to
temper the maharaja's power.

Despite aid from the British in

suppressing the rebellion, the prince was compelled to concede
elementary civil liberties and to establish a legislature of
limited powers.

In the new atmosphere of relative freedom.

^Alice Thorner, "Issues in Kashmir," Far Eastern
Survey. XVII (August 11, 1948), p. 174. Two Indian spokes
men, Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Sir Senegal Narsing Rau, in
Council discussions on the Kashmir question were at one
time prime ministers of Kashmir.
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"•8*"
Sheikh Mohammed

A b d u l l a h ,

@ young Moslem educated In India,

founded the All-Jammu and Kashmir Moslem Conference which,
although linked with the nonsectarian Congress party In India,
was conceived as a defender of Moslem rights.

In 1938 Jawa

harlal Nehru,H a close personal friend, advised Sheikh
Abdullah to open the ranks of the Conference to all Kashmiris,
Irrespective of caste or religion.

The organization, renamed

the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, soon became an
Important force In Kashmir’s politics.

Its sole rival, save

for the maharaja’s personalized government, was an exclusively
Moslem party formed when a few of the original members split
with Sheikh Abdullah.

The Moslems revived the old name and

followed the political lead of the conservative and communalminded Moslem League In India.

But in Kashmir, as well as

throughout India, Sheikh Abdullah was recognized as the state’s
outstanding popular leade r. W he n, In a memorandum to the
lOshelkh Mohammed Abdullah, 1905- , Is the son of a
craftsman from the village of Soura near Srinagar. After
working his way through the University of Allgarth In India,
he returned to Kashmir to find success In a professional
field virtually Impossible for a Moslem. His original Moslem
Conference was Intended as a rallying point for advocators
of Moslem rights.
llpandlt Jawaharlal Moll Ata Nehru, 1889- , Is of
Kashmiri descent himself. Educated In England, he entered
politics in 1918 as secretary of the Home-Rule League In
Allahabad. He joined the Congress party In 1920, gaining
recognition as the leader of the Socialist wing. A member of
the viceroy’s council In 1939, Nehru was vice-president and
minister of external affairs In the interim government of
1946. He has been prime minister and minister of foreign
affairs of the Indian Union since 1947. In 1946 he was for
bidden entry to Kashmir to defend Sheikh Abdullah, on trial
for agitating against the maharaja’s government.
l^Thorner, JsiSi* £il*
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British cabinet mission of 1946, he denounced the Treaty of
Amritsar and intitiated a "Quit Kashmir!" campaign against
the maharaja, the prince reacted promptly by arranging the
Sheikh's seventh imprisonment at a moment when unrest in
Kashmir was about to erupt in violence,
Modern communications had begun to penetrate the moun
tain principality, destroying the isolation which in the past
had enabled it to remain somewhat aloof from the political
currents of the Indian plains.

Despite the desires of its

ruler, Kashmir could not avoid the effects of the drive for
independence which threw all India into turmoil,
Born with the commercial activities of the East India
Company in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, British
dominion in India was consolidated after steady military and
political conquest routed all rivals— Moguls, French, and
Sikhs,

With the formal assumption of the government of India

by the Crown in 1858, British political control of the sub
continent was established in a pattern that was to endure
until 1947,

The Indian Empire was a conglomeration of British

provinces, under the direct rule of the Crown, and of many
native states, nominally independent and allied rather than
subjugated to the imperial authority.

The viceroy and his

council were the autocratic apex of this political community.
Desire for representation on the viceregal council and for
eventual self-government produced the Indian nationalist
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-10raovement.

But with nationalism came the theory of communal-

ism, belief in the incompatability of the Hindu and Moslem
communities, which was encouraged by the British with the
hope of retarding the growth of nationalism through interfactional strife,14
The first of the great independence parties, the
Indian National Congress, was established in 1885.15 At
first it drew support from both major religions, but in 1906
arch-conservative Moslem landlords and princes, hostile to
the radical tendencies of Congress, withdrew to form the AllIndia Moslem League, the oldest of parties based on communal16
ism.
However, religious differences had not yet assumed
sufficient importance to prevent Congress and League from co
operating in the early years of the struggle for self-govern
ment,

Together they worked for provincial popular administra

tions and for admission of Indian members to the viceroy’s
council.

Although unity frayed perceptibly during this per

iod, a serious split did not come^until the passage of the
Parliamentary Act of 1935,1? designed to provide the provinces
with considerable self-government while retaining British

JEax

l^Daniel Thorner, "Hindu-Moslem Conflict in India,"
Surxsy, xvii (April 7, 1948), p. 77.

15sir Verney Lovett, A HislQry
lh& ladi# Hâlimxallst Movement (New York; Frederick A Stokes, 1920;, p. 34,
l^Henrv Noel Brailsford, Subject India (New York:
John Day, 1943), p. 100,
1?H. G. Rawlinson, "Backgrounds: II India," Spectator.
CLXXVIII (April 2 5 , 1 9 4 7 ), p . 4 5 9 .
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*11control of the central administration.

India was to be a

federation with a relatively weak central government exer
cising powers of foreign affairs, defense, and communications.
The princely states would enjoy an autonomous status in the
union.

Despite its broad concessions to popular government,

the plan was acceptable to neither the League nor Congress.
The Moslems, fearing that the central authority would be dom
inated by the more numerous Hindus, insisted that the federal
government be further weakened by being denied specifically
the power of taxation.

Congress saw the federal administra

tion as already too weak and demanded that it be given greater
powers.

Nevertheless, the portions of the act relating to the

provinces were implemented and discussion on the eventual
form of the central government was still in process when, in
1939, a world war introduced a new factor into the drive for
independence.
While the British government Concentrated on the
succession of catastrophes in Europe, unrest in India increas
ed.

The British offered first a vague "after-the-war" promise

of greater self-government, then dispatched the Cripps mis
sion^® with an offer of a dominion-status post-war government
based on the act of 1935 in return for a truce on political
activity during the war.

In rejecting the Cripps proposal,

c I S f h e Cabinet mission of 1942 was headed by Sir
Stafford Cripps, a leading Labor party spokesman and minister
of filtrait production in Britain’s wartime coalition min
istry.
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-12Congress leader Mohandas K. Gandhi^^ termed it *a post-dated
cheque on a tottering bank which might come back with the
endorsement, *No e f f e c t s * . T h e British met the subsequent
disturbances by imprisoning the Congress leadership for the
remainder of the war emergency, leaving the League free to
extend its power.

The Moslems gained control of a number of

provincial governments and spoke out more clearly for an in
dependent Moslem state, Pakistan, an aim first formulated In
the Lahore Resolution of 1940.21
Following conclusion of European hostilities, Britain's
new Labor government turned to implementing a campaign pledge
of Indian independence.

The Cabinet mission of 1946 offered

Congress, the League, and the princes a complex plan for a
federated dominion of India, based on the act of 1935 but pro
viding for voluntary "grouping" of provinces in smaller
19
Mohandas Karamchand G«ndhi, 1869-1948, was universal
ly regarded as the living spirit of Indian independence. Soon
after entering politics, Gandhi became the leading political
and spiritual spokesman of the Congress party, formulating his
anti-British policy of passive noncooperation in 1919. He
advocated home rule, the revival of home industries, agrarian
reform, and inter-religion harmony and was an intransigent
foe of partition. He was assassinated in 1948 by a member of
a fanatical Hindu group advocating violence against Moslems.
2*^Brailsford, p. 52.
2ijhe Lahore Resolution demanded independent status
for provinces in which Moslems were in the majority— Sind,
Baluchistan, Northwest Frontier Province, and the Punjab, all
in the northwest, and Bengal in the east. The first three
were overwhelmingly Moslem but Punjab was only 57,1 per cent
Moslem and Bengal but 54.7 per cent. (Dr. O. H. K. Spate,
"Partition of India and the Prospects of Pakistan." Geographic
Review. XXXVIII, January, 1948, p. 6.)
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*•13“
federations within the All-India U n i o n , T h e Moslem League
recognized the proposal as the essence, if not the letter, of
Pakistan and accepted.

However, when Congress rejected the

plan because of the weakness of the central government, the
League announced that no longer would it consider compromises;
henceforth its single goal was an independent Pakistan.
With the failure of the Cabinet mission, new disturb
ances, this time of an ominous religious character, broke out
in the Punjab and Bengal,

On February 20, 1947, Whitehall

aggravated an already tense atmosphere by announcing its in
tention of withdrawing from India in the near future, despite
the inability of Congress and League to agree upon the struc
ture of an independent state.

The complete British program,

made public on June 3, guaranteed Pakistan's existence for
"it is clear that any constitution. • . cannot apply to those
parts of the country which are unwilling to accept it."23
There was also a reference to the princes;
His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear
that the decisions announced above relate only
to British India and that their policy toward
the Indian States contained in thè Cabinet Mis
sion of May 12, 1946, remains u n c h a n g e d , 24
It appeared that the British government was underwriting the
autonomy and powers of the princes in any Indian federation
which might be constructed.
22s, Chandrasekhar, "Freedom for India?" far Eastern
Survey^ XV (July 3, 1946), p. 198,
23»British White Paper on India," Current History,
XIII (July, 1947), pp. 36-38.
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-14Sprawled across the face of India were 562

25

princely

states, accounting for one-half the area and one-fourth the
population of the entire sub-continent and ranging in size
and wealth from giant Kashmir and Hyderabad to midgets with
half the acreage of Central Park:
Many of these States have roots so deeply estab
lished in the soil that the time of their seeding
is lost in the mist of old tradition. They were
in India before a Muslim set foot on Indian soil
east of the Indus, before the first European
ship cast anchor in the water of an Indian bay,
before Queen Elizabeth signed a charter for trade
in the East Indies, and centuries before the
first political party in India was born,26
The exact political status of the states was, to some
extent, a mystery even to the British,

Prior to the Crown's

assumption of the Indian government, relations between the
princes and the East India Company had been governed by a web
of treaties which recognized, in varying degrees, the "sover
eignty" of each potentate.

In the proclamation of 1858, Queen

Victoria promised scrupulously to maintain the engagements,27
In return, the princes ceded to the Crown control of their
foreign affairs, communications, and defense and recognized
the paramountcy of the Crown:
2^The exact number of states was uncertain, varying
from under four hundred to nearly seven hundred according to
the definition of "sovereign" since some states were feuda
tories of others. The compromise figure adopted by the
Political Office of the Government of India was 562. Many of
the "states" were such by courtesy only for most of the smallei
units were nonviable economically and politically,
2^Sir Geoffrey F. de Montmorency, The Indian States any
Indian Federation (Cambridge University Press, 194^, p. 17.
p. 47.
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-15The doctrine of paramountcy. . . in very general
terms may be said to be the taking of action by
the British authority for the common weal in a
direction not specifically covered by treaty or
engagement. • .28
The resultant legal position of the princes was compli
cated and often contradictory.

Their states were not British

territory nor were their subjects British subjects, although
they were British-protected persons.

The authority of the

rulers in state internal affairs was wide but in all cases
limited by relationship to the paramount power:
The States are equally entitled to British pro
tection and defence from aggression and to an
effective guarantee of survival and integrity.
In the territories of the States British-lndian
law does not apply. The British-lndian Central
and Provincial legislatures have no power to
legislate in regard to the affairs or subjects of
the States: and the High Courts and chief courts
of British India have no jurisdiction in their
territories.29
This "Indian India" considered itself in direct alliance with
the occupant of the British throne and was held together by
the common headship of the viceroy, vAxo "as Governor-General
• • , presided over the Government of India and as Crown
Representative# • . exercised paramountcy over the States.
The Office of Political Affairs in New Delhi administered of
ficial relations between the viceroy and the states.
Both parties viewed the arrangement with satisfaction.
Buttressed by British power, the princes rested secure in
p. 55,
p. 15.
Percivai Griffiths, "Struggle for Stability,"
i2til CÊûtUXÏ, CXLIV (July, 1948), p. 11.
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“■16’
”
their autocratic privileges and became Britain*s most loyal
supporters; "they look like Indians, but are in fact the body
guard of the British Viceroy."31

To Whitehall, the states

were island fortresses, the strongest props of the empire,
as their loyalty during the Sepoy Mutiny and two world wars
proved.

Canning thought them the surest guarantee ofBritish

powerÏ
It was long ago said. . . that if we made all
India into zillahs (or British Districts) it was
not in the nature of things that our Empire
should last fifty years; but that if we could
keep up a number of native states without politi
cal power but as royal instruments, we should
exist in India as long as our naval supremacy
was maintained. Of the substantial truth of
this opinion I have no doubt. • ,32
The system was all too effective.

While the nation

alist movement forced concessions in British India, the states
remained autocratic, frozen in the nineteenth century.

As

late as 1940 only twenty-three boasted some type of consulta
tive assembly, and in only one^3 did responsible self-govern
ment exist:
The depth of the loyal feeling of the Princes is
now an Immutable fact, which has to be reckoned
with. . . This sentiment in the case of the Princes
has had a tangible result in the fact that the cry
for an independent India, so often voiced by the
Congress extremist, falls on deaf ears in the
States and makes no appeal whatever to their
rulers.3^
S^Brailsford, p. 130,
32%bid.. pp. 14-15.
33Aundh, in the Deccan area of south-central India.
34ue Montmorencyt p. 76.
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-17The official British view of paramountcy was that it
would lapse upon withdrawal, not devolve upon successor gov
ernments,

The principalities would become completely inde

pendent with the choice of acceding to either dominion or of
remaining independent.

The rulers themselves held this view;

The States demand that without their own agree
ment the rights and obligations of the Paramount
Power should not be assigned to persons who are
not under its control, for instance an Indian
Government in British India responsible to an
Indian legislature,35
The Moslem League leader, Mohammed All Jinnah,^^ indirectly
supported this interpretation when he stated that a state's
ruler possessed full power of accession to whichever dominion
he preferred with no obligation as a result of geography or
devolution of sovereignty,3?

Nehru, speaking for Congress,

rejected the theory of lapsed paramountcy and insisted that
the people of the states, through plebiscites, should possess
the ultimate power of accession;
And here let me make it clear that it has been our
policy all along that where there is a dispute
about the accession of a state to either Dominion,
the decision must be made by the people of that
p. 96.
36Mohammed All Jinnah, 1 8 7 6 -1 9 4 8 , the Quaid-E-Aram
(Great Leader) of India's Moslems and a lawyer by profession,
joined the Moslem League after differing with the policies of
the Indian National Congress, He participated in the London
conferences of 1 9 3 0 -3 2 which led to the Act of 1935, In 1940
Jinnah announced the Moslem goal of an independent state. In
1947 he became the first governor-general Of Pakistan,
3*7Alice Thorner, "The Kashmir Conflict," Middle
£.a.st J g u m a l» m
(January, 1 9 4 9 ), p . 1 8 .
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-18state.38
The controversy remained somewhat academic until, in
June, 1947, the British cabinet announced that the June, 1949
withdrawal deadline would be anticipated by ten months.

Prob

lems of partition, paramountcy, and accession became immedi
ate.

Religious riots broke out in the Punjab and Bengal, two

provinces scheduled to be split in the partition.

The bound

aries of the new dominions were traced according to a hastily
drafted partition plan and, while native Indian administra
tions began to exercise governmental functions, the princes
were presented with an Instrument of Accession which provided
for union with the appropriate dominion on defense, external
affairs, and communications only.

The majority of states soon

ratified accession treaties but the two largest, Kashmir and
Hyderabad, asked more time in which to reach a decision.
Following August 15, Independence Day for the new
dominions of Pakistan and the Indian Union, Kashmir’s Hindu
maharaja played and failed at statecraft. Lord Louis Mount39
batten,
while still viceroy of a united India, had journeyed
to Srinagar but had been unable to persuade Sir Hari Singh to
accept union with either dominion.

In August Kashmir conclud

ed a standstill agreement with Pakistan, providing for
Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence a M
John Day, 1950), p. 57.

(New York:

39Louis Mountbatten of Burma, 1st Viscount, 1900- ,
a grandson of Queen Victoria, was educated at Cambridge and
soon thereafter began a military and naval career. He was
supreme allied commander in southeast Asia, 1943-46; viceroy
of India in 1947; and first governor-general of India in 1947
and *48,
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continuation of economic and administrative relations on a
pre-independence basis, and began to negotiate a similar pact
with India,

But the time for expedients was running out.

Moslem peasants in the districts of Poonch and Muzaffarabad
were restive.

Refugees from the horrors of the Punjab

massacres fled across the border into Jammu, carrying with
them the hates and fears of communal bloodshed.

Despite the

standstill agreement, the necessary supplies were not forth
coming from Pakistan.

The Kashmiri government took vigorous

measures to counteract outside pressure;
In quick succession all voices in Kashmir pleading
for accession to Pakistan were silenced; newspapers
Y/ere censored or shut down, journalists were in
terned, and finally the Kashmir State Assembly was
prorogued to prevent further criticism of the
State Government
When open revolt erupted among the Moslem peasants
of Poonch and Muzaffarabad, the maharaja, in a final attempt
to prevent the toppling of his throne, released Sheikh Ab
dullah and empowered him to negotiate with Karachi and New
Delhi.
Moslem

Jinnah inflexibly demanded that Moslem Kashmir join
Pakistan.41

Nehru's reaction was confused, handicapped

as he was by his previous assertion that the people, not the
ruler, should decide the accession of a state.
In October the Pakistani press reported the establish
ment of an Azad (Free) Kashmir provisional government at
40AlicG Thorner, "Conflict," p. 21.
41l o c . cit. At Lahore in September an agent of Sheikh
Abdullah was informed that Pakistan would not support an accès*
sion plebiscite unless the conference voted solidly for Paki
stan.
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-20Rawalpindi In West Punjab and various Moslem organizations be
gan warning the maharaja not to accede to India.

The Kashmiri

government countered by speeding work on a new road connecting
Jammu with India's East Punjab.

Pakistan protested the

"brutal" suppression of the uprising among the Moslems of
Poonch and Kashmir replied with a detailed list of charges
against Pakistan, including econpmic blockade and infiltration
of armed r a i d e r s . O n October 21, the Pakistani prime minis
ter, Liaquat All Khan,^^ rejected the accusations and again
warned against accession to India.
The following morning large armed bands crossed the
Pakistani border into Kashmir and seized the frontier town of
Muzaffarabad on the road to Srinagar.
ernment staged a dramatic reappearance.

The Azad Kashmir gov
It identified the

raiders as Azad troops and began issuing communiques from
Pulandri in western Kashmir:
The united will of the people has overcome
the organized violence of the ruler's armies and
he and his so-called Prime Minister have fled
from Kashmir and will perhaps soon flee from
Jammu as well.
The Provisional Government entertains sentiments
of the utmost friendliness and good will toward
^^The New York Times. October 21, 1947. The note
further declared:
"If unfortunately this request is
notheed
ed, the Government fully hopes. • • Pakistan would agree that
it would be justified in asking for friendly assistance to
oppose trespass on its fundamental rights."
^^Liaquat Ali Khan, 1895-1951, was a member of a Pun
jabi family of Persian descent. Educated in law in India and
England, he devoted most of his time to politics, joining the
Moslem league in 1923, The first Indian finance minister in
the interim government of 1946, in 1947 Liaquat Ali Khan be
came Pakistan's first prime minister, serving as such until
his assassination in 1951.
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-21the neighboring dominions of India and Pakistan»
The question of the accession of Jammu and
Kashmir to either dominion can be decided only
by a free vote of the people in the foimi of a
referendum.44
As the raiders, later identified as Pathan tribesmen
from the Northwest Frontier Province, neared Srinagar, the
maharaja sought aid from New Delhi.

Negotiations resulted in

the accession of Kashmir to India on October 27, although the
agreement specifically stated that the union was to be regard45
ed as conditional until settled by a referendum.
Within
hours Indian troops were on the way to Srinagar by air to pre
vent the fall of the city.

In accordance with a commitment

reluctantly made by the maharaja. Sheikh Abdullah was asked
to head an emergency administration.
Accession transformed Kashmir's difficulty into an
open clash between India and Pakistan,

Moslem spokesmen termed

the maharaja's action "treachery" while the Pakistani govern
ment refused to recognize the union:
In the opinion of the Government of Pakistan, the
accession of Kashmir is based on fraud and violence.
The sending of Indian troops to Kashmir under cover
of its accession further intensified and inflamed
the feelings of the tribes,4®
The prime minister of the Northwest Frontier Province declared
that Kashmir rightfully belonged to Pakistan and appealed to
"every Moslem in Pakistan to prepare to face the situation
44%tia

York liffiâi» October 25, 1947,

4^SC Official Recordsf 3rd Year, 227th Meeting,
pp. 18-19,
ÜÊU ü a t Times. October 31, 1947.
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created by India’s invasion of

K a s h m i r . "4?

Mew Delhi’s view was equally uncompromising.

Al

though final settlement was conditional upon a plebiscite,
accession was valid,

Kashmir thus had become an integral

part of Inula defended by Indian troops and the invasion of
the state was a violation of Indian territory.

In mid-Novem

ber Nehru announced that India possessed evidence proving
that the entire affair had bean organized by the Pakistani
government;
They helped the tribesmen, • , to collect,
they supplied thèla with lorries, with petrol and
with officers. They are continuing to do so, • •
It is obvious that no large body of men and armed
groups cculd cros« Pakistan territory without the
good will, connivance and active help of author
ities there. It is impossible to escape the con
clusion that the raids on Kashmir were carefully
planned and well-organized by Pakistan authorities
with the deliberate object of seizing the state by
force and then declaring accession to Pakistan,
This was an act of hostility not only to Kashmir
but to the Indian U n i o n . 4 8
Before the advent of winter severed land communication
between Kashmir and India, Indian troops had clëared the Vale
but the Azad government and its adherents retained control of
areas near the Pakistani border.

They continued to receive

supplies and it was reported^^ that in addition to tribesmen
47jj|2idl., November 26, 1947,
^^Ibid,, November 26, 1947,
49ibid.^ January 29, 1948, The source of this report
was Russell K, Haight, a 25-year-old ex-GI from New York who
served two months as a brigadier general in the Azad forces,
Indian representatives repeatedly referred to Haight’s testi
mony during the Security Council debates on Kashmir,
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-23and Kashmiris» the forces consisted of Pakistani nationals
and some regular Pakistani troops— on leave, Karachi said.
New Delhi charged that the raiders retired to bases in Paki
stan following large-scale sorties.

Indian forces could not

drive the invaders from Kashmir without attacking these bases.
To do so would create an international incident.
Both India and Pakistan professed a desire to reach a
settlement but negotiations failed to produce an agreement,
partially as a result of the fanatic and emotional political
climates in both nations which precluded any compromise.
Karachi, while admitting that the tribesmen had crossed Paki
stan to reach Kashmir, denied that official Pakistani sources
had or were aiding them.

And Pakistan would be bound fay the

result of a plebiscite only after all forces, Indian as well
as tribal, had been withdrawn from Kashmir.
the

position that a referendum was not

India had taken

possible until "order

had been restored"— that is, not until Indian troops garrisoned
the entire state:
We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ulti
mately to be decided by the people. That pledge
we have given. • . not only to the
people of Kash
mir but to the world. We will not
and cannot back
out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and
order have been established to have a referendum
held under international auspices liketthe United
Nations. We want it to be a fair and just refer
ence to the people and we shall accept thei» ver
dict. I can imagine no fairer or juster offer.50
Pakistan's delicate internal balance made any move
toward compromise extremely hazardous since the government's
50Nehru, p. 59.
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-24control over the wild tribes of the Northwest Frontier, the
provocateurs of the Kashmir incident, was tenuous to say the
least.

The tribesmen never had acknowledged an overlord—

Mogul, Afghan, or British— and they were even less likely to
surrender meekly to the demands of the new-born Pakistani
government.

The British had exerted what control, through

subsidies and punitive expeditions, as was necessary to pre
vent the tribes from raiding the cities of the Indus valley
but otherwise had left the tribes much to themselves.Paki
stan could not maintain the high British subsidies, neither
did it possess sufficient military strength to administer
the tribes forcibly.

Karachi

would bind the Pathans to the

hoped that a common
new Moslem state.

religion

Kashmir, pre

sented as a Hindu conspiracy to oppress Moslems with the
additional prospect of loot for the "liberators," could be of
use in such a program.

And there was always the possibility

that if Pakistan curbed the tribes in Kashmir, they would
turn on the rich cities of the Punjab;
If Pakistan is to prevent the tribes by force of
arms from infiltrating Into Kashmir, the area
of conflict will extend, not diminish. Pakistan
will have a major war on her hands in her own
territory. Is Pakistan, then, to fight against
the tribesmen on her own territory in order to
help India’s conquest of Kashmir and to prevent
her people from joining Pakistan?52
51"Pakistan and the Tribes," Round Table. XXXIX (Septem
ber, 1949), p. 332.
52The New York Times,. February 6, 1948, The quotation
is an excerpt from a letter written by Col, Majeed Malik, a
member of the Pakistani delegation to the Security Council.
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-25The Indian case, saturated with the theory and the practice
of international law, would not admit the applicability of
such an argument,
Fanatically clinging to their contradictory views,
the dominions moved toward war in the weeks immediately fol
lowing invasion and accession.

But the voice of Great Britain,

rapidly fading to a whisper in Indian political life, proved
yet sufficiently audible to forestall an open clash.

With

Pakistani and Indian armies still officered largely by Britons,
the supreme command of United Kingdom personnel in both forces
rested with British Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck,53
who informed Karachi and New Delhi that British officers
would resign rather than be involved in "a fratricidal Indian
conflict,"

Simultaneously British officers were ordered not

to participate in Indian operations in Kashmir.
averted in October, threatened in December.

But war,

The quarreling

dominions, discouraged by the futility of bilateral negotia
tion, began to look for another jnethod through which to
achieve a settlement,
III
Neither Karachi nor New Delhi overlooked the possibil
ity of a third party contributing its good offices.

That

this party might be the Commonwealth of Nations was, however,
^^Fielci Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, 1884- , has
devoted hi« military career to the East, serving in the
Punjab, Egypt, Aden, and Mesopotamia. He was commander of
British Middle Eastern forces, 1941-42; in India, 1943-47;
and of Indian and Pakistani forces in 1947,
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unacceptable to Nehru:
The Commonwealth might have been considered as
some kind of a superior body which sometimes
acts as a tribunal, or judges, or in a sense
supervises the activities of its member nations,
that certainly would have meant a diminution in
our independence and sovereignty, if we had once
accepted that principle. Therefore, we were not
prepared and we are not prepared to treat the
Commonwealth as such or even to bring disputes
between member nations of the Commonwealth before
the Commonwealth b o d y . 5 4
But on November 3, Nehru suggested that the promised plebiscite
might be conducted "under international auspices like the
United Nations,"55

week later, the Azad government pro

posed that the United States or the United Nations send ob
servers to Kashmir to "testify to the justification" of the
struggle against the Hindu maharaja.5&

(ki November 17,

Liaquat Ali Khan publicly favored asking the United Nations
to send representatives.5? Yet despite apparent agreement on
the acceptability of the United Nations, India's unilateral
communication to the Security Council roused Pakistan to
expressions of violent chagrin.
On January 1, 1948 the Indian government informed
58
Council President Fernand van Langenhove
of Belgium of the
5^Nehru, p. 274,
55%h& New York Times. November 3, 1947,
56ibid.. November 9, 1947.
57lbld., November 17, 1947.
5®Pernand van Langenhove, 1889- , has been Belgium's
permanent representative to the United Nations since 1946, A
former delegate to the League of Nations, he represented
Belgium at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization in 1945,
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-27existence of a dispute covered by Article 3559 of the United
Nations Charter:
A situation now exists* • . owing to the aid
which invaders, consisting of nationals of
Pakistan* •
are drawing from Pakistan for
operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State
which had acceded to the Dominion of India and
is a part of India. • * The Government of India
request the Security Council to call upon Paki
stan to put an end immediately to the giving df
such assistance, which is an act of aggression
against India* If Pakistan does not do so, the
Government of India may be compelled, in self
defence, to enter Pakistan territory, in order
to take military action against the invaders*®0
Van Langenhove immediately urged both governments "to
refrain from any step incompatible with the Charter and liable
to result in an aggravation 6f the situation* . *"&!

On Janu

ary 3, Pakistan replied that its case would be presented to
the Council by Foreign Minister Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan*^^
The initial presentation of arguments was scheduled for
January 6*
Two approaches to the dispute were open to the
59section 1 of Article 35 states that: "Any member
of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation
of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of
the Security Council or of the General Assembly." Article 34:
"The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any sit
uation which might lead to international friction or give
rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continu
ance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security."
Official figfiarsi&t 3rd Year, Supp* for Nov.,
1948, S/628, p. 139.
Gljbld.. 226th Meeting, p. 4.
62$ir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, 1893- , has been
Pakistani minister of foreign affairs since 1947. He served
as president of the Moslem League in 1931 and on the viceroy's
council, 1935-41,
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-28Councll*

It might accept the Indian point of view that the

issue was purely one of international law and that consequently the Council should function as a judicial tribunal.

An

affirmative decision on the validity of the Indian charges
would probably result in branding Pakistan as an aggressor.
Or the Council might ignore the technicalities of formal re
lations among nations and recognize that, no matter which
side the rules favored, there existed a situation in which
both parties held an understandable interest; a satisfactory
solution would have to be one that was acceptable to both.
Solution of the Kashmir question, of great importance
to the parties immediately concerned, would be of scarcely
less significance to the Security Council itself.

An answer

would indicate that the Council might yet be able to function
successfully in a situation relatively uncomplicated by great
power rivalry, that, if given the opportunity, it might be
able to function as had been intended when the outline of an
international security agency had been traced.

The New York

Times noted this aspect of the dispute:
If the Big Five can agree on a proper procedure,
perhaps for the holding of a supervised plebiscite,
the Council's prestige, badly damaged by the veto
controversy, may be repaired. For the Council's
purpose, as outlined in the Charter, is not to
quarrel but to settle quarrels,63
63fhe New York Times. January 4, 1948,
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CHAPTER II
COMPLAINT, COUNTER-COMPLAINT
I
The Kashmir question made its initial appearance on
the Security Council agenda on January 6, 1948.

Five meetings

and seemingly endless debates later, on January 20, the Coun
cil had sketched a pattern for future action.

The shaping of

an approach to the problem could be discerned in procedures
adopted for consideration of the question, the votes on and
significance of two resolutions, and the attitudes of the
Council members themselves.

States represented on the Council

were Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France,
Syria, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.

The first indication of alignments, or lack of such,

followed Pakistan's request, on January 6, for a two-week
postponement to permit better preparation of its case.
Paris el-Khouri^ of Syria gave Pakistan full support.

Only
The

remaining Council members were either noncommittal or dis
played marked uniformity in opposing a delay in excess of one
Iparis el-Khouri, 1879- , entered the Syrian govern
ment in 1918. Prime minister during 1944-45, he attended the
San Francisco conference in 1945 and has participated in
several Arab League congresses.
-29-
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-30week.

Succeeding meetings bore out this first impression of

a Council attitude relatively uncomplicated by great-power
rivalry.
When the Council turned to consideration of the Indian
complaint, it found a case rigidly bound to the theory and
practice of international law,

India called attention to the

existence of a dispute endangering international peace and
security, a dispute engendered by Pakistan's alleged aid to
the invaders of Kashmir.

The "facts" of the situation led to

certain "indisputable* conclusions:
(a) That the invaders are allowed transit
across Pakistan;
(b) That they are allowed to use Pakistan
territory as a base of operations;
(c) That they include Pakistan nationals;
(d) That they draw much of their military
equipment, transportation and supplies (includ
ing petrol) from Pakistan; and
(e) That Pakistan officers are training,
guiding, and otherwise actively helping them,2
Pakistan's attitude in refusing to negotiate on these points
not only was unneutral, "but constitutes active aggression
against India, of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir forms
a part."3

International law sanctioned entry of Pakistan by
4
an Indian aimed force in order to deal with the invaders,

U nited Kallona Seanxlty Cgun^il Qffldal B&caxcLs.,

Third Year, Supplement for November, 1948, S/628, p, 142,

^Theorists in international law support India on this
point, Oppenheim states that self-defense, coupled with an
element of necessity, has long been considered adequate justi
fication for a violation of the rights of another state,
"When, • • a State is informed that a body of armed men is
being organized on neighbouring territory for the purpose of
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However» the possibility that such action might result in
open hostilities with Pakistan caused India to turn to the
United Nations,

In such a situation, the Security Council

would be justified in calling upon Pakistan:
(1) To prevent Pakistan Government person
nel, military and civil, from participating or
assisting in the invasion of the Jammu and
Kashmir State;
(2) To call upon other Pakistani nationals
to desist from taking any part in the fighting
in the Jammu and Kashmir State;
(3) To deny to the invaders: ( a ) access to
and use of its territory for operations against
Kashmir, (b) military and other supplies, (c)
all other kinds of aid that might tend to pro
long the present struggle.5
The Pakistani reply, submitted to the Council on
January 15, relied more upon emotion than upon law in construct
ing a case.

Rather than aiding the invaders, Pakistan had

done and was doing everything within its power "to discourage
6 raid into its territory, and when the danger can be removed
through an appeal to the authorities of the neighbouring coun
try, no case of necessity has arisen. But if such an appeal
is fruitless or not possible, or if there is danger in delay,
a case of necessity arises, and the threatened State is justi
fied in invading the neighbouring country and disarming the
intending raiders," L. Oppenheim, International Law, A
Treatise, ed. H, Lauterpacht, Vol. I, Peace (7th ed., London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1948), pp. 265-66.
Brierly concurs. "A state, like an individual, may
protect itself against an attack, actual or threatened."
J. L. Brierly, Jhs. Lam fli. Natjpna, Aa latroduclion ia iha laternational Lam fil jEaaaa (4th ed., Oxford; Clarendon Press,
1949), p. 291.
Jessup states that in such a situation, "the inciden
tal or consequent infringement of the rights of another state
is excused, although the other state may be legally privileged
to resist." Each state is entitled to judge in its own cause
the "necessary degree of immediacy and urgency" without refer
ence to an international authority. Philip C. Jessup, A Mod
ern Law jgf Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 163-64,
Officiai BjB,CPr.da<. 34d year, Supp, for Nov., 1948
S/628, p, 143
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-32the tribal movement by all means short of war."^

While it

might be possible that "a certain number* of tribesmen and
persons from Pakistan were aiding the Azad Kashmir government
as volunteers»^ it was certainly not true that Pakistan was si
active party.

Granted that a situation prejudicial to peace

did exist, Kashmir, however, has but a portion of this dispute,
an important element but one that could not be isolated.

In

this greater dispute, India was guilty on all counts— genocide
for complicity in a Sikh plan to exterminate the Moslem popu
lation of East Punjab following partition; aggression for
forcibly occupying Junagadh and several smaller states which,
although Hindu-populated, had acceded to Pakistan; and hostil
ity toward Pakistan for failure to implement agreements on
division of the military, financial, and industrial assets of
Q
the former Indian government.
Kashmir was but the culmina
tion of an Indian policy aimed at the destruction of Pakistan.
Accession had been obtained through "fraud and violence* after
the maharaja failed in his attempt to suppress a legitimate
uprising against his autocratic governmentî
On 15 August 1947, Jammu and Kashmir State like
Oüiglj.1
S/646, p. 68.

3rd Year, Supp. for Nov., 1948,

^Westerners in the sub-continent reported that Paki
stani authorities "continued to countenance the recruitment,
training, transport, and equipping of tens of thousands of
tribesmen for service in Kashmir," Alice Thorner, "Issues,"
p. 177.
^Agreement had been reached in December, 1947, but
India withheld delivery of certain supplies, claiming that
they might be used against it in Kashmir.
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other States was free to accede or not to accede
to either Dominion. It entered a standstill
agreement with Pakistan. • • This was, however,
only a device on the part of the Maharajah to
gain enough time within which to create condi
tions which would furnish him with:a plausible
excuse to call in the forces of the Indian Union
so that, after trampling down all popular opposi
tion with their help, he might be able to ac
complish his desire of acceding to the Union of
India; thus putting upon the latter the responsi
bility of dealing with his rebellious people.
Pakistan requested the Council to, first, call upon
India to cease its aggressive tactics and to implement the
partition agreements, and second, to appoint a commission
which would investigate the charge of genocide, arrange evacu
ation of Junagadh and Other states, and bring about a cease
fire in Kashmir.

The latter would entail:

. . . the withdrawal of all outsiders, whether
belonging to Pakistan or the Indian Union. • .;
steps for the establishment of an impartial and
independent administration, . .; and a plebiscite
to ascertain the free and unfettered will of the
people. . • as to whether the State shall accede
to Pakistan or to India.10
Although the Security Council noted receipt of the Pakistani
document— and there were numerous references to it during the
ensuring debates— the counter-complaint did not become immedi
ately a part of the agenda, a fact which was to create some
confusion during a later stage in the discussions.
The Council began its consideration of the dispute in
a routine fashion by seating the representatives of India and
Official Records, 3rd Year, Supp, for Nov., 1948,
S/646, pp. 80-81.
p. 68.
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Pakistan— -neither state was a member of the Council— according
to the provisions of Article 31^^ of the Charter.

With its

second procedural step, the Council adopted an approach to
the problem which it maintained through four-and-a-half years.
Actual negotiations were to be carried on in informal meetings
between the parties with the Council president as rapporteur.
The Council would act only when the results of these confer
ences were reported to it in official session.
As two documents, the Indian and Pakistani complaints,
had opened consideration of the dispute, so two official
papers marked the conclusion of this initial period.

The first

Belgian resolution, adopted January 17, was scarcely more
than a rewording of Van Langenhove*s wires to the governments
in December.

12

However, the final paragraph, although initi

ating no action on the part of the Council, was to be of un
foreseen significance some months later, for India and
Pakistan were requested:
. . . to Inform the Council immediately of any
material change in the situation which occurs
or appears to either of them to be about to
occur while the matter is under consideration
by the Council, and to consult with the Council
thereon,13
^^Article 31: "Any Membqr of Jthe United Nations
which is not a member of the Security Council may participate,
without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before
the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the
interests of that Member are specially affected."
12see page 27.
Official Basfiris., 3rd Year, 229th Meeting,
S/651, p. 121.
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-35The resolution was approved with nine votes in favor—
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria,
the United Kingdom, and the United States— none opposed, and
two abstentions— the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
With adoption of the second Belgian resolution, on
January 20, the Council established a definite basis for
further action:
A. A commission of the Security Council
is hereby established, composed of three members
of the United Nations, one to be selected by
India, one to be selected by Pakistan, and the
third to be designated by the two so select
ed . . .
B« The Commission . . . shall act under
the authority of the Security Council, , , It
shall keep the Security Council currently in
formed of its activities and of the development
of the situation. . •
C. The Commission is invested with a dual
function:
(1) To investigate the facts pursuant to
Article 34 of the Charter;
(2) To exercise. • , any mediatory influ
ence likely to smooth away difficulties, to
carry out the directions given to it by the
Security Council; and to report hbw far the
advice and directions, if any, of the Security
Council have been carried out.14
The commission was to base its activities on India’s
complaint and on Pakistan's counter-complaint, which had ex
tended the scope of the dispute beyond the question of Kashmir
alone.

However, consideration of the additional controversies

introduced by Pakistan was to take place only "v;hen the Secur
ity Council so directs."

The vote on this resolution dupli-

145c Official Records, 3rd Year, 230th Meeting, S/654,
pp. 130-31,
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-36cated that on the first Belgian draft while a Soviet-sponsored
motion to postpone final consideration pending further argu
ments was defeated with two votes in favor— the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist R-public and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics— against nine opposed— Argentina, Belgium, Canada,
China, Colombia, France, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
II
The second Belgian resolution culminated a series of
impassioned debates in which the Indian and Pakistani spokesis
men, Gopalaswami Ayyangar
and Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan,
found themselves in violent disagreement on five basic points.
First was the general approach to the problem.

Ayyangar saw

the issue as primarily one of international law, a question
of whether or not Pakistan had violated its international
obligations as a result of its activities on behalf of the
insurgents in Kashmir.

Since India regarded the validity of

accession as unshakable, Indian activity in the state waa
clothed in an impeccable legality:
We desire only to see peace restored. . , and
to ensure that the people of Kashmir are left
free to decide in an orderly and peaceful
manner the future of their state. We have no
further interest. . . Everything that we have
done has been in discharge of our legal,
Gopalaswami Ayyangar, 1882- , has been India's
minister of transport and railways since 1948, His career
of legislative and executive service began in 1905.when he
entered the Madras civil
service. Ayyangar
was Prime Minis
ter of Jammu and Kashmir from 1937 to 1943.
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-37constitutional, and moral responsibilities
and obligations,16
Pakistan, on the contrary, was guilty of the most flagrant
violations of obligations among nations Inot only in not pre
venting but in actually abetting the tribal invasion of Kash
mir, which constituted a hostile act against India.

Tenta

tively assuming the martyr's role, Ayyangar promised that
India, whose motives were above reproach, would do its utmost
to avoid a conflagration although war might be forced any day
by the "compelling necessities" of the military situation.
Zafrullah Khan fully agreed on the danger of war but
suggested that it hinged less upon compelling military neces
sities than upon the threat of "direct military attack" upon
Pakistan by India,

The Pakistani representative looked more

to an uncertain international equity than to the'letter of
the law of nations in establishing a cace for Pakistan.

While

in no sense responsible for any transgression of the rights of
either India or Kashmir, Pakistan refused to countenance the
trampling of the desires of the Kashmiris beneath so-called
international obligations,

Pakistan also desired only an

opportunity for the people of Kashmir to make a free choice;
We do not differ over theoobjective as stated.
We desire that peace be restored; we have re
peatedly said that fighting must stop at once
and that means must be taken to stop it. How
ever, we differ over the definition of what you
call peace and what we call peace, what you call
order and what we call,order, what to you is law
and what to us is law,!'
Official Records, 3rd Year, 227th Meeting p. 28,
^^£2 Official £££J2riS.i 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, p. 113,
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-38The matter at Issue concerned illegal Indian suppression of
a legitimate rebellion, suppression supposedly justified by
a fraudulently achieved suzerainty, rather than Pakistani or
tribal disregard of law.
The second major controversy arose as a result of
divergent views on the facts of accession; specifically, which
nation had attempted to pressure Kashmir into submission.
The picture was quite clear and uncomplicated for Ayyangar at
least,

Œi August 15, 1947 Kashmir, which had been an indepen

dent state in treaty relations with the British Crown but
enjoying no international existence, became free to decide
whether to accede to one or the other dominion or to remain
independent.

The Kashmiri government immediately began

negotiating with both India and Pakistan,

Admittedly, India

was interested in Kashmir, both strategically and economically;
"nevertheless, we have at no time put the slightest pressure
on the State to accede to the Indian Dominion, because we
realized that Kashmir was in a very difficult position."18
Not until the eve of accession did India assume an active
role.

Then, after reports of disturbances had been followed

by the news of a full-scale invasion, India felt compelled to
respond to the state government's appeal fore aid.

In order

to give a legal basis to Indian operations in Kashmir, it had
been necessary for the state to accede to India but the
accession agreement clearly stipulated that this union was
Official BfiSflXdÂ, 3rd Year, 227th Meeting,
p, 13,
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-39condltlonal until "order had been restored" and the people of
Kashmir had been given an opportunity to ratify the maharaja's
action:
I would invite* . . attention* . • to the highprincipled statesmanship characteristic of the
Government of India* • * The acceptance of the
accession was urged upon the Government of India
by the leader of the most influential popular
organization In Kashmir* It was clear to my Gov
ernment. • . that peace in Kashmir could never be
restored or maintained without the support of the
people. Sheikh Abdullah. • • pressed for acces
sion as earnestly as the Ruler. • . himself. • .
On the question of accession the Government of
India has always enunciated the policy that in
all cases of dispute ithe people of the State con
cerned should make Ithe decision.i?
Ayyangar launched a frontal attack, challenging
Zafrullah Khan to produce an equally noble Pakistani record.
He doubted that this could sincerely be done for Pakistan's
maneuvers had been all too obvious.

Economic blockade and

repeated threats had constituted Pakistan's consideration of
Kashmir's delicate situation:
The events. • . cannot be explained away
as a fortuitous combination of circumstances.
A closer examination would reveal to any im
partial body of men that there was a definite
method, a calculated plan, which was being
followed.20
Zafrullah Khan ignored Ayyangar's challenge, retreat
ing into a bitter denunciation of India's "considerate" atti
tude toward Kashmir.

He wondered how it could be believed

that India, admittedly aware of Kashmir's strategic and
economic possibilities, had not been aware of what was
p. 20.
ZOiUd.. p. 14.
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contemplated with regard to accession» "that they did not try
to influence it,"^^

The known fact that following his re

lease from prison. Sheikh Abdullah had journeyed to New Delhi,
presumably for conferences on accession terms, would seem to
indicate that India had been urging accession to itself for
some time prior to October 26*

But "it has unfortunately

become a habit with the Government of India simply to deny
whatever they find is inconvenient either to deal with or to
answer,
The true picture of the "economic blockade" was of a
slightly different hue than the version presented byAyyangar,
continued Zafrullah Khan.

Supplies failed to reach Kashmir

as a result of the general Punjab disorders, for as far as
Delhi, transportation was at a standstill:
Consequently, there was a.shortage of supplies
everywhere. It was not that the Pakistan Gov
ernment was unwilling to fulfill its part of
the standstill agreement, but they were unable
to do so owing mainly to these Idisturbances* . .
And if anyone were guilty of non-cooperation, it was the
maharaja*

Geography, economics, and the wishes of his people

pointed toward accession to Pakistan, yet he favored India and
sought to solve the problem by killing, jailing, or expelling
"a million or so" of his Moslem subjects.

Pakistan had agreed

to discuss supply difficulties but heard nothing more on the
matter from Kashmir*

Since the preliminary demand for a

p. 1G5.
^^20. Ofiislal B££..QXds, 3rd Year, 228th Meeting, p, 80,
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-41conference had been met, "there was no reason to ask for any
24
outside assistance.”
Ayyangar side-stepped further wrangling on the issue
of pre-accession pressure, basing a fresh attack on Pakistan's
activities once large-scale strife broke out in Kashmir.
Indian approach on this point was uncompromising.

The

Only with

Pakistani aid could the tribesmen have achieved such consid
erable success; only by crossing Pakistani territory could
they have reached Kashmir.Ayyangar offered the Council
several selections from India's dossier on Pakistan— evidence
that the tribesmen possessed modern weapons which "could only
have come from Pakistan military depots""reliable" infor
mation that the prime minister of the Northwest Frontier
Province functioned as the chief organizer of the rebel forces
at Peshawar and that a number of major Pakistani cities were
used as tribal bases; and the obvious military fact that
tactics employed by the raiders indicated that they were being
trained and led by professional soldiers.

It was, said

Ayyangar, a damning picture.
Anyone familiar with the Northwest Frontier would

sit*
nf\
During the first months of the dispute, even the
most heated Indian protests held to the semi-fiction that the
tribes had come Ithrouoh but not from Pakistan. Not until
repeated representations had failed to bring from Pakistan
the slightest concession to the view that tribal activities
were illegal did India directly accuse Pakistan of complicity.
Alice Thorner, "Conflict," p. 29.
3rd Year, 227th Meeting, p. 22.
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-42know that the tribes, in addition to manufacturing weapons,
had always been in the habit of accumulating large stores of
arms by means "legitimate as well as illegitimate," countered
Zafrullah Khan2
, , • One of the matters to which attention has
been invited by the Pakistan Government. . , is
the failure of. . . India to hand over to, « .
Pakistan. , • its due share of military stores.
Pakistan is woefully short of its quota, much
less could it supply anybody out of it. . • To
retend that the Pakistan Government is supplyng them when the Government of India knows it
has withheld. . .military stores is to add
insult to injury.27

?

Any British officer who had served on the frontier
could testify that the tribesmen were in no need of training
in Jmilitary tactics or in the use of small arms.

Lastly, if

Pakistani military personnel were operating in Kashmir, they
were Poonchis on leave and therefore on their own time:
If, when they go home on leave, these officers
or men find that their people are being massa
cred or persecuted, and if some of them take a
hand in whatever is going on,lit is nevertheless
not a case of allowing them to go on leave in
order to take part in the fighting. . . They
are expected to say, "My brother may have been
killed, my father may have been killed, my wife
may have been raped and my children butchered,
but I am not a member of the Pakistan forces
and must not retaliate," That kind of thing
might be expected of angels but it cannot be
expected of human beings,28
The question of which government bore the blame for
failure to resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations
was the third major clash between the Indian and Pakistani
OiiXçiâl Records. 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, pp.
107-08.
p. 109.
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-43interpretations of the situation.

Ayyangar again cast India

in a role of altruistic nobility, for India, seeking only a
reasonable settlement in a friendly spirit of "give and take,"
had made repeated attempts to reach agreement, only to be re
buffed by Pakistan.

Not until the military situation had so

degenerated that India's own peace and security werethreaten
ed had New Delhi chosen another course:
Negotiations finally broke down as a result of
the attitude adopted by the Pakistan Government
in declining to do what, under any view of right
international conduct, it Is its obligation to
do. , . Settlement would have been reached but
for the intransigeance and the lack of adequate
confidence and courage, in dealing with their
own people, which the Government of Pakistan
have unfortunately exhibited in this connec
tion. 29
Quite the contrary interpretation was presented by
Zafrullah Khan.

Each time the Pakistani government advanced

proposals, the Indian government insisted that anything relat
ing to Kashmir must be approved by Sheikh Abdullah's admin
istration, a position wholly unacceptable to Pakistan since
it "prejudges the whole question of the plebiscite."30

And

each time Pakistan had suggested that the question be re
ferred to the United Nations, India had argued that, since
Pakistan was not a legitimate party to the dispute and the
raiders were not a state, the United Nations could do nothing
apart from sending observers.

Zafrullah Khan concluded with

a well-aimed thrust at the Indian charge of non-cooperation
Official Records. 3rd Year, 227th Meeting, p. 11.
Official Recordp, 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, p. 93.
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by asking, why, if India was so interested in joint action,
it had hot informed Pakistan in advance that Indian troops
were to be moved into Kashmir rather than waiting until the
■occupation* was a faJLl apigmplA»
Were they not willing at the very least to noti
fy the Government of Pakistan that the landing
of troops in Kashmir was intended? There was
no opportunity for discussion and no opportunity
to partake of joint action in order to arrive at
a settlement.
Unable to agree on an interpretation of the dispute,
Zafrullah Khan and Ayyangar were similarly at odds on a fourth
point— the action to be taken by the Security Council.

Still

steeped in the maxims of the cult of Grotius, Ayyangar ex
pounded the Indian view of right and law.

Pakistan had violât"

ed its international obligations and the Council should "use
its undoubted influence and power" to correct this situation
by calling upon Pakistan to cease forthwith all aid and enoouragement of the anti-government forces in Kashmir.

The dispute

had arisen as a result of such Pakistani activity; once it
had ceased, there would be no further disagreement.
This was neither the source of nor Ithe solution to
the difficulties as Zafrullah Khan viewed them.

Kashmir wa4

the result of years of oppression of the Moslem population by
the maharaja's government.

The spark for this long-stored

fuel had been the maharaja's desire to accede to India.

The

result had been an understandable uprising of the people, in
sympathy for whom the tribesmen and some Pakistani nationals
Records. 3rd Year, 228th Meetin, p. 84.
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-45had offered aid,

A bad situation had been made infinitely

worse by the maharaja's "treacherous* accession to
the "occupation" of Kashmir by

Indian troops.

India and

The onlysolu

tion was to order all outsiders to withdraw from the state so
as to permit the people to decide their own fate:
, , , The condition to be brought about is this;
Whether by joint administration under the two
Governors-General, by joint occupation of pre
dominantly Muslim areas by Muslim troops from
Pakistan and predominantly non-Muslim areas, ••
by Indian troops, by joint occupation in each
place, by inviting Commonwealth forces. ♦
or
whether through the United Nations— Kashmir must
be cleared. . . Normal administration must be
restored. There should be no kind of pressure,
either from the Muslim Conference. . . or the
National Conference, , , The people should then
be invited to express the way in which they want
to go, , ,32
The fifth and, at this stags of the discussions on
Kashmir, the most important agreement between the two advocates
concerned the significance and scope of the dispute,

Pakistan

saw it as one facet of a much broader problem, a facet that
could not be dealt with apart from the whole.

India’s view

was that "the subject-matter of reference is limited to the
33
dispute in Kashmir, • ,"
Kashmir was a problem by itself,
but vaguely related to the extraneous.matters introduced by
Pakistan,

Discussion of additional issues at this point would

only further impede progress toward a settlement while if
Kashmir were considered by Itself and a settlement achieved.
Official Records. 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, p. 120.
The question of Commonwealth troops, which passed unnoticed at
this point, was to assume some significance at a later stage.
Official ils&a&Ma, 3rd Year, 227th Meeting, p.
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tension between the two states would be eased and the other
questions could be more readily resolved:
We hope to be able to convince the Security Council
that once we have dealt with the Kashmir question,
there will probably not be anything of substance
which will divide India and Pakistan to the extent
of endangering international peace and security.34
Introduction of the second Belgian resolution, estab
lishing the commission, provoked controversy on this point,
Zafrullah Khan argued that reference to Kashmir should be
omitted from the resolution's title to permit the conunission
full latitude in considering all points raised by the Indian
complaint and the Pakistani counter-complaint.

At this point,

Ayyangar seized upon the fact that the Pakistani representa
tion had never officially appeared on the agenda, thus the
resolution and Council consideration at the moment were limit
ed to Kashmir alone:
• • • The Security Council can pass this resolu
tion only with regard to the item entered on the
agenda, • • The main contention is whether we
are investing this commission today with juris
diction to deal not only with matters connected
with the 0ammu and Kashmir situation, but also
with matters outside that situation, • .35
Zafrullah Khan agreed that the language of the
resolution referred directly only to Kashmir but insisted that
the commission's powers should be broad enough to embrace all
matters disturbing relations between the dominions and of
which the Council was seized, "irrespective of the fact that
Qfiiglal Recordsf 3rd Year, 230th Meeting, p. 136,
35xbid., p. 132.
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-47discussion was proceeding at the moment only with regard to
one of them."36

Council compromise, omission of direct

reference to Kashmir with the understanding that it would
nevertheless be considered before any attention was given to
other items, was accepted althoggh not applauded by both
parties.
Although the statements of the Indian and Pakistani
representatives consumed the major portion 6f these meetings
and discussion among the Council members was consequently
brief, some indication of the members* approach to the prob
lem was evident.

The prevailing attitude was neutrality with

certain individuals openly voicing this view while others
remained largely noncommittal, their sentiments appearing
only during the three votes.

As previously mentioned, only

Paris el-Khouri of Syria appeared openly to favor one party.
The Council member placed in the most difficult
position in this dispute between two members of the Common
wealth of Nations was Philip Noel-Baker,United Kingdom
secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, v^o had been
accredited as the United Kingdom’s special representative to
the Council during consideration of the Kashmir question.

As

p, 134.
37philip John Noel-Baker, 1889- , a Member of Parlia
ment since 1936, served in the Labor government from 1946 to
1951. Noel-Baker*s background in international affairs in
cludes membership in the British delegation at Versailles in
1919, service with the League of Nations Secretariat and
Assembly, and participation on the Executive Commission of
the United Nations Preparatory Committee in 1945.
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was to be expected, Noel-Baker maintained a scrupulously
neutral attitude.

Repeatedly he suggested compromise on

major disagreements and urged the parties to seek agreement
themselves in the out-of-Council conversations.
The most outspoken delegate was Dr. Jose Arce^S of
Argentina Wio voted with the majority and pursued a neutral
policy but displayed an attitude all his own.

Where the

British attitude had been conciliatory, almost appeasing, Arce
reprimanded both India and Pakistan.

Nothing that the United

Nations Charter contained no definition of aggression, he
reminded Ayyangar and Zafrullah Khan that a definition, con
tained in theURio pact,^^ existed among the American states,
Argentina would hold as the aggressor whichever dominion com
mitted actions failing under this definition.

Although ap

proving the second Belgian resolution, Arce Was disappointed
at its weakness for he understood that the Council had been
established "for the purpose of finding a speedy solution for
S®Dr, Jose Arce, 1881- , surgeon, medical educator,
and writer, was appointed permanent Argentine delegate to the
United Nations in 1946, Arce's government career began in
1903 and in 1945 hb represented Argentina at the United Na
tions Conference on International Organization, taking a
leading part in the attack upon the great-power veto.
S^Article 9 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance states: "In addition to other acts which the Organ
of Consultation may characterize as aggression, the following
shall be considered as such: (a) Unprovoked armed attack by a
State against the territory, the people, or the land, sea or
air forces of another State; (b) Invasion, by the armed forces
of a State, of the territory of an American State, through
the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a
treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award, or, in the ab
sence of frontiers thus demarcated, invasion affecting a
region Wiich is under the effective jurisdiction of another
State."
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any situation liable to compromise world peace and secur
ity."40 Yet after lengthy debates and several meetings, the
Council did little but "appeal to these two governments to
be calm and sensible."

Arce did not suggest another approach.

In only one instance, dicussion on the second Belgian
resolution, did sharp controversy arise among the Council
members themselves.

Andrei Gromyko*^ of the Soviet Union did

not care for the structure of the commission.

Theoretically

a Council creature, it would really be quite independent of
the Council and "would act without any reference to the
latter, as the connexion between it and the Security Council
would exist only on paper,"42

This would be the result of

establishing a body whose members were not necessarily repre
sented on the Security Council.

If a commission was to be

created, let it be composed of states on the Council so that
it would be obvious that it was the Council and not an out
side agency investigating the dispute.
Alfonso Lopez of Colombia took exception in curtly
reminding Gromyko that the Council’s goal was to settle the
dispute, not to ientangle it in technicalities.

All legal

4°SC Official Records. 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, p. 124.
4lAndrei A. Gromyko, 1908- , chief deputy foreign
minister of the Soviet Union since 1949, entered the commis
sariat of foreign affairs in 1939. He has served as Soviet
Counselor at Washington, D.C.; minister to Cuba; and ambas
sador to the United States. Gromyko was in the Soviet delega
tion at San Francisco in 1945 and was permanent representative
to the United Nations from 1946 to 1948.
4 2 ^ Oiiiclai Records. 3rd Year, 230th Meeting, p. 140.
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*•50means of achieving this goal should be considered;
It seems. . , it is only too clear that, as
they themselves have begun to establish the
basis for an agreement in the appointment of
the proposed commission, we should in turn
be only too glad to accept the principle of
this initial step.43
Although Gromyko reiterated his view that the commission was
not an agent of the Council "either in form or in fact," the
remaining members unanimously endorsed Lopez’s view,
III
All too soon it was to become evident that the
significant results of initial Council consideration of the
Kashmir question merely delimited the arena for future battles.
But despite the brief duration of the optimism engendered by
the accomplishments of this period, the five meetings were
far from wasted time.

A relatively firm basis for future

action had been established.

The broad principle of a

plebiscite as the ultimate determinant of Kashmir’s allegiance
was never at issue between the parties and with Council ac
ceptance, it became, for the greater part of four-and-a-half
years, the factor upon which hinged all attempts to achieve a
settlement.

A first step, based upon this principle, had been

taken with the creation of a commission charged with bringing
about conditions favorable to a plebiscite and with supervis
ing the eventual vote itself.

And a Council approach toward

the entire problem had been tacitly adopted,

124.

43sc Official

3rd Year, 229th Meeting, p.
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-51The parties themselves had clearly outlined their
positions.

India underlined each Item In Its Indictment of

Pakistan with the maxims of International law, taking Its
stand on a case based upon three presumptions:

(l) the ac

cession of Kashmir to India was valid; (2) Pakistan, In
abetting Insurgents against the legitimate authority of a
friendly state was violating certain rights and duties of
members of the International community; and (3) Kashmir was
a problem by Itself and should be considered onilts own merits,
not In relation to other situations.
the Council's course was clear.

In these circumstances,

Pakistan should be ordered

to cease Its activities In Kashmir, thus allowing India to
restore order In the state and to remove the threat to peace.
That the Indian case was handicapped by Immersion In legal
theory was obvious.

India's alms might be legitimate and un

derstandable but they were scarcely furthered by Insisting
that an Issue Involving the fear, pride, and lives of men must
be treated as a textbook problem In law.

Practicalities, no

matter what theory might say, demanded that Pakistan be re
garded as a legitimate and vitally Interested party.

Practi

calities, In an International community where Judgments could
be enforced only through cooperation or superior force, ruled
out a satisfactory solution on the basis of Council "orders".
But India's devotion to theory was fanatic and was to obstruct,
for long months to come, the concessions and compromises
necessary to bring peace to Kashmir.
The Pakistani case adroitly side-stepped the legal
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-52Issues raised by India and, beneath a flimsy interpretation
of the facts in the case, rested upon emotion and moral right.
For the record, Pakistan offered a legal position based upon
four points;

(1) the disturbance in Kashmir was a legitimate

revolt against an autocratic government; (2) foreign elements
in the state were neither aided nor officially sanctioned by
Pakistan; (3} accession was fraudulent and therefore Indian
troops were operating illegally in Kashmir; and (4) )the situa
tion was compounded of many factors and could not be resolved
without practical action on all issues of the broader contro
versy.

The interpretation of accession was shaky.

The

replies to the Indian charges and evidence of aid were not
quite convincing.

The justification for raising additional

matters in dispute to the importance of Kashmir was weak.
But Pakistan's practical approach to Kashmir itself— that it
was of legitimate and vital interest to both India and Paki
stan and both must participate in the settlement— found a
favorable reception among the Council members.
The resolutions, voting record, and comments indicated
that, for all practical purposes, the Council was united in
seeking a solution acceptable to both India and Pakistan with
no particular favoritism shown to either party.

Soviet devia

tions, although difficult to analyze at this early stage,
hinted at lack of interest or opinion rather than an obstruc
tionist policy.

It appeared that the Council had chosen a

mediatory, not a judicial, approach.
Pakistan was the greater beneficiary of this <
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-53development for it achieved recognition of equal status with
India and could begin to shed its defendant's role.

India,

originally on the diplomatic offensive, found its carefully
documented legal case all but ignored and its own actions
about to be investigated.
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CHAPTER III
A QUESTION OF PRIORITY
I
The opening meetings of the second period of Council
consideration, during which the agenda entry became the India-*
Pakistan Question, seemed to presage steady, if not swift,
progress toward a solution of the dispute.

On January 22,

Van Langenhove was able to report that Ayyangar and Zafrullah
Khan were agreed in principle on the prerequisites of a
settlement.

But development of details with which to flesh

the principles proved beyond the Council's capabilities.

As

discussion degenerated into deadlock, Ayyangar, dissatisfied
with the "unfavorable trend" of the debates, requested ad
journment in order to return to New Delhi for consultation.
The request was granted on February 12.
The meeting of February 5 was noteworthy for Sheikh
Mohammed Abdullah's appearance before the Council,

In a

bitter denunciation of Pakistan, he outlined the latest chap
ter, dating from the partition of India, in the history of
Kashmir.

The state had been so maladministered that the first

task was construction of a democratic regime, not accession.
India had granted time for the reorganization of internal
-54-
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-55affairs but Pakistan had applied pressure:
Pakistan wanted to
slavery* . . I had
Goebbels were dead.
in my poor country
have transmigrated

force us to a position of
thought that Hitler and
Dut what has happened
convinces me that they
.
their souls into Pakistan.^

The change in agenda, which Van Langenhove had made on
his own authority, symbolized the basic disagreement at this
point,

Ayyangar protested that only through a formal vote

could an item on the agenda be altered once adopted.

In

effect. Council jurisdiction should be limited to Kashmir
alone.
was

Zafrullah Khan reiterated Pakistan's thesis;

Kashmir

but one facet of a complex situation, all of whichmust

be considered in order to achieve a solution.

Although the

Council eventually approved the change, India was appeased
with a promise that only after Kashmir had been dealt with
would the Pakistani charges be considered.

Thus, on January

22, the Jammu and Kashmir Question became the India-Pakistan
Question.
A distinct note of optimism was introduced when Van
Langenhove reported the parties agreed on three points;

(1)

accession was to be decided by a plebiscite; (2} conditions
must ensure complete impartiality; and (3) therefore, the
referendum must be conducted under the aegis of the United
Nations,

If details to effect these principles could be

agreed upon, Kashmir would cease to be a problem.
Although no resolutions reached a vote during these
tell ïfixk HfflSi» February 6, 1948.
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meetings, six were introduced and remained before the Council
at adjournment,

A Belgian draft^ recognized that Kashmir's

future must be decided through a referendum sponsored by the
United Nations.

After India and Pakistan had submitted qual

ifications, the resolution was amended to provide that the
commission should work toward "promoting the ceswation of
acts of hostility and violence" and should report to the Coun
cil on the fulfilment of essential plebiscite conditions:
Such proposals shall include measures designed
to ensure cooperation between the military forces
of India and Pakistan with a view. . , to main
taining order and security in the f u t u r e . 3
On January 29, Van Langenhove introduced additional
resolutions calling for a plebiscite and a cease-fire.

The

plebiscite draft^ was primarily repetitious verbiage, again
recognizing that a vote must be organized and supervised under
the authority of the Security Council.

The cease-fire pro

posal stated that:
1. In the accomplishment of its functions,
the Commission of the Security Council shall
take into consideration that, among the duties
incumbent upon it, are included those which
would tend towards promoting the cessation of
acts of hostility and violence, and which are
of a particularly urgent character;
2. In the pursuit of this aim, the Com
mission shall use every diligence to ensure
that its mediatory action beexercised without
^52 Official

3rd Year, 236th Meeting, p. 265.

Official

3rd Year, 236th Meeting, p. 269.

Official R$£PrdS» 3rd Year, 237th Meeting, S/661,
p. 285.
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In the fourth document, the Council received the
first indication that India was not presslngly interested in
an immediate plebiscite, an impression more than borne out in
the ensuing months*

On February 3, Ayyangar suggested a

resolution in which the Security Council would concentrate on
getting Pakistani-aided forces out of Kashmir and
. . . that the Commission of the Council shall,
among its duties, regard as particularly urgent
the promotion of measures intended to bring
about as expeditiously as possible the cessa
tion of fighting and other acts of hostil
ity. . .G
Plainly, India was interested in discussion Of a plebiscite
only after a cease-fire had been arranged.
A resolution submitted on February 6 by General
McNaughton? of Canada, then Council president, urged coopera
tion among India, Pakistan, and the Council and listed seven
principles of a just settlement:

(l) cessation of hostilities;

(2) withdrawal of all non-Kashmiri irregular armed forces;
(3) maintenance of order by the forces of both India and Paki
stan until accession was determined; (4) withdrawal of all
Qffisial Records. 3rd Year, 237th Meeting, S/662,
p. 286.
Official Records. 3rd Year, 239th Meeting, p. 326,
"^Andrew George Latta McNaughton, 1887- , has served
Canada in military and civil capacities since 1909. Commander
of the 1st Army Overseas, 1940-44, he was minister of defense,
1944-45, and at present is chairman of the Canadian section
of the Canada-U.S, Permanent Joint Board on Defense. General
McNaughton has been a delegate to the League of Nations and
Commonwealth conferences and was permanent Canadian repre
sentative to the United Nations, 1948-50.
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forces when such was accomplished; (5) return of refugees and
release of political prisoners; (6) establishment of conditions
necessary to a fair plebiscite, including an interim adminis
tration; and (7) a plebiscite under authority of the Council
at the earliest possible date.
The final document, a Colombian resolution introduced
on February 11, followed McNaughton*s proposals in calling
for withdrawal of tribal forces and an interim administra
tion and in addition;
The Commission of the Security Council shall be
composed of representatives of five Members of
the United Nations, designated as follows: one
to be selected by India, one by Pakistan, as
already provided, . . and three by the Security
Council. . .8
II
The alteration of the agenda entry was the first of
four points to provoke prolonged controversy between the
Indian and Pakistan representatives,

Ayyangar again displayed

his devotion to technicalities by noting that the previous
meeting had adjourned with the understanding that the Council
would meet again to consider "this question," obviously re
ferring to the existing entry, the Jammu and Kashmir Question.
Since that was the matter to be discussed, the change was un
authorized and invalid,

India was not unwilling to discuss

other issues but it was important that there be no change in
agenda at the present times
Qgg Oülcial B££.QXd5i 3rd Year, Supp, for Feb., 1948,
S/671, p. 27.
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What I have been trying to persuade the Security
Council to accept is the point that we are now
engaged in debating only the Jammu and Kashmir
question, with all the background that anyone
may bring into it. . , I am now concerned with
being satisfied that the debate in which we are
now engaged will confine itself to the Jammu
and Kashmir question.?
Kashmir alone would be like "a sentence torn out of
its context," countered Zafrullah Khan.

No matter what might

be the fine points of Council procedure, consideration of all
the questions could not be avoided:
I am not concerned with the technicalities
of the question. So long as it is deemed that
all these questions are before the Security
Council and on its agenda, I do not insist
that a particular hfeading be applied, , . The
point which I desire to have stablished clearly
is that the Security Council is now seized of
a situation between India and Pakistan and that
that situation has many facets, of which Kashmir
and Jammu is only one.10
Although the Council compromise appeared to meet the demands
of both Ayyangar and Zafrullah Khan, it was clear in later
debates that neither party had abandoned or intended to aban
don its position on this question.
The second clash ranged over all previous charges and
counter-charges,

M. C. Setalvad,^^ who spoke for India on

January 23, attacked Zafrullah Khan's accusations as estab-

Official RecorOs, 3rd Year, 231st Meeting, p. 161.
lOUaid.. pp. 159-160.
11m . C. Setalvad, 1884- , has been with the Indian
United Nations delegation since 1947. Advocate General of
Bombay in 1942, he resigned in protest against British policy
in India. Setalvad represented India on the partition com
mission which traced the boundaries of India and Pakistan.
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lishing a record for "calculated venom. . , irrelevancy. . ,
deliberate omission. . , and clever distortion of facts."

12

Complaints of Indian treatment of Moslems came from a govern
ment which had failed "woefully" to discharge its own obliga
tions toward minorities.

Nor would India countenance the

charge of noncooperation:
It has been suggested. . . that the Government
of Pakistan was not informed of the intended
dispatch of troops. My answer is that there
was no need nor obligation to inform the Gov
ernment of Pakistan of this dispatch of troops
to the Kashmir State. The accession had made
it a part of the Indian U n i o n , 13
Hastily deserting this vwekk defense, Setalvad attempt
ed to guide the debate back to the issue as India saw it.
That issue remained whether or not, in reference to the inva
sion of Kashmir, Pakistan had disregarded its obligations to
a friendly neighboring state.

Pakistan protested that it was

anxious to discharge its international duties tüt was unable
to prevent the tribes from entering Kashmir:
That is, I am sure the members of the Security
Council are well aware, no answer. A State
cannot say that it is unable to restrain war
like passage through its territory to others,
and permit an invasion of a neighbouring State,14
Qffl&iai Becorda. 3rd Year. 232nd Meeting, p. 171,
pfilgial BiJEflJzdS., 3rd Year, 233rd Meeting, p. 223.
14£C Official Records. 3rd Year, 232nd Meeting, p. 186,
Oppenheim supports Setalvad: "States ere under a duty to pre
vent and suppress. . . subversive activity against foreign
Governments as assumes the form of armed hostile expeditions
or attempts to commit common crimes against lifeor property."
C^penheim, pp. 260-61.
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Zafrullah Khan, again denying that Pakistan had aided
the invaders, sought to minimize the importance of foreign
forces in the Kashmir disturbances.

He quoted figures listing

60 per cent of the insurgents as native Poonchis, 35 per cent
as tribesmen, and only 5 per cent as Punjabi Moslems, sup
posedly proving that strife in Kashmir was a legitimate revolt
against the maharaja,
Still clinging fanatically to the legal approach,
Setalvad prompted the third controversy by raising the question
of the place of precedent in Security Council procedures.

He

called to the support of his contentions as to Pakistan’s
liability the findings of the commission in the Greek question;
The existence of disturbed conditions. . . in
no way relieves. . . neighbours of their duty
under international law to prevent and suppress
subversive activity in their territory aimed at
another Government, nor does it relieve them of
direct responsibility for their support of. . .
guerrillas.16
Setalvad slipped in a graceful bid for Soviet support by not
ing that although the USSR had not concurred in the report,
he was sure it was not because the principle was faulty under
international law but because the USSR Was not convinced of
the correctness of the commission findings.

Evidence and

^^An Indian White Paper of March 5, 1948 estimated, on
the basis of bodies recovered, that the composition of insur
gent forces opposing the Indian army in Kashmir was "70 per
cent Pathans and Moslems from Dir and Swat states, 20 per
cent deserters from the Maharajah’s state forces, 5 per cent
from Poonch, , , and 5 per cent Sundas." The New York Jimea,
March 6, 1948.
162^; Official

3rd Year, 237th Meeting, p. 298.
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-62precedent combined in a clear case for the Judicial-minded
Indian.

"If measures short of war fall to prevent the in

filtration" of the tribesmen, it was the duty of Pakistan "to
resort to measures of war against these tribesmen."1?
Admittedly "no authority" on international law,
Zafrullah Khan was disinclined to carry on a lengthy discus
sion on the relation between the Kashmir and Greek situations.
But he thought the comparison poor.

Kashmir, unlike Greece,

was a case of an alien oppressor rulingover a people"with
whom he has nothing in common,"

With this briefappeal to

the principles of humanitarianism over the maxims of law, he
stepped around the concept of precedent and moved on to the
"absurd" suggestion that Pakistan go to war with the tribes:
That is strange advice. . . when the object
. . . is to bring about an immediate stoppage
of the fighting. In order to bring about an
inunediate stoppage of fighting. . .not only
should this war in Kashmir continuebetweeen
the people. . . and the Maharaja, but Pakistan
should start a new war on the frontier with
the tribes in the tribal area.18
Such ridiculous references to unrealistic theory
merely obstructed consideration of more important issues, some
of which had more practical legal aspects.

One was the legal

ity of Kashmir's "purported accession" to India, a question
raised by Pakistan at the outset:
All . . . allegations, even if they could be
made out in fact— which is disputed— are based
upon the assumption of the validity and legality
l?Ibld. ■ p, 301.
Official Records. 3rd Year, 239th Meeting, p. 347.
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-63of the accession of the State of Kashmir to
India, which raises. . . questions of fact and
questions of law.19
To question the validity of the accession was incom
prehensible to Setalvad, for India had been approached on
behalf of both the people and the government of Kashmir and
had then agreed only on the condition that the union be rati
fied by a plebiscite.

If accession were a product of fraud

and violence, to Pakistan fell the blame.

And even if the

accession should be invalid, "which we do not for a moment
admit," Pakistan would remain under certain international
obligations:
The position would be that Kashmir has not
validly acceded to India; but it has not ac
ceded to Pakistan at all. , , By all the
principles that govern international relations,
India has the right to go to the aid of a
legitimate Government, even if the opposition
to that Government is from its own insurgent
nationals.::. . A neighbouring country. . ,
has not the right to go. « .to the help of
insurgents against the constituted authority
in a . . . State. That. . . is a well under
stood principle in international law,20
An issue that was to remain an obstacle to a peaceful
settlement for four years was the fourth point which engaged
the advocates in full-scale verbal battle during this series
Official Records. 3rd Year, 236th Meeting p. 274.
2Qibid.. pp. 275-76. Oppenheim is not fully in accord,
holding that a state may recognize as belligerents;,and thus
lawfully aid, insurgents if they succeed in controlling a
part of a country, maintain a government, and conduct their
own military operations. This corresponds to thePakistani
interpretation of the Azad government. But the question of
exactly when such conditions legalize recognition, and aid,
is dangerous and difficult to answer. "For an untimely and
precipitate recognition. . . Is an unlawful act, and it is
frequently maintained that such amount to intervention,"
Oppenheim, p. 124.
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of meetings.

From thé outset India and Pakistan had agreed

on the necessity of a plebiscite but it now developed that
they differed radically on the conditions under which that
plebiscite should be conducted.

The Indian plan called for

pacification of Kashmir» then a referendum under the auspices
of the United Nations,

However, Sheikh Abdullah’s administra

tion was to remain as the state’s civil authority.
We have to take the verdict of the people of a
State which is now being governed by machinery
which it has had for years. Kashmir. . . con
ducts its own administration. . , The question
is whether, , • one can oust that machinery
completely and put something which comes from
outside in its place. I think that would mean
an amount of encroachment on the ordinary
sovereign powers of any State, to which no
State would be willing to agree.21
Thus despite accession, India appeared to attribute
many aspects of sovereignty to Kashmir.

Sheikh Abdullah him

self attacked the concept of an interim government.

Conceding

that he was no longer impartial, he maintained that this fact
would not affect his administration of Kashmir.

In any event,

the United Nations had no authority with which to displace a
legal governments
Where are you going to get this neutral admin
istration? I say to you frankly that if you
ask Almighty God to administer the State of
Kashmir, I do not feel He will act impartially.^^
A neutral administration was prerequisite to Pakistani
agreement on a plebiscite, retorted Zafrullah Khan.

Judging

Records. 3rd Year, 239th Meeting, p. 329.
22uj^ tot Yfixk limea^ February 6, 1948.
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from certain remarks in which he had implied that referendum
plans might be dropped»

Sheikh Abdullah's competence to con

duct a fair vote was questionable.

The Indian plan would not

bring peace, although "it might bring suppression and a good
deal of

o p p r e s s i o n . "24

Zafrullah Khan saw legal technical

ities again obstructing progress:
It is entirely irrelevant today to inquire
whether, juristically, the holding of a pleb
iscite for this specific purpose falls within .
the domestic jurisdiction of the Maharaja or
within international jurisdiction. . . 1 beg
to submit. . « that, in order for the pleb
iscite to be free and unfettered,
. the ad
ministration. , . must be impartial and
neutral.25
This was to be the basis of Pakistan's interpretation of
plebiscite conditions through four years of negotiations.
A question of priority shattered what hope remained
that the disputants might early reach preliminary agreement.
India stubbornly insisted that consideration of detailed pleb
iscite procedures should come only af%er hostilities had
ceased:
It would be putting the cart before the horse
if the Security Council. . . proceeded, . . to
deal with the question of a plebiscite which,
if it is in fact a matter for discussion and
23«iThere may not be a referendum after the disasters
at Baramula, Uri, Pattan, and Muzaffarabad, The people may
not bother about it any more." The New XÊXk Times. Novem
ber 12, 1947.
Official Records» 3rd Year, 239th Meeting, p. 348.
Official Records. 3rd Year, 240th Meeting, p. 354,
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decision by this body, should come at the very
end,20
For this reason, Ayyangar opposed simultaneous consideration
of the Belgian plebiscite and cease-fire drafts.

India's

•concrete" cease-fire proposals had apparently been brushed
aside; "instead, there
ity Council which is.

is a draft resolution

beforethe Secur-

, ,innocuous in the extreme."

Acts

of violence and hostility were being perpetrated every day;
yet the commission, which was not yet in existence, was ad
vised to do something which would "tend" to "promote" the
cessation of those acts.

Certain amendments might make the

drafts acceptable but no matter what action the Council might
take, the Indian goal would remain the same:
After fighting is stopped, normal conditions
are restored and everybody belonging to the
State has returned to his home and land, we
want conditions to be established with a two
fold objective; first, the establishment of\{
a system of self-government acceptable to the
people of the State and secondly, a final set
tlement of the question of a c c e s s i o n , 23
Far from agreeing with the dogmatic Indian attitude,
Zafrullah Khan believed that an immediate plebiscite agreement
would automatically halt hostilities without tiresome investi
gation of questions of fact and of law;
Pakistan was and is willing to forego all these
investigations if the one point on which the
parties are agreed. . , the question of the ac
cession of the Kashmir State. . . shall be
2ÔSC

Official Records. 3rd Year, 236thMeeting, p. 272.

27^

Qfiicial Records. 3rd Year, 237thMeeting, p. 294.

23^

Official Recordsf 3rd Year, 239thMeeting, p. 327.
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-67decided by means of a plebiscite, and if, in
order to secure its fairness and impartiality,
the plebiscite is carried out under the aegis
of the Security C o u n c i l , 29
Despite continued discussion, the deadlock remained
unbroken.

On February 10, Ayyangar summarily requested ad

journment, assuring the Council that India was not withdrawing
the question from consideration.

But as "the trend of opin

ion, . , seemed to ignore the urgency and immediacy of a
solution and to consider problems which could walt,"^^' the
Indian delegation had concluded that the less immediate prob
lems should be considered at leisure, in full appreciation of
all factors Involved,

The request pleased no one,

Zafrullah

Khan considered the situation too urgent to warrant postpone
ment, particularly as Pakistan had other matters to take up.
"We do not know where we s t a n d , B u t on February 12, the
Council acceded to the request with the understanding that
the delegation would return as soon as possible.
Shifts in sympathy among the Council members had
become evident as this series of debates drew to a close.
the question of the agenda, there were varying views,
Gromyko’s thesis was that "only the Council can delete any
item from the Council’s

agenda."32

Official

Therefore, the Kashmir

3rd Year, 236th Meeting,

pp. 274-75,
SOynltM NôUfiüiS.

IV (March l, 1948), p. 193,

3^The New York Times, February 12, 1948.
32S£ CtfflcAal BÊÈfiüsbi, 3rd Year, 231st Meeting, p.
150,
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question was still the legal entry and would remain so until
the Council decided otherwise, although he had no objection
to including the Pakistani counter-complaint as a separate
item.
Fast footwork on both sides of the issue characterized
Noel-Baker on this point.

At first he agreed "broadly" with

the Indian contention that the question of Kashmir had prece
dence, although "we cannot deny to the representative of
Pakistan the right to raise a matter which he thinks

urgent.

"33

But Arce was of a different persuasion, for if the
Council attempted to deal with Kashmir apart from the other
questions, the dispute might never be settled and the Council
would be committing a "flagrant injustice" against the two
dominions.

All factors must be considered regardless of the

fact that only one was officially before the Council:
We must remember. . . that this is not a court
of justice but a political body, which must be
governed by fixed rules but cannot pay too much
attention to trifling details of form, partic
ularly when they do not involve major questions
of principle,34
El-Khouri reached the same conclusion after following
a legal route.

His judicial experience convinced him that,

once a principal claim had been submitted to "any court of
justice," the defending part was free "at any time" to sub
mit a counter-claim relative to the original issue:
The representative of the United Kingdom did
p. 148.
p. 150.
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not speak about the relationship between the
claims. If he considered them not related to
each other, his suggestion would be correct;
but if he considered that they were linked to
each other, then his proposal to have the
claims discussed and decided separately would
not be correct.33
Apparently always willing to oblige, Noel-Baker re
versed his field when he found Council consensus opposed to
his suggestion.

After all, "the substance is what matters"

and the members appeared to be agreed on the substance, which
was that all the matters were on the agenda, directly or by
implication.
Opinions on the question of priority of plebiscite or
cease-fire followed a similar pattern.

Again Noel-Baker, not

inclined to take a "dogmatic" view of the importance of either,
attempted to place a kindly hand on the shoulder of each
party.

He saw merit in iimediate consideration of referendum

procedures but "not at all because I am against the view ex
pressed by the representative of India that stopping the
fighting is our most urgent task.

I agree with him fully. .

Noel-Baker now believed that the entire issue, from measures
to halt strife to the staging of a plebiscite, was one prob
lem.

If confidence in a plebiscite could be created, a cease

fire might automatically follow.

As was to be expected, the

Indian representative took violent exception to this position.
Coincidentally, one meeting later Noel-Baker announced that
he had changed his mind; he no longer felt it necessary to
33lbid.. p. 149.
Official Recordsf 3rd Year, 236th Meeting, p. 282.
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-70to consider the plebiscite first.
El-Khouri and Arc© again favored the Pakistani side
of the issue.

No question of priority arose for cease-fire

and plebiscite were interdependent* said El-Khouri,

Further,

he agreed with Pakistan that the tribesmen were no one’s
agents:
The tribesmen and the inhabitants of Kashmir
are not responsible to anybody, and I do not
believe that anyone would have sufficient con
trol over them to issue a cease-fire order, , ,^7
And Arc© joined Zafrullah Khan on two points.

He questioned

the ability of Sheikh Abdullah’s administration to conduct an
impartial referendum and, in line with the Pakistani argument,
regarded misrule by the maharaja as the basic cause of Kash
mir’s difficulties in arguing for the priority of a plebiscite;
It is worth while to remember the Latin proverb,
which says ÆUfeiala
toliituz sifsfiius., or,
in other words remove the cause and the effects
will disappear, , . If. . , we assure these
human beings that they themselves will be able
to decide their own fate freely, , . I am sure _
that they will lay down their arms, I am sure
that the tribes will withdraw to their own
territories.38
Warren Austin^? of the United States followed NoelBaker in avoiding commitment to either India or Pakistan,
Official Records. 3rd Year, 237th Meeting, p. 290.
Official EsÈSœdâ, 3rd Year, 240th Meeting, p, 367.
39warren Robinson Austin, 1877- , former United
States senator, was named United States special ambassador to
the United Nations in 1947. His record in International af
fairs includes membership on the Senate Foreign Relations
committee and service as an adviser to American delegations
at various inter-American conferences. He is credited with
devising the Act of Chapultepec.
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-71although he did favor an interim government for Kashmir.
Elaborating upon this point,hhe gave indirect support to
India’s position on the validity of accession.

With acces

sion the external sovereignty of Kashmir had been transferred
to India.

Therefore, India need not worry that the foisting

of an interim administration upon the state would be a viola
tion of international law:
Now here we see the external sovereignty of
Kashmir and Jammu possessed, and exercised
before us in this petition by India. A
plebiscite is one of the conditions attend
ing the accession and the grant of this part
of the exercise of sovereignty from Kashmir
and Jamu to India. . . If this solution in
volves an Interim government, India has full
authority.40
At one point Austin became extremely critical of the tone of
the Indian case, which seemed to be requesting the Council
to "pull-off Pakistan" and let India "finish the job" in Kash
mir,

He informed Ayyangar that the Council was opposed to

Officiai
3rd Year, 240th Meeting, p. 376,
Austin is not quite in line with Oppenhelm. If the relation
of states, such as Kashmir, to the central government is con
sidered to be in the nature of vassalship or Indian suzerain
ty, India possesses international guardianship but the state
is independent internally. This is India’s own interpreta
tion, The institution of a new government, even if in pursuit
of international obligations over which India possesses author
ity, would amount to a violation of the internal "sovereignty*
of the state. "Suzerainty is by no means sovereignty. It is
a kind of international guardianship, . , In ever case in
other States, since the suzerain absorbs these relations en
tirely, such vassal nevertheless remains a half sovereign
State on account of its Internal independence, .
Oppenheim specifically cites the states of the Indian Empire as
examples. The Instrument of Accession supposedly placed the
states in the same position toward India or Pakistan that
they had enjoyed with respect to Great Britain. Oppenhelm,
pp. 170-71
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•72all fighting and definitely would not act as an ally of one
party to the dispute.

This was a further indication that, in

the eyes of the Council, Pakistan had achieved equal status
and rights with India in Kashmir.
Although T. F,

of China believed that the

Tsiang^l

obvious key to the problem lay in the plebiscite, he neverthe
less managed to stay on the fence by noting ithat "on the other
hand, unless we restore peace in Kashmir, such a plebiscite
would not be possible."42

The best method of halting strife,

said Tsiang, required Pakistan to use its Influence to keep
the tribesmen from entering Kashmir and India to withdraw Its
troops progressively if the Pakistani appeal were effective.
This suggestion was to be echoed in later, more detailed,
cease-fire proposals.
Ill
The debates which had opened on January 22 in an
atmosphere of optimism closed on February 12 under a cloud of
bitterness and despair.

Far from fulfilling the high hopes

of progress seemingly promised by acceptance of the second
Belgian resolution, the discussions had only revealed appar
ently irreconcileable differences on details in the imple
mentation of principles relatively easily agreed upon.

Yet

4^Tingfu Fuller Tsiang, 1895- , at present permanent
representative of China to the United Nations, was educated
in the United States, A former professor of history, he
entered the Chinese diplomatic service in 1936, serving as
ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1938.
^"52 Official

3rd Year, 237th Meeting, p. 289.
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-73the period was of considerable significance to later develop
ments.

It indicated that achievement of a settlement would

be an arduous and prolonged task and it witnessed emergence
of a number of issues which were to increase in importance
during the months to come.

Disagreement concerning an interim

administration and the priority of plebiscite or cease-fire
was not easily to be reconciled.

The genesis of future cease

fire proposals lay in Tsiang*s suggestions and, in the Colom
bian draft resolution, there lay a modification of the com
mission’s structure v4iich was later to be acted upon.
The six resolutions, which expired unenacted with
adjournment, clearly demonstrated that the Council, despite
India's attitude, planned to make the eventual plebiscite
even more its own concern than the question of Jwho was legally
at fault in Kashmir.

Ayyangar may have been somewhat Justified

in his criticism of the circuitous route by which the Belgian
resolution arrived at a cease-fire proposal but eventually
he, like the Council members themselves, would have to face
the fact that the Council was not an international tribunal
empowered to issue injunctions but must achieve its goals
through mediation and the cooperation of the parties to a
dispute.
The Indian case remained embedded in law, stressing
the legal aspect of all major issues, the validity of ac
cession, an interim administration, and priority of plebiscite
or cease-fire.

There was as yet no indication that

was prepared to compromise on any poSnt:
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-74The Council is not concerned with whether or
not the Maharajaw lawfully became the rule
(sic) of the State, whether or not there is
a moral administration in the State, whether
or not the Maharajah is sovereign, and whether
or not Kashmir.has, legally acceded to India.
The only issue is that Pakistan must observe
its international obligations«and must not
support any outside raiders. ^
The suggestions that Pakistan go to war, if necessary, to
fulfil its obligations and that the Council restrain Pakistan
in order to permit India to accomplish its aims in Kashmir
were ill-advised in the extreme for they could only irritate
those members of the Council sincerely working toward an end
to hostilities.
The Pakistani stand, although still less legal-based
than the Indian, called upon law in entering a stronger chal
lenge to the validity of accession.

This but indicated that

Pakistan would do better to avoid judicial intricacies for
the reasoning in this instance was weak.

On the remaining

issues, an interim government and precedence of plebiscite or
cease-fire, Pakistan continued to stress the practical aspects
of the situation.

The position that a cease-fire would be

a relatively unimportant matter if only a plebiscite were
immediately guaranteed was somevdiat extreme but not so annoy
ing to the Council as India’s seeming dismissal of the pleb
iscite from immediate consideration.
Council opinion, as a result of a number of rash
Indian statements, the abrupt adjournment request, and Indian
Nations Bulletin. IV (March 1, 1948), p. 194.
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-75Intransigeance on the interim administration and plebiscite
issues, had become more critical of New Delhi.

Yet there

was only a slight deviation from the neutral attitude adopted
in previous meetings.

Pakistan had apparently added Arce to

El-Khouri in its list of potential champions, but Austin,
Noel-Baker, and Tsiang remained resolutely in the middle.
Other members were largely noncommital.

And the Council, in

decisions on the agenda and on the plebiscite-cease-fire
controversy, had more clearly defined its approach to the
entire problem.

It was, as Arce had stated, "not a court of

justice but a political body" and it would seek a solution
not through legal but through political means.

Noel-Baker

attested to the Council's belief that its role was mediatory:
Having heard the parties, I want, with equal
understanding, with equal friendship. . . for
both, as a member of the Security Council,
sharing our collective responsibility to man
kind, to ask the question: What ought the
Security Council now to do?44
Granted that officially the Council remained neutral,
Pakistan could yet claim an advance at the conclusion of the
second series of meetings.

The alteration of the agenda v^as

a major victory, although it remained to be seen whether the
Pakistani counter-complaints would assume much importance in
the discussions, and, as a result of the uncompromising
Indian attitude on an interim administration and a plebiscite
and the impolitic request for adjournment, the Council was
growing increasingly annoyed with the Indian position,
Qiiicial Records. 3rd Year, 235th Meeting, p. 256.
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CHAPTER IV
PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH
I
Kashmir again became a problem for the Council on
March 8, 1948,

A recess of almost a month duration had pro

vided time for an alteration of the situation in Kashmir
itself and for considerable diplomatic activity in London and
Washington, the two capitals now beginning to show the most
concern over the dispute.

On March 5, Sheikh Abdullah had

been appointed "state Premier at the head on an interim popu
lar government."^

Previously he had merely headed an emer

gency administration while the pre-invasion prime minister
continued as titular chief of the government.

In addition,

the maharaja had guaranteed a democratic constitution and a
representative government for the state.

And rumors that the

United States and the United Kingdom had been seeking a new
approach to the problem, perhaps a broadening of Sheikh
Abdullah’s regime sufficient to win Pakistani approval, flood*
ed Lake Success.
Hopes for progress during the third phase of Council
debates were not entirely misplaced for when discussion
^JhSi U m ïfixJi

March 6, 1943.
-76-
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-77concluded on June 3, a program for commission activity in
Kashmir had been adopted by the Council, and grudgingly ac
cepted by Mew Delhi and Karachi, and the United Nations Com
mission for India and Pakistan had been constituted.

On

April 23, Belgium and Colombia joined Czechoslovakia and
Argentina, previously selected by India and Pakistan respec
tively, on the commission.

The United States became the

fifth member on May 7,
Of three resolutions introduced during themeetings,
two, a

six-power draft and a Syrian-sponsored document, were

approved.

The former afforded the commission its final

structure and was essentially a modification of a Chinese
resolution which did not reach a vote.

The draft^ submitted

by Tsiang provided for the withdrawal and denial of all aid
to the tribesmen, then the progressive withdrawal from Kash
mir of Indian troops not essential to the security of the
state; the remainder should be stationed so as not to "afford
any intimidation or appearance of intimidation."

India was

to establish a plebiscite administration "with the sole and
full authority to administer the plebiscite on the question
of accession of the State."

Further;

10, The Government of India undertakes to
use its best endeavours to ensure that in the
composition of the Interim Government of Jairanu
and Kashmir provision is made for adequate
representation of all major political groups In
the State,
11. The Government of India agrees to
^
OffiSiai Records. 3rd Year, Supp. for March, 1948,
S/699 $ pp. 3G-40.
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-78appoint an official of high standing to be
stationed in the State during the interim
period, who shall have the power to cause
to be fulfilled by the State Government all
international obligations arising out of the
present Articles of Settlement.3
The commission, after observing the plebiscite, would certify
to the Council whether it had been "really free and impartial."
The six-power (Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia,
United Kingdom, United States) resolution, later adhered to
by France, imitated the Colombian draft of February 11 in the
increase of the size of the commission to five members.

Paki

stan was to persuade insurgent elements in Kashmir to cooper
ate in cease-fire attempts and to secure the withdrawal of
the tribesmen from the state.

India was to withdraw its

troops in stages when arrangements for a cease-fire became
effective and to inform the commission of the completion of
each stage.

Again, the presence of the remaining troops

should not afford "any intimidation or appearance of intimida
tion."

The plebiscite administration was to control state

police forcesi
If these local forces should be found to be
inadequate, the Commission, subject to the
agreement of both the Government of India and
the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for
the use of such forces of either Dominion as
it deems effective for the purpose of pacifica
tion.4
The Kashmiri government was to be broadened to include
representatives of all major political groups and the
p. 340.
flifjjsiaX. B&fariia, 3rd Year, 286th Meeting, 8/726,
p. 21.
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-79plebiscite administration was to be granted all powers neces
sary for an impartial referendum,

Indian forces would be

made available to assist the administration and a plebiscite
administrator, nominated by the secretary-general of the
United Nations, would be appointed by and serve as an official
of the government of Kashmir.

Furthers

The Government of India should undertake to
prevent, and to give full support to the
Administrator. , . in preventing any threat,
coercion or intimidation, bribery or other
undue influence on the voters in the pleb
iscite. . .5
India was to ensure that the Kashmiri government
would guarantee civil liberties, release political prisoners,
and permit the return of refugees.

Lastly, the commission

was to certify, at the conclusion of the plebiscite, that the
vote had been "really free and impartial."
upon each paragraph of the resolution.

The Council voted

Belgium, Canada,

China, Colombia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States favored every provision while the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
abstained on all.

Argentina and Syria abstained on those

paragraphs which appeared to give India a greater voice in
the pre-plebiscite administration than was accorded Pakistan.
Final Council action occurred on June 3 following re
ceipt of a commission request for forther instructions, par
ticularly as to whether the group was to consider the items
in the Pakistani complaint in addition to the situation in
Sibid.. p. 34.
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Kashmir.

The resultant Syrian resolution directed the com

mission to proceed "without delay" to the scene of the dispute
"with a view to accomplishing in priority the duties assigned
to it"6 by the six-power resolution.

Regarding Pakistan's

counter charges, the commission was instructed:
. , . further to study and report to the Security
Council when it considers it appropriate on the
matters raised in the letter of the Foreign Min
ister of Pakistan, dated 15 January 1948, in the
order outlined in Paragraph D of the resolution
of the Council dated 20 January 1948.7
This order was:

(1) the situation in Kashmir as set forth in

the Indian complaint and in the Pakistani reply and (2) the
additional matters contained in the Pakistani counter-com
plaint.

The resolution was approved with eight in favor

(Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, Syria, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) and three abstentions
(China, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics).
II
Initial arguments in the new series of debates reveal
ed no relaxation in the rigid Indian and Pakistani positions
after a month in which to reconsider attitudes.

Ayyangar

proclaimed hopes for an early settlement but repeated India's
refusal to withdraw troops before the plebiscite, emphasizing
that in no fashion would Indian forces be permitted to interOfficial RecordsT 3rd Year, 312th Meeting, S/819,

p. 21.
£ll«
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-81fere with a "free and unfettered" referendum.

Yet a neutral

regime remained "unthinkable"; "it is not possible for India
to yield on this point.
Zafrullah Khan used indignation over India’s failure
to modify its position to mask the absence of compromise in
the Pakistani approach.

A further protest was entered on the

appointment of Sheikh Abdullah as premier of Kashmir, a fait
accompli which would further impede a settlement for "no one"
would accept as fair and just a referendum carried out by
the "hand-picked" premier of the maharaja with the aid of
•J

Indian troops.

For the record, Pakistan continued to demand

immediate consideration of plebiscite procedures.
But the chill was relieved somewhat with the intro
duction of the Chinese resolution.

Although this measure

called for changes in the government of Kashmir and a reduc
tion in the strength of Indian forces, Ayyangar was able to
modify his previous position and to express guarded approval
of the draft as "an honest, bona fide and fair attempt to
settle the question.Still, as a first step, the Council
should order Pakistan to halt aid to the insurgents,
Zafrullah Khan was "bewildered" that anyone should
expect the government of Pakistan to accept the Chinese pro
posal.

The plan might reduce the more obvious forms of

pressure on the voters but it could not prevent more subtle
®lhs. USM Xsxk liCLSS, March 11, 1948.
9lbid.. March 19, 1948.
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methods of coercion as long as Sheikh Abdullah remained at
the head of Kashmir's government.

The Sheikh had stated that

he was willing to broaden his ministry by the Inclusion of
representatives of other political groups as long as all mem
bers of the government were loyal to the National Conference.10
The premier would not tolerate "disloyal and traitorous" ele
ments.

The Idea was obviously to establish one-party govern

ment and to rule out participation by both the Moslem Confer
ence and the Azad Kashmir government.
The Chinese resolution had at least found Ayyangar
not totally unsympathetic but the six-power draft drew his
fire as well as Zafrullah Khan’s.

Ayyangar was not at all

pleased to see that this draft, although based on Tsiang*s,
had been so twisted out of shape by compromise that practically
every amendment of substance was "a definite worsening of our
position, and constitutes a breach— In some cases, a violent
one— in our fundamentals."^^

Resolutely pecking at techni

calities, he noted that although the Chinese version was not
above criticism, It had possessed some happy features:
It avoided any unnecessary or Improper encroach
ment by outside authorities on the sovereign
powers exercisable In the State by the Jammu
and Kashmir Government and by the Government
of India within their respective constitutional
spheres. It respected constitutional propri
eties In the relations which. In a federal
lOAccordlng to the Indian government, Abdullah’s
first ministry Included a member of the Moslem Conference,
one of five Moslems In a seven-member cabinet. The Kashmir
p. 15.
PiiJLulul üj££û£liÂ, 3rd Year, 285th Meeting, p. 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-83structure, should subsist between the Govern
ment of India and the Government of a State
which had acceded to India,12
This was not so in the case of the six-power measure
which appeared to provide for the complete displacement of
the legitimate state government.

And a most unsatisfactory

feature was the scant consideration given the issue on which
India had invoked Security Council Jurisdiction:
Short of obtaining an official declaration of
war by the Pakistan Government and the use of
their regular army openly for conducting mili
tary operations in Jammu and Kashmir, the
fighters have been and are obtaining all other
help and assistance on Pakistan territory.13
It was not clear to Ayyangar whether the provision calling
upon Pakistan "to prevent" the entrance of tribesmen and Pak
istani nationals into Kashmir carried a clear commitment on
the use of Pakistani armed force if peaceful methods failed
to halt this movement.

"Unless this committment is unequiv

ocal, the undertaking *to prevent* is not of any practical
value."14
Zafrullah Khan was even less impressed by the resolu
tion.

The fundamental problem was to determine the conditions

essential to a successful plebiscite.

Yet the draft concerned

to a great extent the character of the insurgents.

Deserting

Kashmir altogether, Zafrullah Khan threw himself into an
p. 4.
13Uiisi.. p. 6.
p. 11.
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hysterical and impolitic attack upon the Council.

He saw in

these "vague provisions" the result of much whispering
diplomacy:
If that is so, it would appear that at least
some of the members of the Security Council
seemed to have realized. « , with a sense of
sharp surprise, that the Security Council had
for once let itself slip into a position of
fairness and impartiality between two contend
ing parties which might help to restore the
United Nations a fraction of the prestige that
it was so rapidly losing in the eyes of the
world. They therefore beat a hasty retreat
from a position so unfamiliar and embarrassing
and fraught with the possibility of such unde
sired consequences,15
If Pakistan were to persuade the tribesmen to with
draw, Pakistani troops must be permitted to operate in the
battle areas in Kashmir to supervise withdrawal.

Yet the

only troops provided for were Indian, which would encourage
non-Moslem elements in Kashmir, knowing that forces charged
with maintaining order were drawn from their own side, to
grow aggressive and repeat the horrors of the Punjab,

In

short, all pre-plebiscite provisions seemed to be weighted
heavily in favor of India.
Ayyangar, unfortunately, had not reached the same con
clusion, although it was only right that arrangements should
favor India.

The union of Kashmir and India was legal; it

existed at that moment ahd it would exist at the conclusion
of hostilities.

It would exist until and if a plebiscite

went against India:
» p. 26.
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Until then, Pakistan has no constitutional posi
tion in Jammu and Kashmir; and we therefore put
it forward as one of our fundamental contentions
that, in regard to the arrangements which we make
for the plebiscite under international auspices,
there is no case for allowing the intervention of
Pakistan at any stage,
Ayyangar resented the tendency of the Council to regard Indian
forces in Kashmir as an army of occupation.

India would not

abdicate its "paramount duty" of defending Kashmir as long
as accession lasted.

Standing rock-solid on the legality of

the union, he attacked the resolution for failing to grant
India a privilege he must have known could never be accepted
by Pakistan:
When the whole of the State, , , comes under one
administration— and that, the administration of
the State of Jammu and Kashmir— India's garrisons
will need to be planted at her outer frontiers on
the west of the Jammu and Kashmir State.1?
Wrath consumed Zafrullah Khan with India's open
espousal of such an extreme position, a position wholly un
acceptable to Pakistan.

India not only desired to be the

sole judge of the validity of accession and of the constitu
tion of the government of Kashmir but insisted on Council aid
in imposing a military regime upon the entire state to achieve
v/hat its own Illegal efforts had been unable to accomplish.
No matter how, India might confuse the issue, the essence of
the matter remained that accession was a question equally
vital to both dominions, "and they are equally vitally
p. 13.
, p. 14.
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interested in its result.
Apparently no matter what its structure, India would
consider no interim government which was not totally an Indian
creature.

The resolution provisions on this point may have

been mild in the eyes of the Council but they were too much
for Ayyangar.

India did not oppose the inclusion of certain

outside elements in the present government.

Yet the proposal

to supplant that government with a special, coalition admin
istration was out of the question, for such administrations
were actually dangerous if brought into existence "at a time
when the major political issue before the country is one on
which those groups differ violently,
Zafrullah Khan was equally uncompromising on the other
side of the issue for he saw the continuance of the existing
government, coupled with the presence of Indian troops in
Kashmir, as unavoidably prejudicial to Pakistan.

On these

"two central crucial matters" Pakistan asked only an impartial
field from which all suspicion of favoritism toward one party
or the other had been removed.

But, as the Pakistani spokes

man correctly pointed out, the arrangements upon which India
insisted would "influence the plebiscite in only one direc
tion; there is no possibility of their influencing it in the
other,"'.20
p. 29.
. p. 14.
20lfcii., p. 30.
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-87Ayyangar*s ultimate view was that the modifications
of the Chinese resolution embodied in the six-power draft so
attenuated the former that India found acceptance impossible.
India and Pakistan appeared to be "tarred with the same brush"
in the interests of building a Council reputation for holding
the scales even between the parties, an attitude Zafrullah
Khan had Just as vehemently criticized the Council for
abandoning with the six-power measure:
India brought before the Security Council a
plain, élmple, straightforward, factually fool
proof issue, and the action that we suggested
the Security Council should take was inescap
able. . . instead of taking that action earlier,
India's complaint was placed in cold storage for
nearly four months. . ► And at the end of it
if all we are exhorted in appealing language,
to agree to a resolution niggardly in its recog
nition of the merits of the matter, vague and
indefinite in the wording of the action to be
taken by Pakistan. And in the interpretation
of that language the Security Council has gone
even further and been apologetic to Pakistan
for reminding it of its duty. India cannot,
in honour, agree to this treatment of its c a s e . 21
At last the Indian and Pakistani representatives found
themselves in agreement, albeit of a negative variety, for
Zafrullah Khan similarly opposed the resolution.

However,

certain amendments, which would actually amount to a drastic
reversal of the intentions of the proposal, might make it
acceptable to Pakistan,

Such alterations as granting Paki

stan the right to employ troops in Kashmir and reorganization
of the government on the basis of equal representation of all
major political groups would, in effect, transfer control of
p. 12.
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the state to the insurgent forces if the wording of the Pak
istani amendment were adopted:
The Government of the State shall forthwith be
reconstituted so as to give equal representa
tion to each major political group in the State
— viz.. the National Conference, the Muslim
Conference and the Azad Kashmir— which will
each be invited to designate an equal number
of responsible representatives to constitute
a Council of Ministers. This Council of
Ministers may choose one of its members to
act as President, but in the allocation of
portfolios it will be guided by the advice of
the Commission. 22
The unusual spectacle of Indian-Pakistani agreement,
even though in opposition to the resolution, evidently con
vinced the Council that at last a fair formula had been dis
covered, for each paragraph received the approval of a major
ity of the members.

And a rereading apparently convinced

Karachi and New Delhi that the measure was not Jquite so ob
jectionable as first supposed for although neither government
unreservedly accepted the resolution, both announced that
they were willing to consult with the commission once it
reached the sub-continent,^3
22jbid., p. 47.
23According to reports from New Delhi, the reception
India would accord the commission might be less than heart
felt: "The Indian press has begun to lay the ground work for
the rejection of any recommendations that the commission may
make unless they favor India. Dispatches from Kashmir make
it plain that the pro-India Government of Sheikh Abdullah is
now unwilling to accept even an impartial plebiscite. . . It
may be borne in mind that India and Sheikh Abdullah, with
Kashmir already in their hands, have nothing to gain and every
thing to lose so far as the United Nations Commission’s work
is concerned. . . In a. . . dispatch from Srinagar, Sheikh
Abdullah is quoted as having said in a speech to, . , his Na
tional Conference party: ’Kashmir is our homeland and no for
eigner has any right to interfere in our internal affairs’"
Ihfi. New York Tic:s. * e 16, 1948.
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-89Neither Ayyangar nor Zafrullah Khan commented ex
tensively on the Syrian resolution for by that time, June 3,
the commission had been constituted and had departed for
India,

However, Ayyangar remained opposed to any broadening

of commission powers:
All I need say is that my Government wishes me
to bring to the notice of the Security Council
the fact that it is opposed to any extension of
the powers of the Commission to cover Ithese three
additional charges, because it considers, first,
that these ancillary charges have not been proved;
and, secondly, that these charges do not consti
tute any alement of international importance
which merits consideration by the Security Coun
cil,24
The Pakistani opinion was even more briefly express
ed, ^returning to the theme that it' was the "totality of rela
tions between the two Dominions which constitutes a threat to
international peace. . .

Consequently, it was but natural

that the commission be instructed to investigate all facets
of the; dispute.
Neutrality remained the Council*s byword.

Austin of

the United States again stepped forward as the champion of an
interim administration, provision for which was contained in
both resolutions.

However, he v;as not in sympathy with the

Pakistani suggestion that all political groups in Kashmir
should share equally in the government:
The draft resolution does not mean. . . that
each of the three political groups. . . should
24sc Official S££fl££Ls., 3rd Year, 312th Meeting, p. 19.
SSltli., p, 8.
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be given the right to designate an equal number
of responsible representatives to constitute a
Council of Ministers. It is not our thought
that the predominantly Muslim character of the
population. . . should be a criterion. . . It
is likewise not our thought that any undue ad
vantage should be given to one group merely
because they hold the power at the present moment.
The principle involved is that of neutralization
of the Government in so
as the issue of ac
cession is c o n c e r n e d . 26
Considered in its entirety, the six-power resolution was not
a final solution, "not a determination of issues," said
Austin.

It was simply a method of aiding the parties to

achieve a solution other than through a military decision.
Noel-Baker similarly stressed the absence of any
indictment in the resolution:
To my Government it is in no sense an award, a
verdict, a judgment between the parties; it is
a plan, a body of measures. . . designed to
stop the present fighting in Kashmir and to pro
vide machinery for the fair and impartial pleb
iscite on Kashmir’s future. . .27
In Tsiang, India found a faintly sympathetic voice
during debates on the six-power measure.

Although criticizing

Ayyangar for his opposition, when the draft actually offered
much that India asked, Tsiang agreed that the plebiscite, the
"arch of the resolution," was impossible without prior restora
tion of order.
forces

The proposal called for a reduction of Indian

in Kashmir but

he couldnot

the right to enter the state again

see that itdenied India
in self-defense if raids

should reoccur:
26^C Official Records. 3rd Year, 236th Meeting, p. 25.
Qi£l&iàX, Records, 3rd Year, 284th Meeting, p. 12.
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I maintain that if the provisions of the draft
resolution were each executed in turn, the prob
lem of defence would be a minor one, if it did
not disappear altogether. . . But if our calcu
lations should be wrong and if, suddenly, there
should be a large invasion, then what? , • Noth
ing in this draft resolution impairs the inherent
right of self-defence.28
Arce continued to display a predilection for Zafrullah
Khan*8 case, opposing all portions of the resolution which
appeared to give India an undue advantage in the deployment
of armed forces in Kashmir,

And, with Zafrullah Khan, he

argued that "speeches and proclamations" alone would not be
sufficient to persuade the tribesmen to withdraw; Pakistan
should be allowed "to make use of all the means at its dis
posal. . , and among those means, the most frequently employ
ed is the use of police, of force,"29

Pakistani troops

should be permitted to operate in Kashmir,
El-Khouri opposed the draft on two counts:

(1) it

unduly favored India and (2) since it did not meet the wishes
of either party, the Council was making a futile gesture in
approving a program which could not be implemented without
the cooperation of India and Pakistan.

He then struck at

India with New Delhi’s own weapon of law for he charged that
although the resolution treated the political aspect of the
problem satisfactorily, it ignored the legal aspect, acces
sion:
It would not be legally and judicially correct
p. 9.
29sc Official Record^. 3rd Year, 2C6th Meeting, p. 13,
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-92If we considered the accession as already hav
ing taken place, and that it cannot be modified
except by a plebiscite. I consider that, up to
the present time, there is no accession of Kash
mir to either Dominion, because that accession
which was proposed was not in conformity with
the arrangements and agreement made between the
two parties, and it is not an arrangement with
the people of Kashmir themselves whereby they
have been given a chance for self-determination,
an opportunity to decide their own fate.30
He considered it "fair and just" that, in drafting the reso
lution, the Council should give both parties equal privileges
in the plebiscite arrangements and thus abstained from voting
on provisions which called for the use of Indian or Kashmiri
state forces or officials and did not provide similar benefits
for Pakistan or Azad Kashmir.
Discussion on the Syrian resolution added Guy de la
Tournelle of France, for the moment, to Tsiang as an Indian
advocate.

De la Tournelle thought the measure unnecessary

and implied that the Pakistani counter-charges did not merit
investigation.

Yet he would vote for the resolution since it

would have an inconsequential effect on the commission’s
activities, neither hindering nor aiding them;
The fact that the Commission is given complete
freedom to consider these questions does not
at all mean that it will deal with them. On
the contrary it will be free to disregard them
without referring back to the Security Council,
if it thinks that these questions do not con
stitute a threat to p e a c e , 31
30lbid.. p. 4. El-Khouri was referring to the IndoPakistani understanding that disputed accessions would not
be regarded as final until settled by a referendum.

Official Records. 3rd Year, 312th Meeting p. 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-93Tsiang stepped forward openly in India's defense in
this instance, abstaining in the vote on the resolution.

He

feared that further instructions to the commission would ob
scure the most important issue, Kashmir, and attempted to
persuade the Pakistani delegation to drop the charges in its
counter-complaint.

The implementation of partition agreements

was a matter of administrative detail; no real injustice would
be done to either party if the charge were dropped.

The

validity of the genocide issue was doubtful:
It would be wise if the representative of Pakistan
would drop the question of genocide, . , Bringing
up that question here casts a certain slur on the
Government of India, I do not think that the
slur is deserved, • . add I do not think that the
handling of that question by the Security Council
would really help to restore better relations
between the two Governments,32
Advice so close to the Indian case was understandably rejected
by Zafrullah Khan.
Ill
The Council record from March 8 to June 3, 1948 was
perhaps more encouraging than that of any other single per
iod during the dispute.

The United Nations Commission for

India and Pakistan, long promised and discussed, had at last
been created and given a fairly detailed plan of operations.
And despite Indian and Pakistani protests during the meetings,
the home government had expressed qualified willingness to
cooperate with the Council's agent once it began its task.
t p* 4.
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If an international investigatory body were the answèr to the
problem of Kashmir, the Council had taken a long step toward
a settlement.

Yet already there were indications that the

commission's future was not to be untroubled.

India's uni*

lateral action in the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah as Kash
mir's premier foreshadowed a tendency to act in Kashmir with
out previous consultation with either the Security Council or
Pakistan.

The practical value of United Kingdom-United States

mediatory activity was evident in the provisions of the
Chinese and six-power resolutions covering an interim adminisi

tration, the principle of which India reluctantly accepted.
But such action had aroused Pakistan's resentment and even
though diligent negotiations might persuade India to move
toward compromise, results would continue to be nullified if
Sheikh Abdullah could not similarly be persuaded to abstain
from inflammatory statements.
The three resolutions, particularly the Chinese and
six power drafts, bore out the Council's determination to
achieve a compromise political settlement rather than to hand
down a judicial decision.

Both resolutions appeared to be

based on a practical analysis of the situation, recognizing
Pakistan's right to a voice in any settlement but similarly
noting that, until accession was definitely invalidated,
India enjoyed a legal status that could not be claimed in pll
honesty and sincerity by Pakistan.

The Syrian resolution, in

providing for the priority of Kashmir, effectively shunted
the Pakistani counter-charges to the sidelines and can be
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-95viewed only as a valueless sop to Pakistani pride and honor,
as De la Tournelle so obviously implied.
On the surface, the Pakistani and Indian positions
appeared to have remained firm but in reactions to the pro
posals of an interim administration and to the six-power
resolution, passed over their protests, the two governments
began to display a grudging willingness to compromise.

But

India refused to abandon its basic premises that accession
was valid and that the issue was a question of legal rights.
In addition, the contentions that Pakistan should play no
role in a plebiscite and that Indian troops should be author
ized to garrison the entire state were advanced more firmly,
and foolishly, for Pakistan could never accept them,
Zafrullah Khan continued to refuse recognition of the
validity of accession and so was unable to give unreserved
support to any measure that accepted the legality of the
Indian position in Kashmir.

But in proposing an amendment to

the six-power resolution, he indicated that Pakistanis con
ception of an ioterim government was no less weighted in
favor of Pakistan than was the Indian in favor of India.
The sole deviation in Council alignment came in
Tsiang's reinforcement of the Indian forces.

Yet even this

development made no appreciable change in the over-all Coun
cil attitude of neutrality.

The voting pattern, aside from

Tsiang’s abstention on the Syrian resolution, remained the
same.

After six months of debate and negotiation, slight

departures from a generally impartial approach appeared to
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place Argentina and Syria in support of Pakistan, China as
India*s advocate, and the United Kingdom and the United States
in the forefront of a resolutely neutral bloc, a bloc that
set the Council line in all resolutions*
India and Pakistan emerged from this latest series
of meetings with equal portions of success and setback.

India,

the loser in two previous bouts, had indicated sufficient will
ingness to compromise to escape the criticism that had fallen
on its previous totally intransigent attitude.

The six-power

resolution, while not granting all it asked, nevertheless gave
to New Delhi the larger role in plebiscite arrangements.

And

although opposed to the Syrian resolution, India could yet
claim satisfaction from it for it definitely gave Kashmir
precedence over all other issues with the likelihood that it
would be the sole question seriously considered by the Council.
Pakistan*s legal position as a party in the dispute
was more clearly established than had previously been the
case.

The six-power resolution recognized this and contained

provisions which might lead to the legal employment of Paki
stani troops in Kashmir.

And the Syrian resolution, although

of slight practical value, demonstrated that the Council had
not, officially at least, dismissed from consideration the
Pakistani charges against India.
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CHAPTER V
A MATTER OF SUBSTANCE
I
With the establishment of the commission, the Secur
ity Council temporarily relinquished direct consideration of
Kashmir.

Areas of serious disagreement remained, and neither

the Indian nor the Pakistani government had accepted uncondi
tionally the six-power resolution defining the commission’s
competence.

Yet prospects were far from inauspicious, for

six months of wrangling and compromise in the meeting rooms
at Lake Success had resulted in broad principles— a cease
fire and a plebiscite under United Nations auspices— upon
which a settlement might be constructed.

And both New Delhi

and Karachi had expressed willingness to confer with the
commission.
For eighteen months, from June 16, 1948^ to December
17, 1949, the five-member "creature of the Council" sought
an answer to the question of Kashmir’s future.

Its search

&The commission’s first eleven meetings, to July 3,
took place at Geneva and were devoted to organization. Mem
bership changed several times during the commission’s life.
The original roster consisted of Santos Gomez, Colombian
diplomat; Jerome Klahr Huddle, United States ambassador to
Burma; Egbert Graeffe, Belgian diplomat; Dr. Josef Korbel,
Czechoslovak ambassador to Yugoslavia; and Dr. Ricardo Sirl,
Argentine minister to Denmark. The New York Times. June 17,
1943.
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was blessed with partial success for in Kashmir a cease-fire
was arranged and a cease-fire line agreed upon.

But certain

questions, at first mere details, had become so magnified as
to present almost insurmountable obstacles to a final truce
and plebiscite agreement.

The military situation in Kashmir

had changed drastically, for Pakistan, contrary to its profes
sions before the Council, had employed regular army units in
the state after May 8, 1948 and had assumed direct military
control of the tribesmen and of the Azad Kashmir

forces,

% As

a result, demilitarization of Kashmir through withdrawal of
armed forces, at first thought a technical question to be
settled by military experts, had become *a matter of substance,"
The new impasse brought from the commission majority a recom
mendation that further mediatory activities be conducted by
a single representative of the Council.
Council discussions following receipt of the final
commission report resulted in a set of demilitarization pro
posals, based upon the commission’s findings and recommenda
tions drafted by General McNaughton,

Although both India and

Pakistan found the suggestions unacceptable without extensive
amendment, the Council viewed them as "fair and just" and on
March 14, 1950 adopted a four-power resolution embodying the
essence of the McNaughton proposals.

An Australian jurist.

^Ibid.. July 18, 1948, The New Delhi report contained
a further indication of change in the situation in Kashmir:
•An Indian news agency reported today that the tribesmen in
, . , Kashmir, once Innmbering 80,000, have now dwindled to an
insignificant force, leaving most of the fighting to local
insurgents and to Pakistanis. ,
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Sir Owen Dixon,3 was named, on April 12, 1950, to the newly
created post of United Nations Representative for India and
Pakistan,
The Security Council experienced a change in member
ship twice during the commission’s existence.

January 1,

1949, Cuba, Norway,\ and.Egypt replaced Colombia, Belgium, and
Syria,

One year later, Ecuador, India, and Yugoslavia were

elected to positions vacated by Argentina, Canada, and the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,

Thus, when the final

commission report was debated, from February through April,
1950, represented on the Council were Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt,
India, Norway, and Yugoslavia in addition to the five perma
nent members.

However, the Soviet delegate, boycotting

Council meetings as a result of the dispute over Chinese
representation, did not participate in the discussions.
The first commission report covered activities during
the three months from June 16 through September 22, 1943,
The original premier problems of an interim government for
Kashmir and arrangement of troop-withdrawal details had faded
before the immediate necessity of a cease-fire with the dis
covery, on July 7, that Itbree brigades of regular Pakistani
troops had been operating in Kashmir since May 8.

Pakistan’s

reasons for this action were necessity to forestall an Indian
3$ir Owen Dixon, 1886- , educated in Australia, was
appointed acting judge on the Victoria state supreme court in
1926, Since 1929 he has served as a justice of the Australian
high court, apart from the years 1940-44 when he sat on var
ious government war boards, 1940-42, and was Australian am
bassador to the United States, 1942-44,
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offensive supposedly designed to crush Moslem opposition in
the state, protection of Pakistani territory from possible
aggression by Indian forces, and prevention of an influx of
refugees into Pakistan:
Pakistan had not informed the Security Council
of the presence of its troops in Kashmir be
cause, by the time they had been sent into the
State, the question had been entrusted to the
Commission whose early departure for the sub
continent was expected, . . In view of the
Foreign Minister, the presence of Pakistani
troops in Kashmir did not raise the question
of international obligations since Pakistan
had never accepted any with regard to non-inter
ference in Kashmir.4
Further legal justification was sought in the invalidity of
Kashmir’s accession to India, according to the Pakistani in
terpretation of that union.
To meet a dangerous situation, the commission asked
the governments to accept a resolution, drafted on August 13,
which consisted of three parts;

(1) a cease-fire proposal;

(2) a truce agreement; and (3) a vague reaffirmationof the
desire of both parties to settle the dispute by means of a
plebiscite.

The first part called upon the Indian and Paki

stani military commands, at the earliest practicable date, to
issue a cease-fire order applicable to all forces under their
control.

Military commanders were then to agree upon a

permanent cease-fire line.

Further;

The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani
forces agree to refrain from taking any measures
that might augment the military potential of the
forces under their control in the State of Jammu
Record3, 3rd Year, Supp. for Nov., 1943,
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-101and Kashmir. {For the purpose of these pro
posals forces ujadsz Ih&lt control shall be
considered to include all forces, organized
and unorganized, fighting or participating in
hostilities on their respective s i d e s . ) 5
The truce section of the resolution recognized the
presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir as a material change
in the situation.&

Consequently, Pakistan was to withdraw

its forces and to secure the withdrawal of the tribesmen.
Pending a final settlement, evacuated territory would be ad
ministered by local authorities supervised by the commission:
When the Commission shall have notified the
Government of India that the tribesmen and Paki
stani nationals. . . have withdrawn, thereby
terminating the situation which was represented
by the Government of India to the Security Coun
cil as having occasioned the presence of Indian
forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and
further, that the Pakistani forces are being
withdrawn. , , the Government of India agrees
to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces. . .
in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.'
Following withdrawal, and until the dispute had been settled,
India would maintain, in agreement with the commission, the
minimum force necessary to ensure law and order in Kashmir.
The Indian government accepted the proposals on the
understanding that a cease-fire would accord no legality to
p. 32.
^The first resolution concerning Kashmir adopted by
the Security Council (S/651) requested India and Pakistan "to
inform the Council immediately of any material change in the
situation which occurs or appears to either of them to be
about to occur while the matter is under consideration by the
Council, and consult with the Council thereon."
Officiai Escsisiâ, 3rd Year, Supp. for Nov., 1948,
S/1100, p. 33.
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the presence of Pakistani troops, that Kashmir’s sovereignty
would not be affected, that Indian troops would occupy
strategic evacuated points, that India would retain sufficient
forces in Kashmir to guarantee security, and that Pakistan
would not participate in the organization 6f the plebiscite.
Pakistan weakened its acceptance with the conditions
that India accede to plebiscite arrangements placing the tv/o
governments on an equal footing, that all Kashmir be placed
under the surveillance of the commission, that evacuated ter
ritories be administered by local authorities in ^

facto con

trol at the time of the cease-fire, and that Azad Kashmir be
a party to any settlement.

Pakistan could not speak for Azad

Kashmir nor would it employ coercion:
Political control over the Azad Kashmir forces
vests in the Azad Kashmir Government, and it is
the latter Government alone that has authority
to issue a cease-fire order to those forces, and
to conclude terms and conditions of a truce which
would be binding upon those forces.8
In addition, Karachi rejected the portion of the resolution
labeling the entry of Pakistani troops into Kashmir a material
change in the situation.
The commission assented to the Indian qualifications
but found that Pakistan’s "clarifications" amounted to ser
ious reservations.

Discussion of plebiscite arrangements was

not yet pertinent and the commission had been informed
previously by Karachi that Azad forces were controlled by the
Pakistani high command:
®Xi2ià» • pp. 41-42.
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-103The commission observes with regret that. . .
Pakistan has been unable to accept. , . without
attaching certain conditions beyond the compass
of this resolution, thereby making Impossible''an
Immediate cease-fire and the beginning of fruit
ful negotiations between the two Governments and
the Commission to bring about a peaceful and
final settlement of the situation In the State
of Jammu and Kashmir,9
In analyzing the situation, the commission found two
new factors primarily responsible for failure to achieve a
cease-fire;

(1) the existence of the Azad Kashmir movement

as an organized political and military entity, assisted by
Pakistan and In control of large areas of Kashmir, and (2)
the presence of Pakistani troops In the state:
The Security Council never contemplated during
Its debates that the Commission, , . should
deal with a situation involving military action
between two regular armies.10
The positions of the governments on the question of the Pak
istani forces had become unyielding,

India insisted that they

be withdrawn before the initiation of negotiations for a final
settlement.

Yet Pakistan refused to consider withdrawal

unless Indian troops left the state simultaneously.

Pakistan,

"in Its desire to anticipate certain specific conditions which
might provide the bases for a plebiscite,"11 had destroyed
all possibility of affecting an Immediate cease-fire.
Following receipt of the first report, the Council
p. 49.
p. 52.
1 1 ^ Official Records. 3rd Year, 382nd Meeting, p. 5.
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-104requested that yet another attempt be made to achieve agree
ment on a cease-fire.

The commission began negotiations with

the Indian and Pakistani representatives to the United Nations
and was able to report on January 10, 1949 that, as a result
of acceptance by both governments of plebiscite provisions
supplementary to the commission’s cease-fire resolution,
neither Karachi nor New Delhi saw any reason for the continu
ation of hostilities:
Both Governments announced their agreement to
order a cease-fire effective one minute before
midnight, 1 January 1949, publicly expressing
the hope that this decision may bring to the
peoples of Pakistan and India a sense of closer
friendship.12
The new provisions called for a plebiscite immediately
upon implementation of the cease-fire and truce measures of
the original resolution.

The secretary-general of the United

Nations was to nominate a plebiscite administrator who would
be appointed officially by the government of Kashmir and
derive all necessary powers from the state:
After implementation of parts I and II of the
Commission’s resolution of 13 August 1948, , .
the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator
will determine, in consultation with the Govern
ment of India, the final disposal of Indian and
State armed forces, such disposal to be with
due regard to the security of the State and the
freedoms of the plebiscite.13
Disposal of armed forces in the evacuated territories would be
determined by the commission and the administrator in consuli2sc Official Records. 4th Year, Supp. for Jan., 1949,
S/1196, p. 23.
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-105tation with local authorities.

The United Nations agents

would also organize the referendum and attest to its impar
tiality.

Details of the vote would be settled following

signature of a truce agreement.

The second report concluded

with a request that the plebiscite administrator be appointed
as soon as possible.
But the commission’s third report, forwarded to the
Council on December 17, 1949, demonstrated all too clearly
that agreement on principle does not ensure a common approach
to detail.

Upon the commission’s return to the sub-continent,

the most urgent problems had been implementation of the cease
fire and arrangement of truce provisions.

Hostilities in

Kashmir had ceased, and Karachi reported considerable progress
in withdrawing tribesmen and other irregular forces from
Kashmir.

It was expected that by the middle of February,

1949 "the obligation of the Pakistan Government in this re
spect would have been fulfilled."14
Comprehensive truce proposals were completed on April
28, and the governments were requested to accept them without
reservations.
fire line.

The commission would demarcate a formal cease

Since the military situation in Kashmir’s northern

areas was confused, disposition of the region would not be
determined immediately:
Should the Commission and/ or the Plebiscite
Administrator conclude upon advice from the
Observers, or upon reports from the Government
Pffi-Cial RegarsUt 4th Year, Special Supp. No. 7,
5/1430, p. 29,
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of India, that it is necessary for the defence
of the area, the Commission and/ orlthe Pleb
iscite Administrator may request the.Government.of India to post garrisons at specified points.
Pakistan was to have seven weeks in which to withdraw its
troops in successive contingents.

India also was to withdraw

the bulk of its forces;
The withdrawal will begin as soon as the Com
mission shall have notified the Government of
India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals
. . . have withdrawn, and that the Pakistan
troops are being withdrawn, , .16
Territory evacuated by Pakistan would be administered
by local authorities under commission surveillance.

Upon

acceptance of the proposals, the commission would consult with
India on the disposal of Indian and state forces and with
"local authorities regarding the disposal of the armed forces
in the territory to be evacuated by Pakistan troops, , ."I?
The truce terms were not to be considered prejudicial to the
territorial integrity or sovereignty of Kashmir,
Neither India nor Pakistan was able to accept the
proposals without reservations,

Pakistan, under no condition,

would agree to Indian occupation of evacuated areas north of
the cease-fire line and insisted on interpreting the "declared
objective" of the truce terms to be a synchronization oflthe
withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces so as to create a
"military balance" between the opposing forces.

In order to

p. 111.
lÊ JM d.. p. 112.
l^ itis t., p, 113.
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-107maintain order in the evacuated areas, it would be necessary
to reorganize the Azad forces, which were to be considered
"local authorities* and not subject to withdrawal or disband
ment.

Further, the guarantee of Kashmir’s integrity and

sovereignty introduced a controversial matter and so should
be omitted from the truce terms.
India found the proposals, further qualified by the
Pakistani reservations, fundamentally opposed to the Indian
position.

The claim of Pakistan, much less that of Azad

Kashmir, to equality of rights in Kashmir in any sphere had
never been acknowledged.

India could never accept "synchro

nization" or "military balance" which would mean that Paki
stani action would be contingent on Indian withdrawal and
that Azad forces would remain in control of state territory.
Pakistani withdrawal and Azad disarmament would have to pre
cede any move to diminish Indian strength:
The Government of India are prepared to discuss
with the Commission the, , , formation of a Civil
Armed Force for the maintenance of, . , order in
Azad. . . territory, but both the composition and
the character of -such a force must be adjusted to
this primary purpose and not to the creation of
"a military balance between the forces on each
side,"IS,
Lastly, since Indian forces were not specifically authorized
to garrison the northern areas, Kashmir’s security would be
dangerously weakened.
Unable to agree upon political provisions of a truce,
the governments nevertheless achieved a formal demarcation of
p. 93,
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the cease-fire line on July 27.

The agreement specified the

positions of opposing forces and provided that "there shall
be no increase of forces or strengthening 6f defences in
areas where no major adjustments are involved in, , . the
cease-fire line,"^^

,

Heartened, the commission suggested further confer
ences on a truce.

In case no common ground could be found,

the governments were asked to submit their differences to
arbitration.

Pakistan assented, but India, explaining that

although it was not opposed to the principle of arbitration,
it thought that the commission proposal was too vague, refused.
Withdrawal and Azad disarmament were not questions for arbitra
tion but for immediate decision.
In analyzing developments during the year and a half
of its existence, the commission found that three principal
issues impeding a solution had emerged in clear focus:

(1)

disposition of Azad forces, (2) withdrawal of regular troops,
and (3) the question of the northern areas:
The implementation of a truce which appeared to
be a question mainly of procedure and of short
duration— approximately three months— became in
fact a matter of substance.20
Augmentation of Azad forces, officered by and working in close
cooperation with the Pakistani military, had seriously com
plicated the basic problem of withdrawal.

On that issue, the

commission sided with India regarding a "military balance"
p. 126.
p. 36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

*•109•
and "synchronization" of withdrawal, which could not be in
terpreted without reference to the distinction drawn by the
resolution between India and Pakistani forces:
The Commission's reference to synchronization
should be interpreted to mean that discussion
with. • . India concerning the withdrawal of
the bulk of its forces would hnsue without de
lay and lead to the establishment of a time
sequence for the two withdrawals, . . after
the acceptance of truce terns by both Govern
ments, The Commission was not able to share
the view of. . . Pakistan that the only method
of assuring this form of synchronization was
by the full and free exchange of information
between the Indian and Pakistan Governments
regarding withdrawal plans.21
But the commission disagreed with India on the northern
areas.

A cease-fire throughout Kashmir was necessary during

the plebiscite, and the entry of Indian troops into these
regions might be opposed bitterly and forcibly by the solidly
Moslem population.

While it was doubtful whether the north

was effectively in Pakistani control during the autumn of
1948, by January 1, 1949 state authority had been eliminated
from the area and Pakistan "undeniably held military con
trol."2%
The commission doubted that a five-member body was
sufficiently flexible Jand suggested a single representative
with broad authority as a more effective means of finding
"the balance and compromise necessary to, , , settlement of
the dispute,"23

%he representative's powers should include
, p. 51.
p. 59.
, p. 62.
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"authority to settle eventually, by arbitration, such issues
involved in the demilitarization, . . which impede the pleb
iscite."^4

as yet unnamed representative was advised to

commence his work with a modification of the original demil
itarization plan:

-,

Such a modification must treat the problem of
demilitarization as a whole, eliminating all
distinctions and comprising all questions concerning the final disposal of all armed forces
in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.25

And the commission's successor would be aided in his task,
for on March 22 Admiral Chester W, Nimitz26 of the United
States had been appointed plebiscite administrator, fulfilling
the request in the commission's second report.

Once demili

tarization and a truce had been achieved, Nimitz could under
take arrangements for the referendum.
A minority report was submitted on December 16, 1949,
by Oldrich Chyle, Czechoslovak commission member.

He stated

bluntly that the commission had failed, failed because the
resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 were not
based on the actual political situation.

No compromise on

the basis of the resolutions was acceptable to both parties.
p. 63.
p. 52.

^^Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, 1885- , a
1905 graduate of Annapolis, has served the United States in
two world wars. Commander of the Atlantic submarine force
in the first war, he was commander in chief of the Pacific
fleet from 1941 to 1945. Admiral Nimitz was awarded the
newly created rank of fleet admiral of ithe navy in 1944.
From 1945 he was chief of naval operations.
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-IllThe majority had shown •insufficient sagacity* by underrating
the significance of the Azad forces and by failing to take
into account the situation in the north when drafting its
truce proposals.

The United States and the United Kingdom

were largely responsible for the failure by pressing for
arbitration, a step the commission had not been authorized to
take.

The American and British governments had continually

interfered with the work of the commission:
If peaceful solution of the dispute is to be
attained it has to be assured that the Commis
sion does not become an instrument of policy
of certain Great Powers.2?
Not lack of flexibility but too much flexibility had under
mined the commission’s "vain attempt" to please both parties.
Chyle recommended a new commission, consisting of representa
tives of all Council members, with complete freedom from
interference guaranteed.
Following the consideration of the third report, the
Council authorized General McNaughton, Council president dur
ing January, 1949, to initiate further negotiations.
forwarded his report on February 3, 1950.

McNaughton

Pakistan would ac

cept the demilitarization proposals subject to slight changes
in wording,

India proposed several amendments, the most

important being the withdrawal of all regular and irregular
forces from Kashmir, the disarmament of Azad forces, and Indian
military control of the northern areas with civil administra
tion by the state government,
Q£Ii£iâl
S/1430, p. 203,

4th Year, Special Supp. No. 7,
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McNaughton prefaced his formal proposals with a
suggestion that future action be based upon existing points
of agreement and that judgment on past issues be avoided.

He

reaffirmed the necessity of a plebiscite and called for a
program of progressive demilitarization designed:
. . . to reduce the armed personnel in the State
. . . on each side of the cease-fire line to the
minimum compatible with the maintenance of secur
ity and of. . . order, and to a level sufficiently
low and with the forces so disposed that they will
not constitute a restriction on the free expression
of opinion. , .28
This meant withdrawal of regular Pakistani and Indian forces
not essential to state security as well as disbandment of
local forces, the state army and Azad Kashmir.

The demili

tarized northern area would be administered by local authori
ties under United Nations supervision.
Agreement between the governments should be reached
upon a number of points:
(a) The Government of Pakistan should give
unconditional assurance to the Government of
India that it will deal effectively within its
own borders with any possibility of tribal in
cursion into Janrniu and Kashmir. . .
(b) The Governments of India and Pakistan
should confirm the continued and unconditional
inviolability of the cease-fire line.
(c) Agreement should be reached on the basic
principles of demilitarization. • .
(d) Agreement should be reached on the min
imum forces required for the maintenance of
security and of. , , order, and on their general
disposition.
(e) Agreement should be reached on a date by
which the reduction of forces. . . is to be
accomplished.
(f) Agreement should be reached on the proOfiiclsI Eææqx A s.» £>th Year, Supp. for Feb.,
1950, S/1453, p. 14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-113gresslve steps to be taken in reducing and re
distributing the forces to the level envisaged
, , , above.
A United Nations representative would supervise the progres
sive stages of demilitarization and would have authority to
"interpret" agreements on these points.

When demilitarization

had not been accomplished, the plebiscite administrator would
take up his duties.
Although unconditional acceptance of the McNaughton
proposals was not offered by either India or Pakistan, the
Council nevertheless acted upon them in the four-power (Cuba,
Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States) resolution
adopted on March 14, 1950.

The draft asked for the "resolu

tion of the outstanding difficulties" based upon the "sub
stantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles
already reached,"

Demilitarization steps should be taken

immediately:

Ihâ

gflungil#

1* Calla upon the Governments of India and
Pakistan to make immediate arrangements without
prejudice to their rights or claims. . . to pre
pare and execute within a period of five months
. . . a programme of demilitarization on the
basis of the principles. . . of General McNaugh
ton* s proposals or of such modifications of
those principles as may be mutually agreed, .
A United Nations representative would "assist in the

preparation and, , , supervise the implementation" of demili
tarization and would "Interpret" agreements reached between

p. 15.
SOygaLbaOk
^Yearbook OL
al lh&
i______ , Uaiims, 12SQ (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 308-09.
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-114India and Pakistan.

He would exercise all powers formerly

devolving upon the commission, which was officially dissolved.
At the "appropriate stage" he was to arrange for assumption
by the plebiscite administrator of functions assigned to the
latter through agreements between the parties.

The resolution

was approved with eight votes in favor (China, Cuba, Ecuador,
Egypt, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United
States); none opposed; two abstentions (India and Yugoslavia);
and one member, the Soviet Union, absent.
II
Six primary issues— Pakistani troops in Kashmir, the
Azad Kashmir forces, troop withdrawal, disposition of Kash
mir’s northern districts, interpretation of plebiscite con
ditions, and the McNaughton proposals reoccurred in Council
debates during the eighteen months of commission activity.
India’s Sir Senegal Narsing Rau^^ belabored the facts of law
and the perfidy of Pakistan with passion on the first issue
to arise, Pakistani military operations in Kashmir.

Eau had

a telling point and he let neither the Council nor Pakistan
forget it.

Within a fortnight after Pakistan had righteously

sworn to the Council that it was not an active party in the
Kashmiri disturbances, Pakistani troops had moved into the
^Sir Senegal Narsing Rau, 1887- , educated in India
and in England, joined the Indian Civil Service in 1910. He
served on several provincial high courts and from 1944 to
1945 he was prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir, In 1946 Rau
was a constitutional adviser to the constituent assemblies of
both India and Burma, Since 1949 he has been permanent
Indian representative to the United Nations.
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-115state, a development that could be viewed only as a material
change in the situation.

Yet Pakistan had not seen fit to

inform an agency of the United Nations luntil several months
later:
Thus, India’s original complaint alleging aid
by Pakistan, , , was now proved to be true or
at least, to have become true in an aggravated
form; not only was there aid, but the Pakistan
Army was actually inside the State giving aid
and direction hnd, indeed, engaging in actual
fighting,32
Self-defense was no Mystification, for under Article
5l33 of the Charter there were two limitations on that right—
there must be an armed attack upon a United Nations member,
and measures taken in self-defense must be reported immedi
ately to the Security Council,

Rau belittled the Indian

actions complained of as merely tactical maneuvers designed
to relieve military pressure in Ladakh and Poonch,
Zafrullah Khan, trapped by an obvious violation of
obligations accepted in several Council resolutions, flayed
wildly at the Indian charges in spasmodic tirddes of question
able legal right and unrestrained emotion.

Ignoring the

^^20. Official Records, 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 6,
Article 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member oflthe
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur
ity. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security."
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-116technical and legal aspects of the situation, he reiterated
the defense that an all-out offensive by India had necessitat
ed an all-out reaction by Pakistan.

The most pressing reason

for Pakistani action had been the need to forestall capture
of certain vital irrigation headworks on the Jhelum, the
Chenab, and the Indus which irrigated nineteen million acres
in West Pakistan,

If Kashmir were to accede to India, the

headworks would be lost and the supply of water cut off al
together.34
Turning from economics to strategy, Zafrullah Khan
departed from the immediate situation to plead that, no matter
what the legal points were, Kashmir was essential to Pakistani
security and must be prevented from falling into the hands of
India,

India, in possession of the state, would outflank

Pakistan’s entire northwest defense system:
If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan
might as well, from both the economic and the
strategic points of view, become a feudatory
of India or cease to exist as an independent
sovereign State. That is the state of the two
sides; these are the considerations.35
Rau, eager to keep his opponent in full retreat,
34a 1though a situation much like this occurred in the
case of headworks falling to India as a result of partition
(see page 5, note 4), Oppenheim frowns on the practice: "A
State, in spite of its territorial supremacy, is not allowed
to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the
disadvantage of the natural conditions of. . . a neighbouring
State— for instance, to stop or divert the flow of a river
which runs from its own into neighbouring territory." Oppen
heim, p. 259.
35^£ Official Records. 5th Year, 464th Meeting,
p. 8.
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-117selzed on this Jremark as indicating that Pakistan was no
longer content with a democratically decided accession but
desired outright possession of Kashmir:
At this point of the argument he seems to have
forgotten that the matter is to be decided not
by the comparative needs of Pakistan and of
India, but by Jthe wishes of the people of Kash
mir. , , If I may say so without any offence,
the wolf may need the lamb desperately, but the
lamb may hava different wishes in the matter.36
Rau found the Pakistani record on the issue of the
augmentation of Azad forces equally damaging, for again,
obligations had been violated.

He relied upon the testimony

of the commission on this point; both the third report and
its accompanying minority report had found the increased
strength of Azad Kashmir a material change in the situation,
a development "contrary to the understanding that Pakistan
would not use the period for consolidating its position or
increasing its military potential."37

%ndia's real point on

the issue was not whether disarmament of the Azad forces
should

occur during a certain period but that it shouldtake

place before

the bulk of the Indian army was withdrawn from

Kashmir,
Zafrullah Khan relied upon a novel interpretation of
the commission truce proposals, an interpretation at odds
with the commission’s own version as contained in the third
report, to argue that disarmament and disbandment of Azad
36s2

Records. 5th Year. 466th Meeting, p. 9,

37£2 fiffixAjjRecoiÙ3. 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 7.
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-118troops had never been intended to take place during the truce
period.

The commission was aware of Azad strength when it

formulated the truce terms, yet the provisions did not mention
Azad Kashmir— "conclusive evidence" that Azad forces were not
intended to be Included.38
On the third ^question, the Indian position had not
changed since dispute first arose as to the correct inter
pretation of the truce proposal withdrawal provisions.

India

would not consider moving the bulk of its troops from Kashmir
until plans for the disbandment of Azad forces as well as the
withdrawal of regular Pakistani forces were underway.

If any

Azad contingents were to assist in maintaining order, they
must be small and matched by non-Azad groups.

Only when the

tribesmen and Azad and Pakistani troops could no longer main
tain large-scale military operations in Kashmir would India
consent to gradual removal of its forces and partial demobili
zation of state troops.
Zafrullah Khan would Jnot desert his highly individual
istic interpretation of the truce terms.

Azad troops were

legitimate local forces, were not covered by the proposals,
and withdrawal should not be contingent upon their disband
ment.

In reality, he charged, the principal obstacle to a

truce was India's refusal to communicate withdrawal plans to
Pakistan in order to effect a synchronized retirement.

The

opinions of India and of the commission to the contrary.
Official Bfig.gxdfi» 5th Year, 465th Meeting, p. 9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-119Zafrullah Khan refused to abandon the principal of "synchro
nization."
Sovereignty was the theme of the Indian case on the
fourth issue, control of the northern districts during the
pre-plebiscite period.

Accession to India, said Rau, had not

meant dissolution of the government of Kashmir; it retained
Internal powers.

If a plebiscite were to be held for all of

Kashmir, the authority of the state government must not be
disrupted beforehand.

The Council, in providing that the

plebiscite administrator should receive his powers from the
state, had recognized this, but he could not do so if the
northern areas were detached from the state.

Rau refused to

compromise further on this issue:
India cannot possibly go on making these con
cessions and frittering away its position. It
is urged that. . . India should acquiesce in them
because, it is said, they are. . . temporary and
only a step towards. , , the plebiscite. But it
is incomprehensible to us why pressure should
always be brought to bear on India to acquiesce
in wrong, and ^y, for a change, some pressure
should not be brought to bear on the other side
to acquiesce in the right on the same g r o u n d s . 3 9
Zafrullah Khan probed the flaw in Rau's argument.

If

Indian reasoning on "authority derived from the state" were
pressed to its logical conclusion, it would necessitate res
toration of state authority and Indian military control
throughout the region bccupied by Azad or Pakistani forces:^®
All that was contemplated was that the Plebiscite
Qfii.fijgl Records. 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 13.
40india expounded exactly this proposal before the
Council on Aoril 19. 1943 (see page 65),
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Administrator should be deemed to have derived
his powers, as a matter of legal technicality,
from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Not even
the Government was mentioned; it was the State
of Jammu and Kashmir, as a legal d o c t r i n e . 41
The fifth clash arose on the issue of the plebiscite
itself.

In a thrust which appeared designed to topple every

thing the Council and the commission had constructed since
January, 1948, Rau questioned the soundness of repeated
references to Indo-Pakistani "agreement" on a plebiscite.
The meaning of "plebiscite? was still very much in disagree
ment:
India offered a plebiscite upon certain. . ,
conditions which amount briefly to this, that
the State must be restored to its normal condi
tions before the plebiscite is held. India stands
by that offer, supject to those conditions.
Pakistan, on the other hand, appears to desire
a plebiscite with the State in its present dis
rupted and abnormal condition. . . Where there
has been no meeting of minds, it is not pos
sible to spell out in a g r e e m e n t . 42
A plebiscite for the entire state and unquestioned sovereignty
of the state over its entire territory were inseparably con
nected, Rau maintained.
Zafrullah Khan held fast to a plebiscite as the
ultimate determinator of Kashmir's disposition.

And he point

edly charged that the prime obstacle to arrangement of a
referendum was not a matter of acceptable conditions but of
India's insistence that it alone should determine those
conditions:
Gffisial Recordsf 5th Year, 465th Meeting, pp.
25-26.
Offiglai Records, 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 23.
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Indla*s insistence is that, although that settle
ment should be with the United Nations and the
United Nations should take the responsibility
for it, that settlement must be what India s a y s . 43
The McNaughton proposals provoked the final contro
versy,

India was in agreement on certainpprovisions but

could not approve the jentire plan,

India had accepted the

commission's truce proposals on assurances that Kashmir's
sovereignty would not be questioned, that Azad Kashmir's
legitimacy would not be recognized, that Azad forces would be
disarmed, and that the northern areas would be considered in
implementation of the terms.

The net effect of McNaughton's

plan was to neutralize every assurance relied upon by India,
To avoid consideration of past issues would be to ignore the
dispute's origin and development.

Security in the north

rested entirely upon Pakistani good will:
May I ask v/hat arrangements Pakistan made to
prevent the tribal incursions of October 1947?
What is to happen if the situation recurs?
India can t a k e no risks in t h i s m a t t e r . 4 4
But most serious of all, although India's original
complaint had been substantiated, although the Pakistani army
should have been withdrawn from Kashmir long ago, the pro
posals contemplated no effective action on this matter:
Indeed, the very reverse is the case. By sanc
tioning the administration of the northern areas
by the existing local authorities, these pro
posals, in effect, recognize and help to perpet
uate the unlawful occupation of these areas by^^20. Official Records. 5th Year, 466th Meeting, p. 27.

44S0 Official Records. 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 16,
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Pakistan.45
Although not quite convinced that they guaranteed a
thoroughly impartial plebiscite, Zafrullah Khan was willing
to accept McNaughton*s suggestions.

Pakistan would reconcile

Itself to the risk, trusting in the integrity of the pleb
iscite administrator to see that the feferendum was “as free
and impartial as human effort can make it.**46 Zafrullah Khan
grew somewhat sarcastically critical of Rau*s attitude toward
the proposals;
His only prejudice is that his p&int of view,
which was unacceptable to the Commission, has
by and large been egually unacceptable to
General McNaughton.47
The Council members, greatly exercised over the
Pakistani incursion into Kashmir following receipt of the
first commission report, largely ignored this issue in suc
ceeding discussions and drew together in a practically unani
mous neutral attitude on "the matters of bubstance" and in
urging acceptance of the McNaughton proposals.

Pakistan*s

entry into Kashmir could only be viewed, said Tsiang, as a
material change in the situation, and Pakistan was at fault in
not having reported immediately to the Council,

But when

discussion reached the commission reports, Tsiang assumed an
attitude critical of both parties, for he thought the three
principal differences were causing difficulties out of all

p. 10.
Official Bcccida, 5th Year, 469th Meeting, p. 12,
47g^ Qffi.S,.ial Records, 5th Year, 465th Meeting, p. 12.
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-123proportion to their importance;
The importance of this disagreement has been
magnified, because each side puts upon the
manner of troop withdrawals a political inter
pretation, as if the settlement of the question
of accession of, . , Kashmir to India or Paki
stan depended upon the method and timing of
the withdrawal of their respective f o r c e s . 48
Pakistan*s action was also criticized by Arne Sunde^^
of Norway, who nevertheless favored acceptance of the situa
tion and a fresh start toward a solution;
I frankly doubt the utility of threshing out
again in the Security Council the manifold and
complex issues which are at stake in this case.
Tentative suggestions swiftly become unalterable
opinions when they are expressed in this Council,
and arguments advanced in the heat of discussion
have a tendency to become vested with the habilements of national p r e s t i g e , 50
It would be tragic should differences on such essentially
procedural problems as withdrawal and demilitarization block
a final settlement.

He had followed the arguments carefully,

avoiding premature persuasion, but "there is no longer any
doubt in my mind as to whose reasoning has the b st foundation
of fairness and justice, . , General McNaughton*s,
4SSC Official Records. 5th Year, 467thMeeting, p, 31.
49Arne Sunde, 1883- , has represented Norway in
numerous posts abroad and in several international arbitra
tion cases. He was a member oflthe government in exile in
London during the war years,Sunde has been Norway’s
permanent representative to the United Nations since 1948.
50^2 Ofilsiai Records. 5th Year, 459th Meeting,
p. 5,

Official Records. 5th Year, 467th Meeting, p. 2.
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-124A new voice, that of Sir Alexander Cadogan,^^ gpoke
for Britain during this period, but Whitehall’s accent was
unchanged.

Slipping off the fence momentarily to join his

confreres in criticizing Pakistan’s action in entering Kash
mir, Cadoganssoon regained his perch, resigning himself to
the situation as it existed*

In favoring the McNaughton

proposals, he echoed Noel-Baker’s position on the six-power
resolution;the proposals were not a final solution but
rather another step toward a plebiscite.

The Council should

avoid dredging up past issues in seeking a solution, for what
had to be discussed was a question of mechanics:
How, then, can either side feel justified in
pursuing points. . . which can do no good and
which, unintentionally I know, merely serve
to frustrate the early expression of the will
of the people? . . Can it be anyone’s wish to
allow legal points of doubtful relevance to
stand in the way of progress?^
Ernest Gross^^ of the United States resolutely
52sir Alexander Cadogan, 1884- , has served the
British foreign office in Constantinople, Vienna, Peking, and
at home. Permanent under-secretary of state for the foreign
office from 1938 to 1946, Cadogan attended the RooseveltChurchill Atlantic meeting, was chairman of the Dumbarton Oaks
conference in 1944, and attended the United Nations Conference
on International Organization in 1945. He is a former United
Kingdom permanent representative to the United Nations, 1947-49.
53See page 90,
Official Records. 5th Year, 467th Meeting p. 7,
S^Ernest A. Gross, 1906- , has been in United States
government service since 1931, with the state department,
1931-33. He has served as legal advisor to a number of feder
al agencies and to American delegations to international con
ferences, Gross was deputy assistant under-secretary of state
for occupied areas, 1946-47, and has been a deputy representa
tive to the United Nations since 1949.
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championed the McNaughton proposals and attention upon the
problems of the present and future rather than the past;
Demilitarization does not prejudge the rights or
claims of the parties. It need not, therefore,
rest upon those rights or claims. It is however,
an essential prerequisite for a solution of the
dispute.56
Demilitarization in a single period was consistent with what
should be the controlling consideration— minimizing the pos
sibility of a resumption of hostilities.

Thus the process

should be timed so that at the conclusion of the demilitari
zation period there would remain no force with an aggressive
potential.

Gross thought it unfortunate that India had re

jected the McNaughton plan, which had been designed to remove
the threat of renewed hostilities.
Ill
The commission phase of the Kashmir dispute was not
altogether devoid of success.

Hostilities in Kashmir had

ceased; a plebiscite administrator had been appointed; the
commission's August 13, 1948 truce proposals provided a basis
for further demilitarization formulas; and, with the appoint
ment of the United Nations representative, the Council had
adopted a new approach to the problem.

But other aspects of

the situation in April, 1950 were less encouraging.

Of the

issues prominent when the coimission began operation, the
question of an interim administration had for the moment
ceased to be of vital importance, and the general problem of
56^2 flfficlai Records. 5th Year, 467th Meeting, p. 15.
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•126demllitarlzatlon had been fractured into technical disagree
ments on the disposition of the Azad forces, phasing of the
withdrawal of regular Indian and Pakistani forces, and
stewardship of Kashmir’s northern districts during the pre
plebiscite period.

Although these differences were primarily

procedural In nature, Jthe intransigent attitudes of both
governments had inflated them out of all relation to their
true importance.

Withdrawal, hinging upon varying interpre

tations of "synchronization" and "balance of forces," indi
cated the extent to which the broad principle of a plebiscite
could become mired in technicalities.
The major development during the period was the open
operation of regular jpakistani forces in Kashmir, a clear
contravention of Pakistan’s original representations to the
Council and of obligations accepted in the initial resolu
tions.

Concomitantly, the tribesmen, instigators of the

dispute, ceased to be a significant factor.
The genesis of future issues could be observed in
Council and commission actions.

Arbitration of differences,

tentatively advanced by the commission, rejected by India and
accepted with reservations by Pakistan, received the approval
of the Council and was implied in both the McNaughton pro
posals and the four-power resolution.

And it was difficult

to believe that demilitarization, which had been of flaming
importance when proposed in two phases, would be less of an
issue in one phase.
The positions of both governments on the issues of
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this period flowed from their basic approaches to the entire
problem.

The cardinal feature^:of the Indian stand was that

India was in Kashmir by right and that Pakistan could not
aspire to equal footing in the contest.

From the fact of ac

cession resulted India’s responsibility for the security of
Kashmir; hence, demilitarization must leave in the state
sufficient Indian and state forces to safeguard that security.
A plebiscite would be for the purpose of confirming accession,
which was, in all respects, already complete.

India’s claims

regarding the northern areas were also based on its fundamen
tal argument.

Refusal to discuss with Pakistan the details

of Indian withdrawal was not only in line with that portion
of the truce proposals providing for the prior withdrawal of
Pakistani troops, but followed upon India’s insistence that
Pakistan had no legal rights in Kashmir.

The position on the

Azad forces was, again, linked with Kashmir’s security.
The Pakistani approach was diametrically opposed to
the Indian.

Pakistan attempted to avoid deserved condemna

tion resulting from operation of its troops in Kashmir through
arguments on Indian aggression, illegality of the Indian
presence in Kashmir, and economic and strategic considerations
making possession of Kashmir a necessity for Pakistan.

Paki

stan considered itself as having equal status with India and
entitled to equal rights.

This claim influenced its position

on implementation of the truce, which should establish a
balance of forces between the parties.

Thus Pakistan asked

to be apprised of Indian plans before signing a truce
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-128agreement,

Pakistan regarded the Azad forces as local and

not covered by the truce terms.

On the question of the

northern areas, Pakistan denied India’s claim to assume de
fense of the territories as a result of the established re
lations between India and Kashmir.
Positions of Council members were noteworthy for an
almost uniform neutrality.

Indications of favoritism, which

had emerged in June, 1948, had disappeared.

Elections to the

Council had removed Pakistan’s adherents, Argentina and Syria,
from the scene and their successors were consistently im
partial,

Tsiang, at one time sympathetic toward India, had

returned to the neutral fold.

The Council attitude toward

the McNaughton proposals and the four-power resolution, de
signed to "balance the scales" between the parties, bore out
this impression of impartiality.

Abstentions from the ballot

on the four-power draft were in no sense contradictory,

India

abstained as a party to thb dispute, and Yugoslavia, not op
posed to the aims and provisions of the resolution, did not
believe that it gave sufficient consideration to the basic
problem, the welfare of the people of Kashmir,5?
Pakistan could find more cause for satisfaction with
the results of commission activity than could India.

The

shadow which darkened the Pakistani position following armed
entry into Kashmir had been dispelled in succeeding months,
for the Council appeared willing to regard the development as
Official Records. 5th Year, 470th Meeting, p. 4.
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a fait accompli and to proceed from the actualities of the
situation.

This worked to the disadvantage of India, whose

position had been but slightly modified since January, 1948.
As a result of New Delhi's unchanging approach and
Council acceptance of the existing situation, the McNaughton
proposals and the four-power resolution appeared more favor
able to Pakistan than to India.

Although Pakistan was not

granted an undue advantage, Karachi would accept any formula
recognizing its position as a legal party to the dispute.

But

New Delhi would inot assent to any departure from its original
position, which barred any solution at all acceptable to
Pakistan.
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CHAPTER VI
THIRD PHASE
I
Since April, 1950, a single United Nations repre
sentative has sought success where the Security Council and a
five-member commission found defeat.

Successive representatives,

like the Council and commission before them, have discovered
that technicalities, grown to matters of substance, continue
to impede final settlement.

And while agents have negotiated

with the governments, reported to the Council, then returned
to negotiations in an apparently unending cycle, Kashmir has
quieted under the heavy hand of stalemate.

Two armies, no

longer engaged in active hostilities, sit out the monotonous
months across a cease-fire line intended as a temporary
demarcation between battle forces but which has assumed the
character of a political boundary.

Denunciation and recrimi

nation no longer flash between New Delhi and Karachi, and the
eyes of the world public have turned to other, more recent
conflicts and crises.

Kashmir, once a blazing issue claiming

full attention from world statesmen, has become a repetitious
disagreement occasionally ruffling the surface of Indo-Paki
stani relations, another bit of unfinished business regularly
-130-
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-131reappearlng on the Security Council agenda.
Political activity within Kashmir did not come to a
halt with invasion.

Amid persistent rumors that Jhe is actu

ally imposing a police regime upon the state. Sheikh Abdullah
has consolidated his position.

A program of land reform and

reduction of farmers* debts has given the Kashmiri peasant,
for the first time in recent history, an economic position a
jot or two above the wretched.^

This, and other reforms, has

resulted in considerable popularity for the Sheikh*s adminis
tration, and there is reason to believe that in a plebiscite,
many Moslems under Sheikh Abdullah's jurisdiction would vote
for his candidate, India, to show appreciation forlthe politi.

?

cal stability and relative economic prosperity that he has
o
brought to Kashmir.
But certain of Sheikh Abdullah's achievements have not
been viewed so favorably by the international forum.

A con

stituent assembly was called on October 27, 1950 to determine
"the future shape and affiliations of the State,Despite
repeated Indian assurances that the assembly is intended only
to frame a state constitution and has no power to decide the
question of accession,^ Pakistan and the Security Council have
Ms m ïgrk limfijs.. February 3, 1952,
2Alice Thorner, "India-Pakistan Tensions Focus on Kash
mir," Fflxslaa £fllA.gy
XXLX (March 17, 1950), p. 3,
Qfiiciai Egg,0XdS, 5th Year, Supp. for Dec., 1950,
pp. 126-27.
4"The question has been asked whether the Constituent
Assembly of Kashmir can decide the question of accession. The
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-132remalned suspicious of Sheikh Abdullah’s intentions.

That

they have reason has been indicated in recent months.

In

April, 1952, Sheikh Abdullah claiEœd full sovereignty for
Kashmir, stating that "no Parliament, be it that of India or
any other country, has any authorization here" and that Kash
mir, as an "autonomous republic within the Indian Union,"
would not accept full integration with India as long as re
ligious prejudice against Moslems existed in India.^

He

acted upon this principle in June, 1952 by asking the con
stituent assembly, commencing to act like a legislative as
sembly, to dethrone the maharaja and to establish an elective
office of chief of state,^
In response to such actions, and to indications dat
ing from the instigation of the dispute that many Kashmiris
preferred independence to accession to either India or Paki
stan, India, in July, 1952, granted to Kashmir "a large
measure of self-government within the Indian union."? Yet
India’s view of the political relationship between Srinagar
and New Delhi remained the same:

"Kashmir's accession to the

Indian government is complete in law and fact— it is a part
answer is NO. The Assembly may express its views on the
subject but it has not power to decide the question. The
Government of India has made this clear more than once."
Some Questions a M
ÛÛ KastuaLc., Government of India,
p. 8,
NêH

ïimSÆ. April 12, 1952.

&Ibid.. June 11, 1952.
Tjbid.. July 25, 1952.
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-133of India."8
While such events took place in Kashmir, the Security
Council and its agett, the United Nations representative,
continued the search for a solution.

From April, 1950 to

June, 1952, the Council received four reports from the repre
sentatives, accepted Sir Owen Dixon*s resignation and appointed
his successor, adopted two resolutions concerning Kashmir,
and consistently recommended continuation of the representa
tive’s activities.
The two-year period covered additional changes in
Council membership.

Throughout 1950, members were Cuba,

Ecuador, Egypt, India, Norway, and Jugoslavia in addition to
\

the five permanent members.

In January, 1951, Brazil, the

Netherlands, and Turkey replaced Cuba, Norway, and Egypt,

One

year later, Chile, Greece, and Pakistan succeeded Ecuador,
Yugoslavia, and India.

Thus, during 1952, the membership has

been Brazil, Chile, Greece, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Turkey,
and the states permanently represented.
Sir Owen Dixon, in submitting his first report to the
Council on September 15, 1950, requested that it be his last,
that it be regarded as the final step in the discharge of his
functions.

He believed himself unable to contribute further

toward a settlement.

Dixon had arrived in the sub-continent

ten v^eeks after the Council had requested the governments to
take immediate steps toward drafting a demilitarization
^1^. £ll.
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-134agreement:
The situation. . . presented strange features.
The parties had agreed that the fate of the
State as a whole should be settled by a general
plebiscite, but over a considerable period of
time they had failed to agree on. . . prelim
inary measures. , , necessary. . . before it
was possible to set up an organization to take
a plebiscite. . . The cease-fire line itself
v;as held in strength and thus two considerable
armies stood opposedlto one another,9
Indian-occupied territory was administered by Sheikh
Abdullah*s government and was garrisoned by Indian troops and
state forces.

On Pakistan*s side, the Azad government held

authority in the western areas, but political agents directly
responsible to the Pakistani government controlled the North
ern regions,

Dixon first sought to negotiate on the measures

necessary for commencement of the plebiscite administrator’s
duties:
Only if and when I was satisfied that no such
agreement could be brought about and that all
real chance of it had ended, ought I to turn
to some ]form of settlement other than a pleb
iscite of the whole State.10
He began his task v/ith assurances to India that,
although unable to indict Pakistan as an aggressor, he would
accept the contention that the crossing of the Kashmiri
border by hostile elements had been contrary to international
law and that "when. . . units of the regular Pakistani forces
moved into, . . the State, that too was inconsistent with
------- Esssxiis., 5th Year, Supp. for .Sept.,
,
1950, S/1791, p. 26.
' ^
i^Xizisl., p. 27.
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-135International law."^^
With that understanding, Dixon proposed a demilitariza
tion program, the first step of which would be withdrawal of
Pakistani forces, to be followed by troop reductions in
Indian-held territory,

India and Pakistan would concurrently

undertake disarmament of state forces and of Azad troops»
Operations would be divided into phases, detailed plans for
which would be prepared by the chiefs of staff, and the number
of troops remaining in Kashmir would be as small as possible.
Administration of evacuated areas would be by existing author
ities, under United Nations surveillance, and according to
custom or law prevailing prior to invasion;
I proposed that it should be expressly provided
that neither 1that provision nor any other pro
vision, . . should. . . import any recognition
of, , , legal authority in such territory other
than one depending upon and derived from the law
of the State or to imply any derogation from or
prejudice to the sovereignty of the State.12
Administration of the northern districts would be by United
Nations officials whose powers would be dependent upon the
custom or law of the areas as of August 1, 1947 and who might
exercise their authority through existing local channels.
The cease-fire line was to continue as a boundary but
it would be preferable if a single government exercised power
throughout the state during the plebiscite period.
this, Dixon suggested three alternatives:

To achieve

(1) a simple

lllfeid., p. 29.
12li2iUi., p. 33.
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-136coalition government; (2) interim administration by individ
uals outside state politics, half Hindu and half Moslem; or
(3) administration conducted entirely by United Nations
agents.
Reactions were not favorable.

New Delhi rejected the

withdrawal proposal on grounds of state security and objected
to plans for the evacuated areas since many of the local mag
istrates, appointed following invasion, were unacceptable to
India.

To curb the authority or to alter the composition of

the state government would interfere with Kashmir's sovereign
ty.

Pakistan would not accept provisions which took control

of northern districts out of Azad or Pakistani hands,

Dixon

concluded that agreement on essentials of a plebiscite for
the entire state was virtually impossiblei
X became convinced that India's agreement would
never be obtained to demilitarization in any such
form, or to provisions governing the period of the
plebiscite of any such character, as would. , .
permit of Jthe plebiscite being conducted in con
ditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation
and other forms of influence, . . by which the, . ,
fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled,13
He then asked the governments if they would agree to
a plebiscite restricted to certain disputed districts, spe
cifically the Vale of Kashmir.

Remaining areas would be

awarded automatically to whichever dominion the inhabitant
clearly favored, or as a result of local référendums.

Paki

stan vehemently protested such an arrangement,charging that
it constituded a breach bf India's original plebiscite
, p. 36.

.
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-137promise.

India would consider the proposal on condition that

areas in which there was no doubt as to the preference of the
population would be awarded to India or Pakistan without pleb
iscites, and that boundary demarcation would have due regard
to geography and the requirements of an international

b o r d e r , 14

Although Pakistan refused to consider such a scheme,
it would accept a simple partition without a plebiscites
. . . a solution having the advantages of being
immediate in its operation and self-executing;
Pakistan would consider the matter, provided
that it took the Kashmir Valley, I had little
doubt however that India would not concede the
Valley of Kashmir in an over-all partition,
India did not concede.
Finally, Dixon proposed himself to prepare a plan of
pattition and partial plebiscite, subject to modification,
\

including a provision that the plebiscite area was to be ad
ministered by the United Nations through the plebiscite
administrator.
phatic refusal,"

Pakistan agreed, but India returned an "em
The state government would be superseded

and to permit Pakistan any role in a plebiscite would be sufj*
render to aggression,

"There can be no equality of any right

between India and Pakistan in this or other relevant
^ New Delhi suggested a plebiscite in the Vale and
parts of Muzaffarabad. India would receive all of Jammu
east of the cease-fire line and most of Ladakh, Pakistan
would acquire Gilglt, Gilgit Agency, Gilgit Wazarat, the
Tribal Territory, and Baltistan (all northern districts),
and Jammu west of the cease-fire line.
Official Records. 5th Year, Supp. for Sept #$
1950, S/1791, p. 39.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-133*
re s p e c ts .*16

Dixon admitted failure, for he was convinced that,
given the docility and gentleness of the Kashmiris, impartial
administration of the plebiscite areas was an absolute neces
sity for a fair plebiscite.

He had given up hope of recon

ciling Indian demands with a formula for partition and partial
plebiscite that would be acceptable to Pakistan.

If there

remained a possibility of settlement by agreement, it lay in
partition with some Method of determining possession of the
Vale other than by an over-all plebiscite.

But the Jdîfficulty

in partition was determination of an acceptable boundary;
I doubt whether it may not be better to leave the
parties to themselves in negotiating terras for
the settlement of the problem of how to dispose
of Jammu and Kashmir, . . So far the attitude of
both parties has been to throw the whole respons
ibility upon the Security Council or its repre
sentatives of settling the dispute, notwithstanding,
except by agreement betv^een them, there was no
means of settling it.i?
Council consideration of Dixon’s report and the
additional factor of the constituent assembly resulted in
adoption on March 30, 1951 of a resolution sponsored by the
United Kingdom and the United States,

The Council viewed the

assembly as possibly prejudicial to a plebiscite in:
l&Ibld.. p. 42. Regarding "surrender to aggression,"
Nehru said on November 25, 1947: "The issue in Kashmir is
whether violence and naked force ishauld decide the future. . .
The raiders encouraged by Pakistan have sought to enforce by
the sword accession to Pakistan against the obvious Iwishes
of large numbers of the people. , , We cannot permit the suc
cess of this method to achieve political ends," Nehru, p. 65.
Qffifilai Bg.£PJdj5> 5th Year, Supp. for Sept..
1950, S/1791, p. 46.
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-139Remlndlna the Governments. . . of the prin
ciple embodied in the Security Council, . . and
the United Nations Commission for India and Paki
stan resolutions. . . that the final disposition
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made
. . . through the democratic method of a free., .
plebiscite. . . under the auspices of the United
Nations;
Affirming that the convening of a Constit
uent Assembly, . , and any action that Assembly
might, . . take to determine the future shape and
affiliation of the. . . State or any part. . .
would not constitute a disposition of the State
in accordance with the above principles. . .18
Dixon's resignation was accepted.

A successor would consult

with the governments to effect demilitarization on the basis
of the commission resolutions of August 13,1943 and January
5, 1949.

And the Council:

upon the parties, in the event their
discussions with the, . . Representative failing
in his opinion to result in full agreement, to
accept arbitration upon all outstanding points
of difference reported by the. . . Representa
tive, . .19
The cease-fire would continue, and the governments were re
quested to refritin from action prejudicial to a peaceful
settlement.

Although India immediately rejected the resolu

tion, it was adopted with eight voting in favor (Brazil, China,
Ecuador, France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States); none opposed; and three abstentions
(India, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugo
slavia).
Activating the resolution, the Council, on ^poril 30,
13se Official Records (S/2375), S/2017/kev. 1, p. 38.
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-1401951, named Dr, Frank P. Graham^O
Dixon's successor,

the United States as

Graham's first report was submitted on

October 15, 1951 and covered his activities from June 30 to
September 15.
continent.

He had found a complex situation in the sub

The cease-fire was being Maintained, there had

been some decrease in armed forces in Kashmir, and there was
a general desire to settle the problem as soon as possible.
Disturbing elements were alleged cease-fire violations on
both sides, war-mongering propaganda, and continued activity
of the constituent assembly.
Ù 1 September 7, Graham drafted a twelve-point demili
tarization program designed to meet the situation:

ol

mi fakiaiaa

1. . . . specifically pledge themselves that
they will not commit aggression or make war, . ,
with regard to the question of. . , Kashmirj
2. Agree that each Government, . . will in
struct its official spokesmen and will urge all
its citizens. . . bot to make. « . statements
calculated to incite the people of either nation
to make war against the other. , ;
3. Reaffirm their will to observe the
cease-fire. . ;
4. Reaffirm, . . the principle that the ques
tion of the accession of. , • Kashmir. , . will
be decided through, , , a free. . , plebiscite
under the auspices of the United Nations;
ZOprank Porter Graham, 1886- , former United States
senator and president of the University of North Carolina,
is one of five American citizens on the United Nations Panel
for Inquiry and Conciliation. During the war he served on a
number of war boards. Graham was the American representative
on the Good Offices Committee on the Indonesian Question,
1947-48, and was subsequently special adviser to the secre
tary of state on Indonesian affairs. He was defense man
power administrator in the Department of Labor when named to
the Kashmir post.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-I4l~
5. Agree that. , . the demilitarization of
. . . Kashmir. . . v.dll be effected in a single,
continous process;
6. Agree that. , . demilitarization shall be
completed during a period of 20 days, unless an
other period is decided upon by the. . . Govern
ments. . ;
7. Agree that. . . at the lend of the period
. . . the situation will be:
A. Qa
££kl£JLüÛ
Ql
11m:
(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals
. . . will have been withdrawn;
(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been
withdrawn from the State, and
(iii) large-scale. . . disarmament of the
Azad. . . forces will have taken place.
B. Qn ^
Indian slds. ol ths.
linn:
(i) the bulk of Indian forces in the State
will have been withdrawn;
(ii) further withdrawals or reductions. . .
of the Indian and State, . . forces
remaining after completion of the
operation referred to in B(i) above
will have been carried out;
so that. . . there will remain on the. . . Pakistan
side of the. . , line a force of ____* Civil Armed
Forces, and on the Indian side. • . a force of
-- 8. Agree that the dorilitarization shall in
volve no threat to the cease-fire agreement. • ;
9. Agree that representatives of the. . .
Governments. . . will. . , draw up a programme
of demilitarization. .;
10. Agree that. . . demilitarization will be
without prejudice to the. . . responsibilities of
the. . , Representative and Plebiscite Administra
tor with regard to the final disposal of forces. , ;
11. Agree that differences regarding the pro
gramme of demilitarization, . . will be referred
to the Military Adviser of the. . . Representative,
and if disagreement continues, to the, . . Repre
sentative, whose decision shall be final.
(*It is requested that the. . , spaces be
filled in by your Government).21
Both governments accepted the first four paragraphs.
But for India, withdrawal of Indian troops and disarmament of
the Azad forces affected Kashmir’s security and could not be
Officiai

s/2375, pp. 41-43.
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-142consldered separately.

India would withdraw the bulk of its

forces and some of the remainder provided there was complete
demilitarization on the Pakistani side of the line except for
a civil force of 4,000, half Azad followers and half not,
commanded by United Nations officers or "locals" and not
Pakistanis.

Pakistan would accept disarmament of Azad forces

provided the balance of the Indian forces were withdrawn and
there were reductions in the state forces.
India thought it premature to appoint the administra
tor before completion of demilitarization, while Pakistan
favored appointment as far in advance of the final day as
possible.

India termed the 90-day period insufficient and

Pakistan accepted it*

In essence, India would agree to with

drawal only when Pakistani troops, tribesmen, and Azad forces
no longer could be considered a menace to security.

The

exact period and phasing of withdrawal and the size of forces
to remain could not yet be determined.

Pakistan assented to

Lhe provisions as they stood but continued to insist upon a
"military balance" on either side of the cease-fire line,
Graham recommended that the Council call upon the governments
to avoid increases in their military forces in Kashmir and to
renew efforts at agreement on demilitarization.
The Council, in a United Kingdom-United States spon
sored resolution adopted on November 10, 1951, approved the
demilitarization proposals and:
2.
Instructs the, . . Representative to con
tinue his efforts to obtain. , . demilitariza
tion. • i
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-1434.
Instructs the. . , Representative to report
to the Security Council on his efforts. . . not
later than six weeks after this resolution comes
into effect.22
Graham reported again on December 18, 1951.
gram during renewed negotiations had been:

His pro

(1) to exhaust

possibilities of agreement on previous proposals for demili
tarization and (2) in case there was no agreement, to obtain
detailed plans from both parties in order to establish points
of difference.

From the outset he had concentrated on narrow

ing disagreement on the size of forces to remain after demili
tarization and on appointment of the administrator, but dif
ferences had remained essentially the same.

However, he was

able to report agreement on four additional paragraphs, 8, 9,
11, and 12— covering, respectively, the cease-fire agreement,
drafting of demilitarization details, responsibilities of the
representative and administrator, and arbitration.

India

accepted the last on condition that it concerned technical
details in implementation of the agreed program, not differ
ences arising in the process of drafting.
But as agreement had not been reached on the remaining
four, most basic, paragraphs covering continuous demilitari
zation, the 90-day period, phasing of withdrawal, and appoint
ment of the administrator, Graham recommended substitution of
an absolute deadline of July 15, 1952 and addition of the
following phrase to the withdrawal-period paragraph:
...

so that on the date referred to. . . there

QUi&iol E&carda (s /2 4 4 8 ), s/2392, p. 2.
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will remain on each side of the cease-fire line
the lowest possible number of armed forces based
in proportion on the number of, , , forces exist
ing on each side of the. . . line on 1 January
1949.23
Concerning the other paragraphs, the governments were
asked their opinions on reduction of forces and employment of
United Nations troops to maintain security.

Pakistan replied

that it would be willing to reduce its forces to any level
provided there existed a "balance" betweenr.Indian and Azad
forces and that it would accept outside forces.

India refused

to consider United Nations troops and noted that further troop
reductions would be dependent upon conditions:
Demilitarization concerns only the Indian and
State forces; the State Militia which is a police
force, clearly does not fall within either cate
gory.24
Graham found that there had been no substantial change
in positions.

Demilitarization presented insurmountable ob

stacles unless agreement were reached on a definite period
for demilitarization, the scope of the program and the number
of troops to remain in Kashmir, and appointment of the admin
istrator, which was the keystone of the entire program; "the
clearest symbol both of, . , ultimate demilitarization and
the promised plebiscite, would be, . . a definite day for in
duction into office of the, . • Administrator."25
The Council, without formal vote, approved continua23sc CffltWL Records. S/2448, p. 13.
^ ^ î h i â . . p . 47

.

23s £ Official Records. 7th Year, 570th Meeting, p. 9,
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tlon of Graham's activities, and on April 22, 1952 his third
report was submitted.

He was of the opinion that of the

three parts of the commission's truce proposals, upon which
all demilitarization attempts had been based, the cease-fire
was largely implemented, and to all practical purposes the
truce was in operation without formal agreement.

The Council

and the representative should henceforth devote their efforts
to the third phase, the plebiscite itself.
But there had been little change in the positions of
Karachi and New Delhi,

India was adamant on the question of

withdrawal, although willing at the conclusion of demilitari
zation to consult with the administrator and the representa
tive on further reductions in its forces.

The remaining

issues could be settled easily once the scope of demilitariza
tion and the size of forces to remain had been decided.
Pakistan accepted the date of July 15, 1952 and agreed
that demilitarization should embrace all armed forces in Kash
mir without exception:
There is no justification whatsoever for the
contention that the State Militia is a police
force and so not liable to disbandment,
The militia was organized along lines of the Indian infantry
and was officered by Indians,

India had not objected when the

McNaughton and Dixon proposals referred to the militia in
connection with the state army and the Azad forces.

But

arbitration of "technical differences" was not sufficient;
Official Records, S/2448, p. 33.
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there should be a provision, similar to that of the March 14,
1950 Council resolution, authorizing the representative to
"interpret" agreements reached on demilitarization.

"The

experience of the last three years underlines the necessity
for such a provision.

Without it, there would be no means of

resolving deadlocks that might arise."2?
II
Seven issues summoned the Indian and Pakistani
champions into battle during the most recent phase of the
Kashmir dispute.

The controversy over the constituent as

sembly was the first to arise.

In Pakistan’s view, convening

of the body nullified the "international agreement" resulting
from acceptance of the commission resolutions of August 13,
1948 and January 5, 1949 and was a challenge to the authority
of the Security Council.
Rau fell back on the legal basis of India’s federal
structure.

Kashmir was a unit of the Indian federation,

largely autonomous and entitled to frame its own constitution.
The main purpose of the assembly was to provide for an elected
legislature with a responsible executive:
So far as the Government of India is concerned,
the Constituent Assembly is not intended to pre
judice the issues before the Security Council,or
to come in its way.28
The assembly might express an opinion on accession, but it
p. 36.
Official Records- 6th Year, 533rd Meeting, p. 6.
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-147could make ho decisions.
Zafrullah Khan saw the shadow of conspiracy.

The

assembly, a result of a long-considered scheme, was a clear
indication that India had never intended to proceed with a
plebiscite.

If a referendum at an early date were to deter

mine accession, there was no need for an assembly to frame
Kashmir’s constitution:
The proposed consituent assembly is. . • an
attempt on India’s part to contrive yet another
pseudo-legalistic subterfuge to cover its occu
pation of Kashmir. • . against the will of the
people, , . We are not convinced that the. , ,
assembly is not an attempt to confuse the issues,
poison the atmosphere and obstruct a just and
peaceful solution. And. . . we are not convinced
that, . . India can be absolved of its full re
sponsibility in this matter by any attempt on its
part theoretically to separateithe so-called
autonomous sphere of the Maharaja’s Government
from India’s own sphere of authority.29
The second point to assume importance touched many of
the differences and agreements comprising the liistory of the
dispute.

Both parties accused the other of failure to fulfil

obligations.

Rau heatedly denied the charge.

On analysis,

India’s "so-called intransigence" would be found to be nothing
more than reliance upon "pledges already given to India,"
Actually, said Rau, India had more than met its obligations.
Without awaiting a truce and demilitarization agreement, India
had reduced its forces despite previous understandings which
called for prior Pakistani action.

On the other hand, Paki

stani troops remained in Kashmir although they had accomplished
Official Records, 6th Year, 548th Meeting, p. 9.
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-148their supposed goal— forestalling of an Indian offensive and
prevention of a fait accompli. And India had not forgotten
its promise of a plebiscite;
Unfortunately, the soil of Kashmir has not yet
been cleared of the invader— the Pakistan Army
which joined the invader is still there— and so
the fulfillment of the wish of the Government
of India has been delayed by Pakistan’s own
act.30
Zafrullah Khan turned to the issue of the Azad forces
for his reply.

Pakistan had never repudiated its obligation

to withdraw its forces, but Indian insistence upon Azad dis
bandment without prejudice to state forces had proved a real
obstacle.

And Indian refusal to consider employment of neu

tral forces blocked a possible solution to the impasse.

No

matter what India offered in the way of justification for this
attitude, Pakistan could not consider withdrawal until definite
procedures were agreed upon and fulfilled by India.
The Dixon report introduced several issues.

Regarding

Council abandonment of responsibility for the dispute, Rau
thought worse programs might be adopted than allowing the
initiative to pass back to India and Pakistan.

Zafrullah

Khan was far from agreement, for he believed the situation
required vigorous and immediate action.

The result of Coun-

cil renunciation of jurisdiction might not be pleasant:
It would enable India to consolidate its hold on
Kashmir and to continue systematically to alter
the composition of the population by forcing or
driving out more and more Muslims as refugees
Official Records. 6th Year, 538th Meeting, p. 2.
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into Pakistan, and settling non“Muslims in their
place.31
On the possibility of a partition-plebiscite arrange
ment providing a solution, Rau repeated to the Council India's
view as expressed to Dixon,

New Delhi was prepared to con

sider the proposal providing a major share of disputed terri
tory were arbitrarily awarded to India,

Pakistan, unwilling

to accept a combination, would agree to simple partition if
the Vale were to be part of its share.
On the possible employment of foreign troops during
the plebiscite period, Pakistan was in agreement.

In fact,

Zafrullah Khan pointed out, as long ago as January, 1943 he
had acquiesced in the use of Commonwealth or United Nations
troops.32

Rau again took refuge in Kashmir's "sovereignty"

and "integrity."

Foreign troops were "unthinkable," for they

would amount to interference with the functions of Kashmir's
lawful government;
We are wholly unable to accept anyentry of for
eign troops in the State or in anyother part of
India{ . . . in view of the provision made by
the resolutions of August 1943 and January 1949,
there is no occasion for the use of foreign troops
or of special local levies recruited by an out
side agency.33
The unchanging attitude of theCouncil members toward
3J-SC QfiifilgJL B££Q£âs.» 6th Year, 535th Meeting, p. 7.
32see page 45,
3 3 ^ Official Records. 6th Year, 536th Meeting, p. 4.
The provision referred to covers employment, in consultation
with the commission, of Indian troops to maintain order and
security.
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-150arbitratlon may possibly have influenced India’s capitulation
on this issue during the Graham negotiations*

But in the

debates on the Dixon report, Rau was unyielding, stubbornly
viewing all suggestions as proposals to reopen questions
settled by resolution or agreement.
Zafrullah Khan delighted in this opportunity to casti
gate the Indian approach to international cooperation.

How

any nation which thought its cause just could refuse impartial
adjudication was beyond his comprehension.

He struck at

Indian sensitivity on the resurrection of past controversies:
It was not suggested that the accession of. . .
Kashmir. . . should be submitted to arbitration.
The suggestion is: as there is an international
agreement embodied in the two resolutions of
13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and as the
implementation of these resolutions has come to
a standstill, the issues arising therefrom
should be submitted to arbitration so that the
arbitrators can determine what is to be d o n e . 34
The final issue, Graham’s proposals on demilitariza
tion, the withdrawal period, and the administrator’s appoint
ment, was only fleetingly touched, for positions had been
made clear to the representative and negotiations were then
in progress.

Yet there were hints of incipient agreement,

for India’s Setalvad saw little difficulty in settling the
withdrawal period and the administrator’s appointment provided
agreements were first reached on

the scope of demilitarization

and the size of residue forces.

As a gesture towarda solu

tion, Setalvad produced a nev/ Indian offer, 6,000 men below
34U2Ü,. p. 9.
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-151le original figure, on condition an additional 6,000-man
.lltla be regarded as an Internal police force, not a mllliry reserve*

Azad territory would be garrisoned by a 4,000-

in force, only half of which should consist of Azad adherents,
Zafrullah Khan was not as yet amenable to any scheme
) far removed from a "military balance* and continued to
ress for early induction Into office of the administrator:
Pakistan is, . , ready to carry out, . . demili
tarization In two stages. . . or a. . . programme
in one single continuous process, , , But Paki
stan could not possibly be expected to agree to
any one-sided, • . arrangement. For us, demili
tarization is not an end in itself; it is an
essential preliminary to, , . a free. , . pleb
iscite,35
The only real differences among the majority of CounL1 members during this final period lay in the zeal with
ilch they pressed for a settlement.

All but the Soviet

lion approved both the Dixon and Graham reports.

All were

rltlcal of the constituent assembly and of India’s refusal
) compromise on demilitarization terms.

The lone conflict

rose when Jacob Malik3b of the Soviet Union criticized the
sthod of Graham’s appointment and his procedures, but not
Is conclusions or recommendations,
Francis Lacoste^^ of France believed a plebiscite,
35SC Official

7th Year, 571st Meeting,p. 6.

36Jacob A. Malik, 1906- , entered diplomatic work in
hie,press section of the Soviet foreign office. He attended
lie Five-Power conference in 1945, was political adviser to
he Soviet representative on the Allied Control Council in
?46, and has been permanent representative to the United
ations since 1948,
3^Francis Lacoste, 1905-

, has served the^Quai
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-152essential to settlement, required fulfilment of one condition
— plebiscite territory must be free of influences "such as
that inevitably involved in the presence of occupation troops
, . . belonging to one, , , of the parties concerned."38 De
militarization was thus a prerequisite:
States like India and Pakistan owe it to the
international community, and to themselves, to
demonstrate their policital maturity. , . The
draft resolution. . . does not ask the parties
to sacrifice principles, ideas or even interests.
It does no more than ask them to apply. . .
classical methods. . . recommended for three
years by the Council as the best means— if not,
in the absence of direct agreement, the only
means— of escaping from what seems. . . to be
assuming. . , the appearance of a dangerous im
passe.39
Malik broke four years of Soviet near-silence only to
ignore the dispute in order to criticize United Kingdom and
United States activities.

He thought it strange that only

one candidate to succeed Dixon was presented, and this candi
date an American,

In the more than four years since the

dispute had been introduced, the western powerb had been par
ticularly active.

Resolutions had been adopted, commissions

established, and representatives appointed, but no real
progress toward a settlement had resulted.

Malik suspected

plans of an "annexationist, imperialist" nature:
They are not based on an effort to achieve a real
d*Orsay in Paris, Belgrade, Peking, and Washington, With the
Free French Forces of the Interior in 1944, he has been a
delegate to the United Nations since 1948.
Official

6th Year, 539th Meeting, p. 5.

39lbisi., p. 6.
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-153settlement, . . They pursue different aims,
different— directly contrary— objectives. The
purpose, , , is interference. , . in the Inter
nal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the
dispute. . , and the conversion of Kashmir into
a protectorate of the United States and the
United Kingdom. , . Finally, the purpose, . . is
to secure the introduction of Anglo-American
troops. . . and convert Kashmir into. . , a mili
tary and strategic base.40
In addition, the American representative had pressed the
governments to accept foreign troops, although the Council
had not authorized him to do so.
Sir Gladwyn

Jebb4l

of the United Kingdom informed

Malik that if the Council were ever to accomplish anything, it
must rise above the "low-lying poisonous mists of suspicion"
that had so often defeated it.

Further, Malik’s charges were

ridiculous and thoroughly unbelievable:
No doubt there are people who can be persuaded
to believe this, just as there are people who
could believe that. • . a mission to Antartica
to study the habits of penguins could only be an
indirect slander on totalitarianism or on Marx
ist society. It is possible to believe that;
and people. . • can always be found who will
Official B££flxd.S.t 7th Year, 570th Meeting,
pp. 13-14. Malik implied Pakistan had attempted to purchase
western support with bases. Pakistan denied this. A rumor,
circulated Immediately following partition, had Pakistan
offering Chittagong, the best port in East Bengal, to the
United States as a naval base. The New York H eês ., October
13, 1947.
4lsir Gladwyn Jebb, 1900- , was minister of economic
warfare in Britain’s wartime cabinet, 1940-42, He attended
the Quebec, Cairo, and Teheran conferences and was acting
secretary general of the United Nations in 1946. Jebb helped
draft peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria,
and Finland. He has been permanent representative to the
United Nations since 1949.
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believe anything.42
On Kashmir itself, the United Kingdom position was
comfortably in line with that of the majority of the Council.
Jebb termed India’s reception of demilitarization proposals
"a little less than fair" and thought arbitration was the key
to this issue, which in itself was the key to a plebiscite.
The United Kingdom felt "very strongly" that the time was past
for mediation and persuasion:
The dispute is not one which time will, . , solve
• , • I hope that the Council will accept. . .
arbitration. . . as the most effective way of
moving forward towards a settlement*43
Jebb expressed grave doubts as to the wisdom of calling the
constituent assembly, attaching "great importance" to assur
ances that it was not competent to decide accession or to
"prejudice the position" of the Council.
Gross of the United States also saw arbitration as
the key and similarly questioned the intentions of the assem
bly, particularly as relating to India’s interpretation of
the plebiscite provision in the accession agreement:
That commitment is not. . , "to give the people
the right to decide whether they would remain
in India or not." To phrase the plebiscite
question in this form would be to disregard the
binding agreement accepted by both parties. The
Security Council has from the beginning held
that the issue of accession is one which is to
be settled by a fair, . . plebiscite under United
Nations auspices, and both parties, in the lan
guage of their own commitments, have accepted
42s q Offjçial

7th Year, 570th Meeting, p. 19.

43SC Dfficlai Records. 6th Year, 566th Meeting, p. 3.
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this view,44
III
The commission's faith in the "flexibility" of an
approach to the problem by a single United Nations representa
tive has been substantiated to a great extent by the accom
plishments of the Security Council's two representatives.

As

a result of their activities, and of time, the issues divid
ing India and Pakistan are no longer so numerous or so vital.
A cease-fire in Kashmir has been maintained for some time,
and a truce, the second part of the commission's comprehensive
settlement proposal, for all practical purposes has been
implemented.

Sir Owen Dixon's acceptance of the Indian con

tentions regarding the invasion as a violation of international
law, while not acted upon, have partially mollified India on
this issue.

Dr. Frank Graham's twelve-point truce program

has all but found acceptance.

The introduction of the prin

ciple of proportional residue forces in Kashmir has pointed
a way to a solution of a portion of the withdrawal question.
And, most important, limited acceptance of arbitration has
removed many of the difficulties surrounding demilitarization.
Yet Issues remain.

The scope of and size of forces

to remain after withdrawal are still in contention.

And to

"military balance" and “synchronization" as factors in this
problem, has been added the status of the Kashmiri militia.
The exact period during which withdrawal is to be completed
44sg Official Records. 6th Year, 537th Meeting p. 10.
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is still undecided as is the date of official appointment of
the plebiscite administrator.

The parties continue to be

divided on employment of outside forces during the plebiscite
period, and the existence of the constituent assembly is a
festering sore.
has again arisen.

The question of an interim administration
And on the most promising formula for a

final settlement, partition and a partial plebiscite, the
demands of both parties are unacceptable to the other.
But once these problems are recognized as the techni
calities that they are, the present Kashmiri picture appears
brighter than at any time during the history of the dispute.
As the United Nations representative continues his slow but
increasingly successful progress toward bringing India and
Pakistan together on the remaining details of the demilitar
ization prograip, there is reason for hope that a settlement
may yet be achieved on the twin pillars of his twelve-point
program and acceptance of some plan of partial plebiscite
and partition.
Rhetorically, Indian and Pakistani arguments appear
to have changed but slightly since the Inception of the dis
pute,

To India, it was and is a question of international

law, the violation of international obligations; to Pakistan,
a question of unlawful occupation of Kashmir and of thwarting
the desire of Ithe people to express their political prefer
ence,

But beneath the surface, and in many instances quite

cleatly, both governments tend increasingly to adopt a
realistic approach and to accept the situation as it exists.
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Thus India, although continuing

to place the greatest stress upon the inviolability of Kashmir
sovereignty, has, for all practical purposes, abandoned hope
or intention of occupying all of Kashmir during the plebiscite
period.

And Pakistan is amenable to a preponderance of Indian

forces in the state, though not yet so great as India demands.
Both parties, in action if not in words, have come far desert
ing an absolute approach for compromise and practicality.
The Council voting record has followed the pattern
firmly established in previous periods.

Attitudes rarely show

partiality; the desire is to settle the question in almost any
fashion capable of winning approval from both governments.
Where Pakistan had been universally reproved for its action
in moving troops into Kashmir, India was similarly reprimanded
on the issue of the constituent assembly and on its picayunish
approach to demilitarization.

And the United Kingdom and the

United States continue to lead the Council in quest of an
answer to the problem of Kashmir.
The detached Council attitude precludes a distinct ad
vantage for either party.

Pakistan's great success came

earlier in being accepted as a legitimate party to the dis
pute.

Indications that the various settlement proposals favor

ed Pakistan were only apparent, for Pakistan may better afford
to accept any proposal which does not grant India a decided
advantage.

India yet finds it difficult to accept certain

essential provisions without abandoning completely the
original basis of its case.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VII
SIGNIFICANCE
I
For the observer who cuts beneath a surface of repe
titive arguments and intransigent positions, the problem of
Kashmir presents several questions concerning its signifi
cance, for India and Pakistan and for the Security Council.
Logical answers are possible only through an understanding of
the dispute itself.
the world scene.

Kashmir did not spring full-grown upon

Its slow generation lies in history, deep

in the turbulent past of India^ and in the chaotic history of
the modern international coiranunity.
Of vital importance is the character of modern India,
the result of centuries of change and conflict in the sub
continent.

An apparently irresistible attraction for conquer*

ers throughout recorded history has precluded development of
an homogeneous character.

Invasions have piled successive

layers of culture upon the land until it has become a welter
of people and races, religions and sects, philosophies of
government and ways of life.

The British, and the Moguls

before them, imposed a surface political unity upon the
lln this case, "India" refers to both the Indian
Union and Pakistan.
-158-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-159sub-contlnent.

But always there remained many Indias.

Two

facets of pre-independence India— its religious cleavage and
its political anatomy— resulting from the confused past con
tributed directly to the dispute that is Kashmir,
India in political flux at the conclusion of the
Second World war was scarred by conflict between two great
faiths.

Three hundred million Hindus and one hundred million

Moslems had radically different ideas as to the structure of
an independent state,

A solution was sought through the

establishment of two nations, Pakistan as a Moslem homeland
and the Indian Union as a secular state.

Though perhaps a

political solution, partition did not result in reconciliation
of religious antagonism, which continued to corrupt relations
between the new govèrnments.
As repeated invasions aided in generating Indians
religious difficulties, so they created a complex political
configuration which had few equals.

Under the British, long

masters at construction and administration of complicated
governmental systems, the intermingling of sovereign states
and British provinces was not a barrier but an actual aid to
domination.

But when Great Britain relinquished power in

India, the exact status of the principalities could no longer
be considered of importance in theory alone.

Two successor

states, imbued with modern nationalism, were not inclined to
permit continuation of a ritualistic political hierarchy
challenging their own authority over the millions of the sub
continent,

The problem became Immediate with partition and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-160•
Independence and found rough solution in the rush of events.
Yet in cases where religious animosities merged with politi
cal complexities, serious complications were inevitable.
Granted a background composed of unique religious
and political elements, the problem of the states might have
been solved without serious difficulty had there been suf
ficient time to seek a solution through negotiation and com
promise,

But precipitate British withdrawal precluded

leisurely consideration of the issue; the question of the
future of the states was thrown into the arena, to be answer
ed by circumstances rather than reason.
The character of the governments involved has had
much influence in prolongation of a dispute thus engendered.
Independence day on August 15, 1947 saw two new commonwealths
rise from the defunct Indian Empire.
frankly based upon theology.

Pakistan is a nation

Thersense of religious singular

ity is coupled with the pride of a new nation and the fear
of domination by the remaining great bulk of the sub-continent#
All combine to give the Pakistani government a character
fanatic, nationalistic, and sensitive to any apparent chal
lenge of its rights.
The creators of the Indian Union, on the other hand,
are determined that it will be a secular state.

They have

lost the battle of communalism and partition in India as a
whole but are dedicated to the proposition that the territory
remaining to them will not be marked as an exclusively Hindi
polity#

Already possessing a large Moslem minority popula-
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Zl61tlon» India is able to view the acquisition of more Moslems
in Kashmir, particularly if the people voluntarily reject
communalism and indicate preference for a secular though
Hindu-majority state, as furthering this program.

In addi

tion, India's leaders are almost without exception rarified
intellectuals, usuilly educated in law, immersed in the tech
nicalities of abstract theory, and idealistic.

The result is

a government which, in a case such as Kashmir, may be depended
upon to stress the letter of international law, which is sus
picious, of the motives of a government that has destroyed the
dream of alunified secular sub-continent, and which will take
umbrage at the slightest impugning of its own motives.
II
From this situation issues the Kashmir dispute, a
disturbance initiated by tribal invasion but which soon in
volved both dominions.

Although neither government desired

open conflict, public excitement, nurtured on bitterness re
sulting from partition and recent communal bloodshed, was
capable of producing a situation in which, reason overwhelmed
by emotion, India and Pakistan would plunge Into war.
Initial Indian and Pakistani attitudes were dogmatic.
India viewed the tribal incursion and alleged aid furnished by
Pakistan as violations of international law which would have
to be punished, whatever the other aspects of the situation.
Accession v/as legal and India's actions were legitimate and
understandable.

Nehru defended the Indian record one week

following accession:
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-162I want to say at once that every step that we
have taken in regard to Kashmir has been taken
after the fullest thought and consideration of
the consequences and I am convinced that what
we have done was the right thing. Not to have
taken those steps would have been a betrayal of
a trust and cowardly submission to the law of
the sword with its accompaniment of arson, rape
and slaughter.2
But Pakistan saw in India's acceptance of Kashmir's
accession a violation of the meaning of partition and an at
tack upon the security of Moslems and of Pakistan.

Denying

all charges of complicity in the invasion, Pakistan refused
to recognize either accession or the legality of Indian mili
tary operations in Kashmir,
Equally important in influencing the later course of
the dispute is the character of the Security Council itself.
Two years following its establishment, it was already clear
that the Council was not alunified body able to cope efficierfcly with major international disturbances:
The Council's particular job is to listen to
any nation, whether a member or not, which thinks
it is being imposed upon enought by another nation
to threaten the peace. The Council has the further
job of deciding what action to take in such argu
ments.^
The Council is capable of fulfilling its first func
tion as a forum for debate.

But on the second, internal

division prevents resolute action.

The Council is uncertain

as to the exact line between suggestion of action and imposi
tion of its will, which it is unable to back with force.
^Nehru, p. 55.
Ssigrid Arne, à UniiM lÜ-tApjjia Primer (New York;
Ehinehart and Company, 1943), p. 216.
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-163is clear that the Council cannot function as an international
board of adjudication, returning decisions based solely on
law and fact:
The Security Council has in no case any authority
to settle a dispute with binding force. Hence
it can never exercise any activities having the
character of. . . arbitration, but at most make
non-binding recommendations, i.e. mediate.*
The Council must attempt to bring the parties together on a
compromise program which will ensure cooperation in effecting
a settlement*

Without voluntary participation of the states

involved, a proposal would be valueless.
An approach such as this inevitably led to frequent
abandonment of legal light.

Rather than treating the Indian

complaint as a legal charge, the Council indicated its inten
tion to consider the practical aspects of the situation and t)
seek a compromise solution.
through two methods;

This could be accomplished

"The Security Council may either recom

mend procedures or methods of adjustment or recommend directly
the terms, . . . the basis of a settlement,"^

Both procedures

were followed, the first in authorization of conversations beI

tween the parties with the Council president as rapporteur and
in the later suggestion of arbitration of demilitarization dif
ferences; the second in adoption of a cease-fire, demilitariza
tion, and a plebiscite as the principles upon Miich a settle
ment should be based.
^Aif Ross, gfiMiliuiaa
ih& Ub U s û Maiisaa: Apaiyaia
of structure and Function (New York: Rhinehart, 1950), p. 156.
^Alexandre Parodi, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,"
International Conciliation. CDXI.V (November, 1948), p. 622.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

164 -

The task of the United Nations Commission for India
and Pakistan was to develop details for implementations of the
agreed-upon principles.

Commission activities resulted in a

cease-fire and acceptance of general demilitarization plans.
But differing interpretations of certain details of the formula
blocked further progress by the commission and led to its dis
solution and replacement by a single United Nations representa
tive,

Two successive representatives have maneuvered India and

Pakistan closer to a settlement.

Although no agreement has

been signed, long months of quiet have so cooled initial pas
sions that a iig. facto truce exists.

And only three technical

differences obstruct agreement on plebiscite prerequisites on
the basis of Graham’s twelve-point program.

In the process

of negotiations, India and Pakistan gradually have abandoned
their initial dogmatic positions; they are inclined to accept
conditions which would have been repugnant in the first months
of the dispute.

With increasingly serious consideration of a

settlement proposal based upon both partition and a plebiscite,
the Council may yet find a formula which will satisfy both
parties to the dispute.

It would appear that Francis Lacoste,

the Council representative of France, was overly pessimistic
in his opinion expressed to the Council on March 30, 1951;
Year by year the eloquence and skill of the rep
resentatives of India and Pakistan seem to raise
new aspects of the subject. However, a calm
study of their speeches and of the practical re
sults they have each year achieved, leads to the
dual conclusion that, in the realm of ideas, the
Council has had no occasion to change its posi
tion, . . and that, so far as the facts are con
cerned, there has unfortunately been no real
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progress towards a settlement of the dispute,&
Although the final form and date of a solution remain
uncertain, a number of possible settlements may be examined.
Least likely, nearly five years after violation of a mountain
border threatened conflict in Asia, is war.

As The New York

lime^ remarked editorially:
The Security Council has been at this problem
for more than four years, during which time
there has been only one positive achievement—
the establishment of a cease-fire line, , ,
However, there has been a negative achieve
ment that far surpasses any other feature of
this case— war between India and Pakistan over
Kashmir has been avoided.'
An only slightly less remote possibility is an inde
pendent Kashmir, friendly to both dominions but controlled by
neither,

While it is undoubtedly true that many Kashmiris,

even members of Sheikh Abdullah’s government, nurture hope of
complete independence,® it is highly unlikely that either New
Delhi or Karachi would give it serious consideration.
The dispute may yet be settled according to the
original formula, an all-inclusive plebiscite.

But consider

ing the impasse on plebiscite conditions and recent favorable
attitudes toward total or partial partition, this possibility
appears to be rapidly losing its appeal.
The possibility of total stalemate cannot be over
looked,

If the Council were to adopt Sir Owen Dixon’s
Official Records. 6th Year. 539th Meeting, p. 4.
?The Now York Times. Jpril 23, 1952,
, February 3, 1952,
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-166suggestion that the initiative be returned to India and Paki
stan, such could very likely be the result, for the govern
ments displayed no ability to negotiate a solution when they
possessed the initiative before the introduction

ofthe dis

pute into the Security Council.
A simple partition of Kashmir between India and
Pakistan along the present cease-fire line, now beginning to
assume the characteristics of a political boundary, may be
regarded as a practical, if not an entirely satisfactory, solu
tion.

But controversy over possession of the Vale of Kashmir

effectively blocks agreement along this line.
Lastly, a solution may result from the proposal to
partition most of Kashmir according tothe obvious wishes of
the inhabitants with plebiscites to beconducted in doubtful
areas.

Although Zafrullah Khan Informed the commission in

1948 that "under no circumstances" would Pakistan consider any

9

form of partition

and Nehru rejected arbitrary division on

religious or any other principle in 1947,10 in June, 1952
plebiscite and partition appeared to be the most likely answer
to the problem.

Within recent months, both parties have ex

pressed willingness to consider partition— provided they were
awaided the Vale of Kashmir— and India has assented to a combi
nation of plebiscite and partition, although advancing demands
Official

3rd Year, Supp. for Nov., 1948,

p. 93.
lOVera M. Dean, "Impact of the 1947 Partition Darkens
India's Outlook," fflxgigo Policy Bulletin. XXX (November 17,
1950), p. 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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But

If New Delhi and Karachi are able to agree upon which areas
are to be favored by a plebiscite, not an impossibility, a
solution according to this formula may be achieved.
Ill
There is more significance, for India, Pakistan, and
the Security Council, in the Kashmir question than is usually
the case in a territorial dispute.

India and Pakistan clearly

have shown increased stature in their approaches to the prob
lem during five years of negotiations.

Although both parties

continue to pay verbal homage to their original positions, in
practice they have adopted a more realistic attitude than was
apparent in the early days of wildly inflammatory accusations.
They appear to have realized that compromise on position or
principle does not necessarily involve abandonment.
The. j^Iey; York Times is much too harsh in noting:
So far as the attitudes of India and Pakistan are
concerned, impartial outsiders have been given
no reason to change the opinion that has been
held ever since the United Nations started its
efforts at mediation. India must be condemned.
Pakistan has at all times showed a willingness
to accept United Nations proposals and India has
with equal consistency either rejected them or
made unreasonable conditions,Ü
The Times overlooks India's acceptance of the joint plebiscite
and partition formula, rejected by Pakistan.

And Pakistan

has been in a better position to assent to other proposals,
for each tacitly or openly recognized the legitimacy of PakiJpril 28, 1952.
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stani participation in Kashmir's affairs.

In most instances,

Pakistan has everything to gain by acceptance.
For India, Council, commission, and representative
suggestions involved nullification of a portion of the legal
framework upon which the Indian case rests.
certain to be slow and painful.

This process is

That India eventually did

accede to most major proposals is an indication of how great
a change time has produced in the Indiana approach to the dis
pute.
With cynicism toward international cooperation in
control of the public mind after six years of half-peace, half
war in world affairs, it Is popular to depreciate the Council
on all counts, in all cases.

Such an attitude is not just to

the Council record on Kashmir.

Four years of patient listen

ing and proposals have carried India and Pakistan close to
agreement.

Even supposing progress were the result of time

and exhaustion, the Council has contributed nevertheless in
continuing negotiations and in forestalling war in the ini
tial stages of the controversy.

The Council, or its agents,

brought agreement from India and Pakistan on a plebiscite as
the solution to the dispute, on a cease-fire, and on general
demilitarization provisions.
Study of the internal workings of the Security Council
during consideration of the Kashmir question discloses several
interesting points.

The members acted with almost total im-r

partiality toward India and Pakistan,

Although in the early

stages of discussion Argentina and Syria appeared more
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receptive to Pakistani arguments and at one point the Chinese
delegate spoke out in defense of India, there has been no
forthright championing of one party or the other, and touches
of favoritism but imperceptibly have affected Council action,
as revealed in resolutions.

The majority has been resolutely

neutral throughout; deviations clearly have been the result
of personal opinion rather than alignments of opposing forces
within the Council,
Even the East-West split, which has insinuated itself
into almost every situation to fall under Council scrutiny,
has been a negligible factor in consideration of the Kashmir
dispute,12
tion,

At no point has the veto power come into opera

Soviet abstention from resolution votes indicates lack

of interest rather than opposition to majority policies.

Al

though United Kingdom and United States diplomatic activity
outside the Security Council drew fire from both the Soviet
Union and Pakistan and indications of it appeared in several
resolutions, efforts appear to have been in furtherance of
Council policy rather than attempts to circumvent the inter
national agency.
Coupled with this evidence that the Council is capable
of functioning as an impartial mediator, a settlement, not
too long delayed, may yet contribute toward recouping some
of the Council’s prestige, diminished by slight success in
12Although the USSR publicly announced support of
India in late 1951, the move has had no apparent influence
upon Council attitudes and actions during consideration of
the dispute in 1952.
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A satisfactory solution could demonstrate

that the Council, although as now constituted incapable of
fulfilling the high hopes once held for it, can function
effectively as a conciliatory agency in the 'type of dispute
for which it was intended, a situation not complicated by
the unprovided for great-power rivalry.

Graham noted this

possibility in his third reporti
The intellectual, political, and spiritual
leaders of India and Pakistan have the most
strategic opportunity through the settlement
of a complex and stubborn dispute to give to
the United Nations and to the peoples of the
world a desperately needed example of interna-.,
tional cooperation for freedom, , , and peace.
Activities and achievements in the Kashmir question
add no new facet to the known character of the Council.

De

spite over-enthusiastic expectations in certain quarters, the
Security Council does not pretend to be the resolver of all
international difficulties, the bearer of the millenium in
international affairs.

Without clear authority of its own

and sufficient force to buttress that power, it is unable to
function as an international arbiter.

The Council was con

ceived as more of a mediating agency to which international
difficulties may be carried for discussion and settlement.
But even this interpretation of the Council's role
rests on the hope that the great powers can cooperate, avoid
ing alignment in rival factions.

Any organization acceptable

to the nations whose membership is essential can never preOfficial Records. 5th Year, 564th Meeting,
pp. 23—25.
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•171vail in the face of determined opposition of any great power
or reconcile a serious dispute among great powers.

It is

obvious that the Council, following the failure of this hope,
cannot function effectively while split into contending fac
tions.

But, as T, F, Tsiang noted, it can yet perform a

service;
What, then, can the United Nations contribute
towards the maintenance of peace? It has no
force of its ov/n. It has no financial resources
of its own. Some of the important problems of
the world are not within the scope of its activ
ities. . . In the face of all these limitations
and difficulties there is one sphere where we can
be useful and strong. That is the sphere of world
public opinion. It is by mobilization of the
moral forces of the world that the United Nations
today can make a real contribution. I am firmly
convinced that if we should be courageous enough
to deploy all the moral forces of the world, we
could yet maintain the peace of the world.14
Although Tsiang’8 view is perhaps overly idealistic,
the Security Council does provide a forum by means of which
states may release tensions which threaten hostilities.
Kashmir question is an example.

The

"Dr, Graham obviously feels

that if he and .the disputants. . . keep on talking, nothing
drastic will happen, and perhaps time. . , will bring. . . a
solution.*15
The Security Council, as the United Nations organ
primarily responsible for world peace and security, may yet
contribute to some degree of international stability.

Graham

is of this opinion;
Official
15%h& b m

5th Year, 471st Meeting, p. 14.
/ipril 23, 1952.
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-172The United Nations, with all its growing pains
and frustrations, is the only international
body for the settlement of the most difficult
international disputes. The failure of peace
ful settlement of such deep disputes has in
volved the w/orld in tragedies too terrible to
risk again. The United Nations, with all its
defects, is nevertheless, with its multilateral
procedures for the peaceful settlement of com
plex disputes, still the best hope of the
peoples for peace.16

Official Esfiajds, 6th Year, 564th Meeting,
pp. 23-25.
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government toward states which have acceded to
the Indian Union,
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It was of considerable value in supplementing
references to this subject in the Council debates.
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publications were inclined to favor Pakistani
arguments in the Kashmir question.
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